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The Fall into the phenomenal: How idealism can help the Creation story converge with deep scientific truth

The Fall into the phenomenal: How idealism can help the Creation story converge with deep scientific truth

Reading | Theology

Black snake with an apple fruit in a branch of a tree. Forbidden fruit concept.

Taking a clue from Christian theologian and philosopher Origen of Alexandria, Androu Arsanious argues that the biblical Fall is the story of humanity’s mistaking of the Kantian phenomena (the world as represented in perception) for the Kantian noumena (the world as it is in itself); that is, the story of our mistaking appearances for reality. Understanding this allows us to complete the Augustinian project of reconciling the stories of religion, which describe what is beyond the world in terms of the world, with the stories of science, which describe the world in terms of what is beyond the world, such as mathematical abstractions. This is a fascinating essay.

The Church bells tolled, and I felt it in my bones.

I grew up in a religious household. We’d attend church twice or thrice weekly: sports, youth group, and Sunday school. Every Easter liturgy, they’d ring the Church bells at 10:30 pm to mark the Resurrection of Christ. Incense filled the Nave as deacons sang at the top of their voices, and then we’d process around the packed church three times, holding crosses and icons. It was a surreal experience for 10-year-old me. We didn’t just accept the stories propositionally, we performed them. That’s because religious stories describe what is beyond the world in terms of the world. Good stories aren’t just heard or read. They’re felt.

Scientists tell stories too. They call them theories. Like any good story, a valid theory doesn’t just describe the past but helps us understand the present and prepare for the future. The most foundational theories in science use mathematics, a language that wasn’t invented as much as it was discovered. After all, math will remain true well beyond the heat death of the universe. As such, scientific theories are religious stories turned inside out because they describe the world in terms that are beyond the world.

No one tried harmonizing theory and story more than St. Augustine. Born in the 4th century, the Berber Bishop was a prodigal son of the Church. Raised by a Christian mother, he rejected religion as fictional absurdities in his youth and chose to walk “the streets of Babylon, in whose filth I was rolled, as if in cinnamon and precious ointments.” After moving to Italy for a teaching post, he discovered the teachings of St. Ambrose of Milan, whose biblical exegesis gave him a new purchase on his mother’s faith. St. Augustine recounts the moment he converted “under a certain fig tree, giving free course to my tears, and the streams of my eyes gushed out.” He felt a story and was reborn a saint.

A towering figure in Western thinking, St. Augustine emphasized the oneness of Truth as revealed in the Book of Scripture and the Book of Nature. He urges the faithful to “let the Bible be a book for you so that you may hear it. Let the sphere of the world be also a book for you. So that you may see it”. For St. Augustine, perception and interpretation had to be guided by rationality and revelation. In the Venn Diagram of religious stories and scientific theories, the most profound truths lay in the area that encircled both.

In the 1600 years since his death, the Book of Nature has seen a few updates. Today, it is full of theories spanning biology and physics that would be foreign to the North African Saint. Is the Augustinian project redeemable, or has the plot in the Book of Nature hopelessly strayed from that of the Book of Scripture?

 

The Paradox of Perception

If there were an opening chapter in the Book of Nature, it would be on Evolution. The Darwinian theory has much to say about human perceptions. Different life forms evolved diverse ways of sensing and responding to their respective environments. Bats use sound to see. Bees see UV light to sniff out their flowers. Nematodes don’t “see” but “sniff” out sugar using chemical receptors on the surface of their body. Life is the process of figuring out how to live, perceive, and respond to the environment through the senses.

Life forms use short stories—cheat codes—to survive. Male jewel beetles track their female mates using the cheat code ‘smooth, glossy surfaces = female’ to find mates. Yet, when humans started throwing out their shiny, glossy beer bottles, the male beetles started getting funky with the empty beer bottles. It nearly drove the species to extinction.

Natural selection hadn’t ‘cared’ whether the smooth, glossy surfaces were females. The cheat code had been sufficiently reliable to help the males pass their genes onto the next generation. None of the beetles needed to understand the game; they just needed to learn how to cheat.

What about our perceptual senses?

