Eliminating the impossible: The metaphysics of consciousness

Reading | Metaphysics

Peter Guy Jones, BA | 2026-09-25

The task for the sciences, the purpose of their method, is to reduce the number of viable explanations for their subject matter. Philosophy is usually thought to be incapable of doing this, and it is difficult to think otherwise if we are aware of the situation in consciousness studies. Here theories of consciousness multiply unrestrained and almost every conceivable possibility has advocates. It is as if philosophy has no method for making decisions. My proposal in this article is that, while the philosophical method is effective and sufficient for its task, it is seldom rigorously employed and, in consciousness studies, often not employed at all.

For his comprehensive taxonomy of theories of consciousness Robert Kuhn [1] identifies more than three hundred distinguishable proposals. In an interview he suggests that, as a historical record of the ingenuity of human thought, this profusion of explanations for just one explanandum ought to be wondered at and celebrated. This may be so. If, however, we see it as a survey of the current state of human thought, as it seems to be, it indicates a profound methodological confusion. A philosophical method that allows a vast array of distinguishable and often wildly different explanations of consciousness to co-exist is clearly unfit for purpose.

Where there are many competing theories in physics, this is not a methodological problem. It usually signifies just a need for more data. In metaphysics the data never changes and metaphysicians, as a community, have all the data they will ever have. Where there are two competing fundamental theories or competing views on a metaphysical issue, then, this is either a failure of the method or a failure to apply the method correctly. We must hope it is the latter, for otherwise philosophy is doomed.

The principal tools of philosophy are logic and reason, and it would be a bold move to suggest these are unfit for purpose. Before doing so we must ask whether Kuhn’s landscape of theories indicates an inadequate method or, what is surely more likely, the poor application of an adequate method. The comprehensiveness and detail of his landscape provide us with a perfect opportunity to address this question. Does logical analysis enable us to reduce the number of candidate theories of consciousness to one?

Let us, by employing the abductive method employed by Sherlock Holmes and necessary for metaphysics, test the power of logic and reason to eliminate the impossible in order to reveal the possible and, in this way, reduce the list of suspects to a manageable number.

 

Eliminating the Impossible

In order to cull the list we could examine each theory or category in turn and attempt to reduce it to absurdity, or, failing this, to reveal its inadequacy. Kuhn’s careful categorization of candidate theories makes this method practical, since most of the work can be done at the category level.

One cause of this profusion of theories is not difficult to identify: most are not empirically testable. This is not a disqualifying feature for a theory of consciousness but, rather, since consciousness is empirically invisible, a necessary one. However, it creates a catastrophic problem when empiricism is taken to be, as it often is, the only method of testing. Then there is no method of elimination and no suspect can ever be crossed off the list. Without a disciplined system of refutation and elimination there is only unbridled speculation and no hope of ever sorting the wheat from the chaff. This is our fate if we ignore metaphysics as a science of logic. Most of the theories on Kuhn’s list require that we take no notice of logical analysis, for they do not survive a disciplined process of refutation. They are empirically untestable, however, and this is enough for their survival in a landscape where logical absurdity is not an evolutionary disadvantage.

Yet it stands to reason that a theory of consciousness has no possibility of avoiding metaphysics. The theory must state clearly whether consciousness is or is-not fundamental and thus must be a metaphysical theory. If it states consciousness is not fundamental, then it must put something else in its place. The claim that consciousness is emergent from matter or mind is a claim about the fundamental nature of reality, not a way to avoid metaphysics. If a theory of consciousness is to be plausible, it must describe the fundamental nature of reality and allow us to make at least some sense of metaphysics. Metaphysical questions ask about the fundamental nature of reality and so always pertain to consciousness. A fundamental theory must, in potential at least, answer those questions.

A theory may explain particular features or mechanisms of consciousness without being fundamental. But a general theory of consciousness cannot avoid saying what consciousness ultimately is and how it relates to the rest of reality. At this point, it has entered metaphysics.

If we accept this argument, then finding the needle in this haystack of ideas about consciousness becomes not only possible, but also a fairly straightforward process of elimination. To be plausible a theory must be more than a speculation that survives empirical testing, for such theories are two-a-penny. Instead, it must be a systematic, fundamental theory that helps us to make sense of metaphysics and the world itself. Even with three hundred and fifty possibilities roaming the landscape, such a theory cannot remain hidden for long.

