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Reason is not sacred: Finding a way when there is no magnetic north

Reading | Existentialism

Orlando Moreira, PhD | 2026-10-16

Buenos Aires - Distrito Autônomo - Argentina - OCT 20 2023: View of "The Thinker"  Statue by Auguste Rodin

Prof. Moreira argues that reason cannot generate intrinsic value; it merely operates on existing human needs and emotional commitments. While reason can expose contradictions, refine desires, and structure society, it cannot logically compel anyone to care about existence, honesty, or reciprocity. True human value begins with felt needs—most fundamentally, the recognition of the “Other” and their inner life. Ultimately, reason and need must work together to build a pluralistic society where individuals can coexist without needing universal agreement on what makes life meaningful.

Philosophy has often placed reason above the rest of human existence. We desire, fear, suffer, love, and depend on one another, while reason stands apart—impartial and sovereign, judging life from some cleaner altitude.

This picture is attractive. Feelings can mislead us, desires conflict, and societies teach us to mistake prejudice for truth. Reason lets us question all of this. Yet it cannot, by itself, establish why anything should matter.

It can tell us what is true, what is possible, and what follows from our actions. It can reveal contradictions between our commitments. But it cannot extract the value of living, loving, or avoiding suffering from a position in which nothing is already of value. An argument can tell me how to preserve my life; it cannot make me want to preserve it if I have no reason to care.

Before we reason, we must need.

A hungry person does not deduce the value of nourishment; a child does not argue for companionship before crying for someone. These needs are not conclusions, but conditions that make arguments matter.

I do not say this as a detached observation. In Meaning Is Not in Yourself, I described a period when illness deprived me of much that had given my life its color. I continued to think, work, and create, but these activities offered no answer to why I should endure. What eventually reached me was not a new argument for existence. It was the suffering of other people, offered in response to my own, and the recognition that we still mattered to one another.

This proves nothing about what everyone ought to value. It simply shows where my philosophy begins: with a need I did not arrive at through deduction.


The feeling beneath the argument

Reason’s limits become clear when confronting the apparent absurdity of existence. Without a purpose assigned to us by the universe, without a guarantee that suffering will be redeemed or death overcome, why must we choose life over its rejection? I can find no purely logical necessity that settles the question. Nor is nihilism a consequence of reason. Remove need, desire, fear, affection, and joy from the premises, and reason does not discover that life is worthless; it discovers no source from which worth can arise.

Nietzsche’s affirmation of life, Camus’s revolt against the absurd, and Sartre’s insistence on freedom and responsibility are all responses to this reality. They are also far more sensitive to lived experience than many rationalist systems. It would be unfair to accuse these philosophers of hiding emotion. Yet I think their prescriptions depend upon commitments that their reasoning cannot make obligatory for someone who does not share them.

Why should I affirm rather than renounce? Revolt rather than resign myself? Prize authenticity rather than comfort? These responses can be explained, defended, and made compelling. But their force ultimately draws upon something that already matters to the person being addressed. Even a demand for lucidity expresses an attachment to truth over consolation—a preference many people do not share. The question is not whether these philosophers have emotions beneath their arguments, but why any single emotional response to existence should be binding upon every rational being.

For me, Camus’s Sisyphus remains an extraordinary but insufficient image. The rock cannot answer him, recognize his persistence, or care when he falls. Defiance directed at an indifferent universe does not meet my deepest need. I would rather turn toward someone who might answer back.


What reason can and cannot justify

The stronger claim I want to make is not merely that reason fails to motivate a person who feels nothing. It is that reason cannot establish value without a premise that already carries value.

Consider someone who knowingly exploits the cooperation of others. He agrees that a society in which everyone did likewise would be worse for everyone. But he does not intend to universalize his conduct; he intends to benefit from others’ restraint. Should he, from the standpoint of his own ends, regard this as irrational?

Kant’s answer is not simply that cooperation is advantageous. He argues that rational agents must act according to principles they can will as universal laws, and must treat rational humanity as an end in itself. He does not imagine that people always tell the truth; rather, he holds that reason obliges them to be honest. His example of a false promise is revealing: if everyone made promises they intended to break whenever it suited them, the practice of promising would lose its meaning.

Curiously, this also explains why deception works. The liar exploits the expectation that other people will keep their word. A few liars can exploit widespread honesty without destroying the institution of promising. The deceiver can reason carefully about how best to exploit this, benefiting precisely because others do not lie. Kant would answer that the deceiver’s maxim cannot be willed as a universal law. But this is where we disagree: why must the capacity to reason entail a commitment to will only what can be universalized? Why should recognizing the conditions that make deceit possible compel the deceiver to renounce it? Rational calculation is not the same as a commitment to honesty, fairness, or reciprocity.