We can answer this question with mathematical precision. In evolution, game theory predicts how a population changes over time if competing for limited resources and—importantly for our purposes—how its sensory systems would have to evolve to compete effectively. A population is more likely to outcompete another population if its sensory systems are superior. But there’s a trade-off. A population can’t have the perfect cheat codes while also being attuned to the objective world. In the words of Donald Hoffman, “In evolution, where the race is often to the swift, a quick and dirty category can easily trump one more complex and veridical.”

Perceptions do not provide a window into the objective world if natural selection is valid. Instead, they’ve evolved to interfaces that maximize our fitness. Critically, the Interface Theory of Perception posits that this interface diverges from Reality.

Think of the relationship between a computer screen and its motherboard. Screens are helpful insofar as they help us manipulate electrons to ‘increase our fitness.’ Fitness in this context could mean completing a bank transaction or writing an essay. The pixels on our screen tell us nearly nothing about the nature of the motherboard. They’re not designed to help us ‘understand’ semiconductors.

Theoretically, you could open the back of your computer to tinker around with the switches in the semiconductors to write an essay or send a bank transfer, ignoring the ‘illusion’ of icons on a screen. But this red pill is a hard one to swallow. Even though screens tell you nearly nothing about how the computer works, they’re virtually essential to any task.

Likewise, our screen of perception maximizes our ability to get things done, yet conveys precisely nothing about the nature of the world. That isn’t to say we shouldn’t take what we see seriously. Walk in front of a bus, and you might not walk again. Drag that Word Document icon into your screen’s trash bin, and you will lose all your hard work. Bernardo Kastrup goes at length to stress how our perceptions don’t tell us what the world is, only how it behaves. Scientific theory quantifies these behaviors.

The ‘Fitness Beats Truth’ theory illustrates a wider conflict between real truth and desired outcomes that isn’t exclusive to evolutionary biology. Social media is a distortion field that warps online personas to maximize the shareability or likeability of their content, regardless of its underlying truth or authenticity. How often have people lied to move ahead in their careers or fibbed about their physical height to up their profile on a dating app? Consider the psychological aspects of playing sports, where pure skill and athleticism may not be enough to win a match. Or the art of the bluff in poker. Behaviors that maximize fitness are more valuable yet less veridical. Systems often disincentivize ‘truthful’ behavior.

If natural selection is true, then objects in space-time don’t have stand-alone existence in the way we think they do. Instead, our senses build an interface, a story that allows us to organize our lives. This odd conclusion is one physicists have likewise converged on.

On the quantum level, energy and matter are pixelated or ‘quantized’ as discrete bits. These quantized chunks behave in ways that defy all commonsense notions of spacetime. They influence each other’s behavior instantaneously, seemingly defying both Einstein’s Theory of Relativity and our commonsense intuitions of the world. Quantum objects exist in a superposition of states, and only take on defined characteristics once measured. Such irreconcilable differences have forced many physicists to explore alternative models for understanding the cosmos.

In other words, at a fundamental level in physics and biology, our best scientific theories conclude that Reality is not what we experience it to be. Yet, because we logically cannot experience the un-experienceable, we cannot experience Reality as it truly is.

Philosophers were onto this idea centuries ago. Writing 2,500 years ago, Plato analogized the human relationship with Reality to prisoners chained in a cave, mistaking the silhouettes and shadows on its walls for Reality. To the Greek philosopher, the physical world is an illusion we can only break out of through contemplation. Immanuel Kant distinguished between the noumenal, things in themselves, and the phenomenal, things as they appear. The German philosopher proposed that, while the phenomenal world operates via cause and effect, the Noumenal world is the arena for human agency, will, and spirit. This dualistic framework for understanding our relationship with the cosmos is central to religious stories, as we will soon see.

Screens glitch and this Interface is no different. It is in these glitchy moments that we can appreciate this metaphor.

 

The Apocryphal Sciences

For the better part of 150 years, scientists have documented psi phenomena. Everything we think we know is confounded by psi, which include precognition, paranormal experiences, near-death experiences, and miracles. Psi phenomena are important “because they provide examples of human behavioral capacities that seem extremely difficult or impossible to account for in terms of presently recognized computational, biological, or physical principles.” There is an overwhelming amount of empirical evidence documented across thousands of cases.