Kuhn breaks his list down into ten categories:

1. Materialism Theories
2. Non-reductive Physicalism
3. Quantum Theories
4. Integrated Information Theory
5. Panpsychisms
6. Monisms
7. Dualisms
8. Idealisms
9. Anomalous and Altered States Theories
10. Challenge Theories

The reason why there are so many theories on the list is easy to see. As a fundamental theory, materialism is empirically untestable and logically absurd, yet here it is at the top of the list. In terms of its current popularity this may be its rightful place, but its popularity indicates that the facts of metaphysics, the known results of logical analysis, are being widely ignored. Materialism will never be a systematic, fundamental theory because it cannot take the final reductive step required of such a theory: it cannot reduce matter to its origin and has to begin its ‘explanation of everything’ with a paradox or divine miracle of some sort, a rabbit pulled from a hat. As a consequence, it renders metaphysics and the world itself incomprehensible. It may be rightly at the top of the list, but as the largest category of theories it offers us an easy way of significantly shortening it.

If materialism is ruled out, then the next largest category may be idealism. Kuhn says this of Materialism’s main rival:

To the surprise of some, Idealism as a theory of consciousness has not been fading in light of scientific advances. If anything, Idealism’s explanatory star seems on the ascent, shining brighter, as consciousness maintains its mysteries and Idealism attracts more adherents.

In most cases idealism is not an extended metaphysical theory with explanatory powers but a philosophically unproductive position or hypothesis. Most forms of it state that mind or consciousness is fundamental in much the same dogmatic way that materialism states matter is fundamental and have no greater explanatory power. Such conjectures are easy but have no utility. They are not theories in the sense that a mathematician or physicist would use this word and may be ignored.

The same approach does away with most of the remaining theories but would entail a close study of many of them. There is another method that is easier. This is to establish the minimum basic specification for a fundamental theory, the minimum condition it must meet in order to be functional and plausible, and then wander around the landscape eliminating theories that do not meet it. This requires little involvement with the details of each theory.

This approach works because even the most basic specification for a fundamental theory is a list of daunting challenges, each of which on its own is enough to disqualify most candidates, and it is always easy to see whether a theory meets them. In order to detail these specifications, some discussion of metaphysics is required.

 

Metaphysical Issues

Kuhn says this of his list:

 My high-bar attempt here is to generate a landscape that is universally exhaustive, in that whatever the ultimate explanation of consciousness, it is somewhere, somehow, embedded in this Landscape of theories (perhaps in multiple places)—even if we have no way, now or in the foreseeable future, to discern it from its cohort Landscapees.

Kuhn’s pessimism regarding our ability to discern the correct theory in his landscape is telling. It is the assumption that metaphysical analysis, the application of logic and reason, is not a reliable method. Whether it is a reliable method will depend on how we use it, but reliable or not it is the only method available to us. Unless we wish to become a mystic and follow the ‘inward arrow’ of inquiry into consciousness and reality, then metaphysical analysis is all we have for a method. We have to work out which is the correct theory. The evidence of our senses is not sufficient, so we have to use our reason. Only if we ignore the results of metaphysics will we be doomed to wander aimlessly around the landscape forever. Let us instead take logic and reason seriously.

By the ‘results’ of metaphysics I refer to a small number of demonstrable general conclusions that pertain directly to the consciousness debate. There are two in particular that, on their own, are able to do most of the work.

The first is that all metaphysical positions, theories, ideas, doctrines and dogmas that in some respect state that reality is this as opposed to that are logically indefensible. These are ‘positive’ metaphysical positions that assert reality is one thing rather than another: matter rather than mind, multiplicity rather than unity, determinism rather than free will, and so on. Such theories are positive, extreme, selective and one-sided. They do not make sense. They do not work. They give rise to contradictions. As a consequence, as Kant famously notes, all selective (positive) conclusions about the world-as-a-whole are logically undecidable. This result is the root cause of all metaphysical problems, a stumbling block that persuades many philosophers to give up on the subject and claim it is intractable, incomprehensible or meaningless. If we ignore this result of analysis, as do most of the theories in Kuhn’s landscape, then we cannot call our approach rational.

If we take metaphysics seriously and respect logic and reason, however, then we can make short work of the list. A plausible theory of consciousness must be fundamental (even if it states that consciousness is emergent), and it must not make positive one-sided assertions about the true nature of reality. Most theories quite obviously fail this test.

The failure in logic of all positive theories and positions is not a problem, as is often thought, but an immensely valuable result. It allows us to eliminate the impossible and reveal the possible. The only suspect it does not allow us to cross off the list is the nondual doctrine of the Perennial philosophy. Kuhn places this under the ‘Idealisms’ category but it also permeates into others. We cannot cross this off the list because of a second philosophical fact, which is that a nondual theory is logically defensible. It is in keeping with Aristotle’s rules for the dialectic and gives rise to no contradictions, so it is technically ‘reasonable’; it can never be crossed off the list.