Nor does an appeal to an “ideally rational agent” settle this for me. Kant knows that human beings are not perfectly rational; he takes reason to obligate us despite that imperfection. But why should the requirements attributed to an ideal rational will bind beings whose reasoning is inseparable from need, fear, and desire? To say that we ought to submit to that ideal still requires an account of why the ideal itself must command us. And that, ultimately, is an emotional choice.

Reason can expose an inconsistency between values I profess and actions I perform. If I care about mutual recognition while denying recognition to someone inconvenient, I have something to answer for. But a person who does not care about reciprocity cannot be made to care simply by being shown its logical structure. Reason may reveal obligations implicit in an existing commitment; it cannot confer ultimate importance upon a commitment out of thin air.

Nor does this make reason a helpless servant of impulse. Quite the contrary.


The restless life of need

Schopenhauer recognized that the intellect does not sit at the foundation of desire. Beneath it he placed the Will—a ceaseless striving from which satisfaction offers only temporary relief. His deepest response was to seek release from willing altogether. My account is less metaphysical and less resigned. We possess many particular needs: companionship, security, recognition, intimacy, autonomy, relief from pain. Their satisfaction can be deeply real even when temporary. To be held by someone we love does not become meaningless simply because tomorrow we may need to be held again.

These needs are also often opaque to us. Someone convinced they need a specific person’s love may discover a broader longing for intimacy. Someone pursuing prestige may actually be frightened of insignificance. Someone craving a drug may, through reflection, see that satisfying that craving would destroy deeper needs.

Reason can uncover these connections, investigate their causes, anticipate consequences, and help us find substitutes or healthier forms of sublimation. It can show that a desire is impossible to satisfy, that its cost would be intolerable, or that its pursuit conflicts with other needs. I may then accept frustration, adjust my expectations, and eventually feel differently.

But none of this makes the original feeling unreal or illegitimate as an experience. A mistaken belief can be corrected, a proposed remedy can be rejected, and an action can be restrained. Yet the pain of wanting remains a fact, even when the object of desire is unattainable or its pursuit destructive. Reason must not pretend that showing me why I should not act on a feeling proves I ought never to have felt it.

There is, however, a complication more interesting than the familiar opposition between reason and desire: reason can participate in the creation of new needs.

Through narrative, imagination, and explanation, we acquire new objects of hope and fear. The idea of a benevolent God, for example, might answer needs for security, meaning, continuity, and justice. That possibility can then become indispensable. A person may come to need God’s existence, salvation, or forgiveness. A narrative of damnation may even generate terrors that would have been impossible without the concept itself.

Reason does not conjure emotional force out of nothing. Yet, together with imagination, language, and social life, it builds the conceptual world in which that force acquires new objects. These needs then reshape the very reasoning that helped make them possible. Religion is not unique in this; ideologies, identities, romantic ideals, and definitions of success can all create things that people come genuinely to need.

We therefore cannot draw a simple line between a reasoning mind and a fixed inventory of desires. Need gives reason its urgency; reason interprets, transforms, and sometimes helps generate new needs. What it still cannot do is derive the importance of anything from absolute indifference.


Hope in the Other

My deepest need is for the Other: the possibility of another center of experience beyond my own—someone who feels, suffers, hopes, and responds, whom I might genuinely reach. The horror of solipsism is not simply that the world might be illusory; it is that every apparent relationship might be a monologue.

I have come to recognize this as my most fundamental need because, in examining my other desires, I find that I can ultimately sublimate them into this one.

I cannot prove with absolute certainty that another consciousness inhabits the person facing me, nor can I simply discount solipsism as statistically unlikely. The arguments for the existence of other minds begin with what my senses present, yet I know my senses can mislead me; trusting them is already part of what is in question. This is not a claim that the possibilities have equal odds, but that I find no Archimedean point from which to rank solipsism beneath its alternatives. Nor can I conclusively establish what, if anything, is experienced by a dog that seeks my affection. Yet the possibility that someone is there moves me. The dog’s apparent joy, fear, and expectation are not evidence that I can turn into certainty at will; they are reasons to attend, to wonder, and to respond with care.

My position resembles religious faith, especially Kierkegaard’s account of commitment in the presence of objective uncertainty. But I do not make a leap of faith. I do not convert what I hope for into what I claim to know or believe. Nor do I cherish the fragility of hope for its own sake—I would welcome a guarantee if one existed. I simply accept that none is available. The fact that I need the Other cannot establish the Other’s existence, any more than the need for God can establish God’s.

Yet refusing a guarantee does not require refusing to live. I can reach toward the Other while acknowledging that my reach is not proof. Hope does not abolish uncertainty; it allows me to act without pretending that uncertainty has been resolved.

And the emotional movement does not stop at the relief of my own solitude. The possibility of another inner life matters to me in itself. If someone is there, then things can matter to them as they matter to me. Their pain is not merely an event in my surroundings; it is suffering experienced from within. This is what I have elsewhere called co-sentiment: not an inference that all minds are alike, but the felt recognition that another has an interior life of their own.