Take the curious case of “The Twins,” described by famous neuroscientist Oliver Sacks in the 1970s. The two brothers couldn’t perform basic arithmetic calculations and had been institutionalized for the better part of 20 years, being “variously diagnosed as autistic, psychotic, or severely retarded.” However, during one consult, Sacks found them riffing prime numbers to each other, sometimes over 20 digits long. This would’ve been an impossible feat for the most powerful computer at the time, let alone for anyone without arithmetic skills.

There are documented reports of people who can be hypnotized into thinking their skin is burning, only to have their skin spontaneously blister shortly afterward. Then there are apparitions and documented cases suggesting premonitions of death. Near-death experiences have turned skeptics into advocates for alternatives to conventional materialism. Faith healing cases defy conventional explanations. Inert substances with no clinical effects can ‘elicit’ a state of mind that instills positive clinical effects.

The glitches happen constantly, yet the scientific theories we tell ourselves simply cannot explain this data away. But religion might…

 

The Fall into Evolution

With each page turn in the Book of Nature, the world has gotten stranger. Evolution and physics conclude that the world as we experience it is not the world as it truly is, and psi breakout experiences appear to vindicate this claim.

It is here where religious stories pick up the mantle. Recall that religious stories describe what is beyond the world in terms of the world. We’ll enlist the help of the third-century Church Father Origen of Alexandria to guide our brief tour. A pioneer of Biblical exegesis, it is on Origen’s shoulders that Augustine stood when he proclaimed the oneness of Truth. Origen comes as close to recognizing the duality of the created order—in terms of the noumenal and the phenomenal—as the most viable interpretation of the Judeo-Christian Creation account in Genesis.

Origen notes this in his commentary on Genesis 1:6, when God creates the firmament or sky. That God first creates the light and darkness on Day 1, then the sky on Day 2, suggested to Origen the need for an alternative, allegorical interpretation. He writes, “The first heaven … which we said is spiritual, is our mind, which is also itself spirit … sees and perceives God. But that corporeal heaven called the firmament is our outer man, which looks at things in a corporeal way.” For Origen, God created a spiritual and ‘corporeal,’ or physical, world.

At the end of the first chapter, God crowns his creation, with humans famously formed in His image and likeness. But not the material image, writes Origen: “For the form of the body does not contain the image of God, nor is the corporeal man said to be ‘made,’ but ‘formed.’”

In Genesis 2, God creates man in his Image by molding a “wet clod” of soil and blasting his breath into it. Humans have a unique relationship with their Creator, according to Origen, who observes that “it is our inner man, invisible, incorporeal, incorruptible, and immortal, which is made according to the image of God … But if anyone supposes that this man … is made of flesh, he will appear to represent God himself as made of flesh and in human form. It is most clearly impious to think this about God.”

Why does Origen think God needed to create a corporeal and spiritual world?

God places him in Paradise, the Garden of Eden. The root word for garden is “ganan” in Hebrew, which means “to defend, cover, or surround.” In every other use, it describes the defense of a city, as if in battle. God then creates a helper, often better translated as a ‘rescuer’: a woman from the Man’s rib who lives in shameless nudity with the Man.

Among the shrubbery of the Garden are the Tree of Knowledge and the Tree of Life. God explicitly tells the couple not to eat the former’s fruit lest they “surely die.” Here, we see a hint of the trade-off between having the ‘cheat codes’ to knowledge, courtesy of the first tree, and participating in everlasting life, courtesy of the second tree.

A Serpent resides in Eden. It asks the Woman what God had commanded for the Tree of Knowledge, and she responds by saying God told them not to eat or touch its fruit. By adding to God’s words, Eve opens the door for the Serpent to twist God’s words further. He replies that, to the contrary, her eyes would be opened and that she and her husband would become gods.

Serpents play an evolutionary role in our history, for only creatures with acute vision and quick reflexes could avoid the tree-dwelling reptiles. Sure enough, the serpent’s words opened her mind, and she “took of its fruit and ate.”

But in their attempt to raise their consciousness, the fated couple is brought lower than the dirt. The “original sin” is one that all humanity partakes in, and for Origen, the events precipitate a fall of humanity into the safety net of the corporeal order. Adam and Eve’s eyes opened to the material realities that would forever consume their descendants. God had anticipated this fall and engineered the corporeal world to accommodate their eventual self-destruction. This, for Origen, is why God created the corporeal world.

