Unlearning experience: How we are taught to un-see a mystery
Reading | Psychology
Brian Fang, BSc | 2025-12-05
This short and powerful essay argues that the widespread dismissal of the Hard Problem of Consciousness is an unintended consequence of science education itself. Our pedagogy first encourages us to project the language of intention onto mindless processes, cheapening the concept; then, it swiftly debunks that intention as a mere metaphor. After years of this training, we reflexively apply the same logic to ourselves, trivializing the one form of interiority that is undeniably real, argues Brian Fang.
There is a fundamental gap in our scientific understanding of the world: the fact of subjective experience. Why must various permuting states of matter and energy produce an inner aspect—not self-representation or information processing, but what it feels like to be anything at all? This is what David Chalmers (1995) famously called the “Hard Problem” of consciousness. It’s not a question about what the brain does, but why it feels like something to be a brain in the first place.
This essay argues that the widespread dismissal of the Hard Problem is an unintended consequence of science education itself. Our pedagogy, while effective at explaining the material world, inadvertently cultivates a cognitive reflex that makes genuine interiority first seem granted, and then ultimately, illusory. It does this through a consistent, two-step mental maneuver: first, it encourages us to project the language of intention onto mindless processes, cheapening the concept; second, it swiftly debunks that intention as a mere metaphor. After years of this training, we reflexively apply the same logic to ourselves, trivializing the one form of interiority that is undeniably real.
This pedagogical method isn’t just a lazy shortcut; it may be a cognitive necessity. The human mind evolved to understand the world through agency and purpose, and grappling with the mindless, statistical processes of cell biology requires a conceptual bridge. As researchers like Zohar and Ginossar (1998) have noted, “teleological and anthropomorphic explanations” provide that bridge. We are told that the immune system recognizes invaders or that electrons want to find a lower energy state. Philosophically, this is a practical application of what Daniel Dennett (1987) termed “the intentional stance.”
Curiously, this first step trains the mind to accept that intentional states come for free with physical processes. It fosters a sort of latent, everyday panpsychism, where we are unsurprised to find agency lurking in every corner of the material world. We get used to the idea of an “intelligent” algorithm or a “selfish” gene. Intentionality becomes a default property of complex systems.
But this story is immediately followed by a powerful correction. We learn that, of course, the immune system doesn’t “recognize” anything; its function is a matter of protein shape-matching. Electrons don’t “want” anything; their behavior is governed by thermodynamic gradients. This dance—animating nature with intentional language and then mechanistically explaining it away—drills a powerful meta-lesson into our minds: where you see purpose, look for the mechanism that reveals it to be a fiction. The psychological power of this lesson is profound, conditioning us to find reductionist explanations deeply satisfying, as demonstrated by the “seductive allure of neuroscience” that Weisberg et al. (2008) observed.
After years of this, the conditioning shapes how we interpret new scientific findings. Consider the constant stream of popular media reports on fMRI studies that claim to have “found the brain region for” love, jealousy, or belief. The vibrant colors of the brain scan become a visual stand-in for the experience itself, reinforcing the implicit conclusion that the feeling is nothing more than that localized neural activity. This modern, data-driven narrative serves the same function as older, blunter declarations: it mistakes a correlation for an identity, subtly confirming that interiority is just a behavior of physical parts.
Now, a sophisticated physicalist, perhaps channeling Dennett himself, might argue that this conditioning isn’t a bug but a feature. They would contend that this pedagogy correctly trains us to see that all intentionality—from an electron to a human—is a useful predictive stance, not a fundamental property of the universe. Our own consciousness, in this view, is simply the most complex system to which we apply that stance.
The problem with this elegant view is that it requires us to treat our own immediate experience—the only thing we are truly certain of—as the final and most complex “useful fiction.” It asks us to accept that the felt pain of a wound is merely a stance we take toward our own neurochemistry. While this might be a coherent philosophical position, it fails to explain why this particular grand, self-directed illusion should exist at all. It re-labels experience rather than explaining it.
The roadblock, then, is not a lack of clever thought experiments, but a deeply ingrained cognitive paradigm. The issue isn’t logical; it’s psychological. Overcoming it may require a paradigm shift akin to the one physics underwent in the early 20th century. To understand the quantum world, physicists had to abandon their intuitive, classical models of objects with definite positions and trajectories. They had to learn to accept the bizarre, non-intuitive nature of reality—like superposition and entanglement—as fundamental, not as problems to be explained away. A similar shift may be necessary for consciousness. It would require moving from a paradigm that seeks to reduce experience to familiar mechanisms, to one that accepts the existence of an inner, subjective aspect as a fundamental feature of the world, from which a new, and perhaps very different, kind of science could proceed.
This is not an argument against science education or reductive analysis. It is an argument for awareness of the cognitive side-effects of our training. As cognitive scientist Robert McCauley (2011) has noted, scientific thinking is an unnatural skill. But in training our minds to see through the illusion of purpose in nature, we may have inadvertently trained them to see through the reality of purpose in ourselves. The Hard Problem persists not because we lack data, but perhaps because our intellectual tools—and the way we’ve been taught to use them—have shaped our hands so that we can no longer feel the shape of the question.
References
Chalmers, D. J. (1995). Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2( 3), 200-219.
Dennett, D. C. (1987). The Intentional Stance. MIT Press.
McCauley, R. N. (2011). Why Religion Is Natural and Science Is Not. Oxford University Press.
Weisberg, D. S., Keil, F. C., Goodstein, J., Rawson, E., & Gray, J. R. (2008). The seductive allure of neuroscience explanations. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 20( 3), 470-477.
Zohar, A., & Ginossar, S. (1998). Lifting the taboo on teleological and anthropomorphic explanations in science education. Science Education, 82( 6), 679-697.
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