A relationship cannot satisfy my need if the Other is not free—an answer I have manufactured or controlled is no answer from another. More fundamentally, I need the Other to exist and to be free even when no relationship between us is possible. Co-sentiment extends that concern to those I will never meet.

The Other moves me, though I acknowledge that I can fear or despise someone without reducing them to an object. My problem is how to live among people for whom such concern is weak, selective, or absent.


When caring is not enough

Need does not justify whatever satisfies it. Loneliness can make fanaticism attractive; the longing for recognition can produce cruelty toward outsiders; fear of abandonment can sustain a destructive relationship. A feeling may be real while the story it tells about the world is mistaken and the action it demands is disastrous.

Here, reason becomes indispensable. It asks whether an imagined satisfaction will actually satisfy, which other needs it may destroy, and what it will cost. It can help us distinguish the reality of suffering from the truth of the explanation attached to it. It can expose how a community that offers belonging might demand that its members deny the humanity of those outside it.

But reason cannot guarantee compassion. A person may understand another’s suffering perfectly and remain indifferent. Furthermore, care can easily be overcome by fear, ambition, humiliation, or tribal loyalty. I cannot build a society on the assumption that everyone will feel sufficiently moved by everyone else.

Nor do I need to prove that exploitation is irrational in order to oppose it. The exploiter may pursue his interests entirely coherently. I oppose him because those he harms matter to me. The law can protect them even when it cannot persuade him to care. Law enforces commitments not everyone shares; it does not manufacture ethics by decree.


A minimum viable society

The political question is therefore not how to make everyone share my hierarchy of needs, but how to build a minimum viable society for people whose needs permit coexistence.

Such a society necessarily imposes restrictions. Enough people want certain conditions of collective life to enforce them; others may support them for security, prosperity, freedom, or predictability. Some reject them entirely. The restrictions remain.

My ideal society would impose itself upon someone who wants to murder. I cannot expect reason to make his victims’ lives matter to him, or to persuade him before preventing him from killing. Those he threatens matter to me and to others. We will restrain him whether he accepts our reasons or not. There is no natural harmony of needs here, no final argument that makes coercion unnecessary. There is a conflict, and we are choosing a side.

But acknowledging coercion does not grant it unlimited authority. I want to impose as little as possible while preserving the conditions of coexistence compatible with the needs and ideals I seek to protect. This restraint has an ethical source: the Other’s needs and ideals are not extensions of my own, and I want to leave room for lives different from mine. It also has a practical advantage: the fewer unnecessary demands a society makes, the more people with different values will be willing to defend it. I do not require everyone to value what I value, only that we find ways of living together where our needs do not destroy one another’s possibilities. Even the murderer remains an Other: preventing him from killing does not give me a reason to humiliate him, torture him, or disregard his suffering.

Nor does minimal imposition mean a minimal state. Leaving people exposed to violence, destitution, or domination by the powerful is not a less coercive arrangement. Security, opportunities for association, autonomy, and mechanisms for settling conflict require substantial institutions and collective obligations. The task is to avoid demanding more merely because we have the power to do so.

Reason is indispensable to that task. It can examine consequences, make conflicting needs intelligible, discover compromises, and expose impositions that serve no defensible purpose within our commitments. But it cannot guarantee consensus or objectively determine what the minimum requires. These remain matters for ongoing argument, negotiation, and sometimes struggle.

The compact must also constrain those who impose it. No institution becomes sacred simply because it was established for purposes I support. Law can protect or it can dominate. Even our most necessary restrictions remain open to challenge.

The comforts of stable societies easily obscure how much their existence depends upon continuing commitment. Water comes from a tap, fires summon firefighters, agreements are usually enforceable. These are not natural facts; they are the precarious achievements of people willing to cooperate, contribute, and restrain one another. It is a fantasy of self-sufficiency to imagine that a society can sustain itself without people who care enough to defend it.


Reason within life

I began by saying that before we reason, we must need. That remains true, but it is not the whole story. We are not born with a fixed, immutable list of desires. We are vulnerable creatures who reason, imagine, and tell stories—and, in doing so, transform the very things we come to need.

Reason is more than a tool for satisfying appetites: it can reshape needs, expose conflicts, and help design institutions that restrain domination without pretending to abolish coercion.

What it cannot do is stand outside living experience and decree what deserves to matter. Nor can feeling make something true merely because we need it to be so.

For me, everything begins with hope in the Other. I cannot turn that hope into certainty, and I do not ask anyone to adopt it through logic alone. But it moves me toward other lives. Out of that movement comes the attempt to construct a society in which people can coexist without agreeing about what gives existence its ultimate value.

Reason is not sacred. Neither is need. Reason cannot manufacture the ultimate worth of what we care about; need cannot establish truth or justify every act performed in its name. We have no vantage point outside life from which to settle these questions once and for all. We have only our capacity to feel, to think, and to make room for others who feel and think differently—and to defend that room when persuasion is not enough.

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