The fall sparks a sense of self-awareness that sheds light on the couple’s corporeal vulnerability. The Tree of Knowledge opens their eyes up to the possibility of death. Overcome with fear, Adam and his wife cover themselves in fig leaves and fearfully cower as though hunted like wild beasts, for instinct has taken over.

In Kantian terms, the ordeal of Eden is the human fall out of the noumenal and into the phenomenal place. Adam and Eve lose the blissful truths of paradise and must now face the nasty, brutish existence awaiting them in the corporeal world. Fitness is of primary concern now. True to the Serpents’ words, their eyes ‘see’ and fall into the corporeal world, yet are also blinded to the noumenal, ‘spiritual’ place they once inhabited. Eden was cloistered and gated because the noumenal world could not be accessed from the phenomenal world. And once you fall into the phenomenal world, you cannot return to the noumenal place.

The story of the fall is, therefore, a tale of exile into Plato’s Cave. Origen writes that “this sinking results in us taking on bodies” and warns that “all rational creatures who are incorporeal and invisible, if they become negligent, gradually sink to a lower level and take to themselves bodies suitable to the regions into which they descend.”

As a result, the embodied souls of Adam and Eve become ensouled bodies. Material corporeal concerns take center stage for man, woman, and beast. Fitness is the new name of the game, and God reluctantly pronounces its accursed rules.

The Serpent will slither on its belly and, as a symbol for all animal life, enmity erupts between it and humankind, telling it that humans “shall bruise your head, and you shall bruise its heel.” The interface between humans and beasts is created.

For Eve, her toil will be in labor and the accursed state of yearning after her husband. The helper has become helpless because the corporeal world is now too dangerous for her to fend for herself. Indeed, Adam’s first act after their exile from Eden is to name his wife Eve, a ‘power move’ symbolizing the rule of man over woman. The interface between man and woman—patriarchy—is born.

Adam fairs no better, for the soil he once tilled is now cursed and must be tilled in toil. The Earth will wage war on him, using every thorn and thistle. The thing he was created from will now entomb him: “From dust you came, and to dust, ye shall return.” The interface between humanity and the cosmos boots up.

God’s parting gift is to knit tunics out of “mortal skin” for the couple. Origen observed that “heir being clothed with tunics of skins, contain a certain secret and mystical doctrine far transcending that of Plato of the souls losing its wings, and being borne downwards to the earth until it can lay hold of some stable resting-place.” The interface is sealed with mortality, and the world as we experience it is now here for good.

The Bible blossoms when stripped of materialistic presuppositions, and the Augustinian project of reconciling the Book of Nature with the Book of Scripture takes on new life. But we must abandon the idea that Reality is ontologically a physical place. As new chapters in the Book of Nature are written, we should footnote religious texts to catalog the ultimate Oneness of Truth. Only then can we synthesize and harmonize truth between science and religion.

 

Bibliography

  1. St. Augustine, Confessions Book II, Chapter 3 (8). Available at: https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/110102.htm#:~:text=Behold%20with%20what%20companions%20I,me%2C%20I%20being%20easily%20seduced. Accessed 15 Jan. 2024.
  2. St. Augustine, Confessions Book VIII, Chapter 12. Available at: https://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf101.vi.VIII.XII.html Accessed 15 Jan. 2024.
  3. Male Jewel Beetles. Available at: https://www.npr.org/sections/krulwich/2013/06/19/193493225/the-love-that-dared-not-speak-its-name-of-a-beetle-for-a-beer-bottle Accessed 15 Jan. 2024.
  4. Hoffman D, The Interface Theory of Perception: Natural Selection Drives Truth Perception to Swift Extinction. Available at: https://sites.socsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/interface.pdf Accessed 15 Jan. 2024.
  5. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental-idealism/#Bib Accessed 15 Jan. 2024.
  6. Sacks, O. The Man who Mistook his Wife for a Hat. Accessed 15 Jan. 2024.
  7. Hallson, P. (2016). ‘Ghosts and Apparitions in Psi Research (Overview)’. Psi Encyclopedia. London: The Society for Psychical Research. <https://psi-encyclopedia.spr.ac.uk/articles/ghosts-and-apparitions-psi-research-overview>. Retrieved 15 January 2024.
  8. All quotes from the Bible are from NKJV, available at https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Genesis+1&version=NKJV  Accessed 15 Jan. 2024.
  9. Origen Homilies on Genesis 1.2.
  10. Paulsen, David L. “Early Christian Belief in a Corporeal Deity: Origen and Augustine as Reluctant Witnesses.” The Harvard Theological Review, vol. 83, no. 2, 1990, pp. 105–16. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1509938. Accessed 15 Jan. 2024.
  11. Blue Letter Bible, Strong’s Reference: https://www.blueletterbible.org/lexicon/h1598/kjv/wlc/0-1/
  12. McGrew, W.C. Snakes as hazards: modelling risk by chasing chimpanzees. Primates 56, 107–111 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10329-015-0456-4
  13. Contra Celsus Chapter 40. Available at: https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/04164.htm