The defensibility in logic of the nondual ‘explanation of everything’ is a far less widely known fact than the first, and many philosophers assume it is not the case. The nondual doctrine rejects all extreme metaphysical positions, in full accordance with the results of metaphysics, but most philosophers believe it is necessary to view pairs of extreme metaphysical positions as examples of A/not-A for logic, such that there can be no third option—and so they feel they must reject the nondual doctrine for being ‘illogical’ or unreasonable. In this way, they trap themselves in dualism and an incomprehensible metaphysics. By assuming that pairs of extreme and opposed metaphysical positions are examples of A/not-A for logic, they turn what should be their moment of triumph—the falsification of all extreme metaphysical positions—into a disaster. Having eliminated the impossible, they cannot see another possibility. They do not see what they have actually proved, which is that only one suspect is plausible, and assume they have eliminated all possible theories.

Whether this second fact—the logical coherence of a nondual theory—truly is a fact, the space available here does not allow me to demonstrate. But the essential point is simple: logic cannot prove that the seemingly contradictory pairs out of which we construct metaphysical questions—such as ‘free vs will-determinism’ or ‘something vs nothing’—are, in fact, contradictory pairs in the form A/not-A, such that they exhaust the possibilities. This is something we must establish prior to employing the dialectical method to decide between them, and in metaphysics this cannot be established. This means that logic cannot refute the nondual solution for metaphysics and consciousness, and it must be deemed reasonable.

These two facts together allow us to eliminate almost all of the theories on Kuhn’s list. That it acknowledges these facts is a crucial and difficult-to-meet condition for a fundamental theory or theory of consciousness. There are many others.

If the argument presented here is sound, then the existence of hundreds of competing theories is not evidence of an inadequate method but evidence of a methodological error. Once we understand the minimum conditions for a fundamental theory, most of these candidate theories may be eliminated with no need to examine their details.

 

Specifications for a Fundamental Theory

It is a well-known fact that theories that describe the world-as-a-whole as belonging to a category or as comprised of categories, such that it is this as opposed to that in some sense, give rise to intractable problems. They generate all the well-known undecidable questions and problems of metaphysics.

The first condition for a fundamental theory must be, therefore, that it does not endorse a positive, one-sided metaphysical position. The second is that the theory must give rise to no contradictions or absurdities.

While there are further demanding conditions a fundamental theory must meet, these two on their own enable us to identify the only plausible theory of consciousness. Only one theory meets them both, and this is the nondual doctrine of the Perennial philosophy. It states that all positive metaphysical positions are wrong, thus explaining their logical incoherence. Kuhn places this under ‘Idealisms’ and it may sometimes be called ‘nondual idealism.’

 

In Conclusion

The two facts on which this analysis has been based are not equally well-known in philosophy. The first—the failure of all positive metaphysical positions—has been established explicitly by Nagarjuna, Kant and others, and implicitly by all philosophers who have been unable to decide any metaphysical question. The second fact, however—namely, the logical soundness of the nondual answer for such questions—is rarely known, although not difficult to establish. I present a comprehensive discussion of this issue elsewhere [2].

Having identified the guilty suspect by a process of reductio ad absurdum, Holmes would now have to turn to other methods. Analysis leaves us with just one theory to consider, but we have yet to examine its explanatory reach, economy, comprehensibility, elegance and logical form. Here these further issues are unimportant. The task of culling the list is complete and just one theory remains to be further examined.

Such a conclusion should not be surprising. The ‘hands-on’ study of consciousness undertaken by way of self-inquiry has, for thousands of years, led investigators to the unity of all and the nondual or advaita (not-two) ‘explanation of everything.’ If logical analysis were enough to refute their conclusions, it would be surprising that nobody had noticed this during all this time. When we suppose it is incorrect, it becomes impossible to explain why it is irrefutable; impossible to explain metaphysics or mysticism; impossible to explain reality and consciousness within a fundamental theory; and impossible to explain the incomprehension of metaphysics that is such a prominent feature of Western philosophical thought. If we assume the nondual doctrine is correct, then all these things may easily be explained.

This is where we arrive if we take metaphysics seriously. If we do not, then we will have to live with more than three hundred competing theories of consciousness—forever.

 

References

1. A Landscape of Consciousness: Toward a Taxonomy of Explanations and Implications, Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology (Volume 190, August 2024).
2. Peter G Jones, In Pursuit of the Inconceivable: An Investigation of Metaphysics and Mysticism, Essentia Books, (2026).