Metabolism is what the ‘unconscious’ mind looks like

Metabolism is what the ‘unconscious’ mind looks like

Reading | Philosophy

Dr. Ludwig Sachs | 2024-02-04

a illustration of a soul leaving the body

Dr. Sachs discusses the dynamics of our deepest, seemingly ‘unconscious’ mental processes, and shows remarkable correspondences between them and metabolic processes such as protein synthesis and folding. He suggests, along firm idealist lines, that our body’s metabolism is simply a metaphor, the extrinsic appearance of our inner, ‘unconscious’ mental processes. In other words, metabolism may be what the deepest layers of our own mind look like, when displayed on the screen of perception. This is an involved essay and not the easiest of reads, but it is well worth the effort.

From the idealist point of view—which entails a psychic or spiritual foundation of being—a fascinating puzzle arises: how do the myriad aspects of our world, from human consciousness and matter to time, space, and life, originate from this foundation?

In a previous article1, I already discussed the three orders of structural psychoanalysis (the Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real), a development of Freud’s conception of the psychic apparatus by the French psychiatrist Jacques Lacan2. I further discussed how the dissociation or splitting of the subject leads to a lack of being, as well as how the subject repeatedly tries in vain to find itself. In the language of systems theory, these repeated attempts to ‘return to oneself’ are self-referential processes. I already pointed out the phenomena of complex systems that arise through self-referentiality in connection with the language-like structures of the Symbolic, as well as its iterative referential structure: fractal geometries characterized by self-similar patterns that we can find everywhere in nature.

The concept of self-similarity could potentially be a key to understanding deeper connections in our reality. When we apply this principle to mental and physical processes, an exciting question arises: is there a self-similar relationship between the unconscious processes that govern our mental life and the genetic mechanisms that regulate our bodily functions? This consideration leads us to a deeper examination of structural psychoanalysis and biological processes.

Before we proceed, it is extremely important to emphasize that the ‘subject’ discussed here is not understood as a human individual in the everyday sense. As I outlined in the previous article, our everyday consciousness is predominantly under an Imaginary perspective, entailing that the world presents itself to us from the dissociated perspective of an imaginary ‘I.’ However, we overlook the linkage with the Symbolic and Real orders as a split subject.

Therefore, when I speak of the subject in the present essay, it is in the sense of an archetypal Anthropos, Schelling’s ‘World Spirit,’ which unfolds in time and space and manifests itself in the diversity of all living things—not only as a human. The considerations refer to the topological structures of this subject in the Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary orders.

 

The chain of signifiers

In the context of structural psychoanalysis, the concept of the ‘chain of signifiers’ is central to understanding the Symbolic and the language-like structures of the unconscious. This chain is best visualized by considering everyday signifiers that we regularly and consciously deal with: sounds, words, sentences. These elements of language are connected in a temporal sequence, known as diachronic chaining.

The meaning of a statement—the signified—emerges from the linking of these signifiers in their specific order. A change in this order can considerably alter the meaning, as illustrated by the statement ‘Idealism is better than Materialism,’ when compared to ‘Materialism is better than Idealism.’

However, the chain of signifiers is not limited to a horizontal, diachronic (temporal) chaining. At each point in this chain, one can imagine a vertical, synchronic chain or ‘plane’ that adds further levels of meaning. This vertical linking of signifiers is understood in structural psychoanalysis as metaphor, as opposed to horizontal metonymy. Here, it is emphasized that meanings always refer to other meanings and never directly to ‘the thing itself.’ The combination of signifiers creates a kind of barrier that prevents direct access to the signified, or the meaning. An analogy for this is the experience of looking up the meaning of a word in a dictionary: one is often led from one term to the next, never reaching a final clarification.

Therefore, the generation of meaning in a chain of signifiers is a dynamic process in which the signified changes with every added element—the signified ‘slides under the signifiers,’ so to speak. In structural psychoanalysis, the meaning (the signified) of a sentence is determined not solely by the individual signifiers (words), but significantly by their overall sequence. An important phenomenon in this context is the retroactive determination of the signified of a chain of signifiers, highlighting how the meaning of a sentence is fixed by the end of the chain.

Consider this example: the sentence ‘I love you’ conveys a very different meaning than ‘I do not love you.’ This illustrates how each added signifier changes the overall meaning of a sentence. Also, ‘I do not love you’ suggests a different context than ‘I do not love you anymore.’ And this, in turn, changes once again if ‘as much as her’ is added, to form ‘I do not love you as much as her anymore.’ In this case, the words ‘as her’ retroactively influence and fix the meaning of the entire sentence.

 

The quilting point

This dynamic of meaning formation can be topologically represented by the concept of the ‘point de capiton,’ or quilting point, a concept derived from Ferdinand de Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics. Saussure’s model assumes that the signifier and signified correspond point by point and together form a ‘sign,’ an assumption critiqued by structural psychoanalysis. It emphasizes that the signified of a sentence is its overall meaning, which does not simply result from the addition of the meanings of individual words but is retroactively fixed by the end of the chain. The quilting point in this context represents the function of specific signifiers (so-called ‘master signifiers’), which intervene in the chaotic signified, fixing and simultaneously altering it.

 

The signified: The desire modified by the signifier

In the context of structural psychoanalysis, the signified is viewed as a form of human want that is influenced and transformed by the signifier. This transformation of need by the signifier is referred to as ‘desire.’ However, desire is not to be understood solely in biological or physiological terms: it is structured by the signifier and thus acquires a special dynamic.

The desires are not only transformed by the signifier, but their transformation is also associated with a loss—structurally speaking, a lack. The entirety of the effects of the signified produced by the signifier is this lack. Thus, the imprinting of the signifier into the subject leads to the emergence of the signified, which can also be understood as a lack and is associated with the dissociation/splitting of the subject, as I discussed in my previous article.

Therefore, the signified in its entirety is not only the result of the effect of the signifier, but also an expression of the lack and the dissociation/splitting of the subject that arises from this effect.

 

The graph of desire

In structural psychoanalysis, the ‘graph of desire’3 (see below) is used to illustrate the concept of the quilting point and the relationships between signifiers and signifieds. This graphical representation includes two main lines forming an arc, each representing different aspects of language. The line running from S (linguistic sign) to S’ (linguistic meaning) symbolizes the chain of signifiers—i.e., the sequence of words and sentences we use in everyday life on a conscious, Imaginary level. This is called the ‘signifying chain.’ The other line, from Δ (the pre-linguistic subject) to $ (the barred subject) and forming a horseshoe shape, represents the chain of signifieds—i.e., what is generated in terms of meaning and sense by the signifiers. This second line is called the ‘vector of desire.’

In different words, the vector of desire represents subjective intentions arising from needs, the deliberate pursuit of the fulfillment of these needs. The signifying chain, in turn, represents sentences such as ‘Give me something to eat!’ Need and speech are linked by the two intersection points, symbolizing the interaction between signifiers and signifieds.

The first intersection point on the right is labeled ‘A’ for the French ‘Autre’ (‘Other’). It stands for the language code and vocabulary used by the subject. The capitalization indicates that it pertains to the Symbolic order. The interaction at this point shows how the vocabulary imprints itself in the subject and alters its intentions, influencing its need structures. Desire is thus heavily dependent on the relationship to the Other. ‘Desire is the desire of the Other’ is the formula of structural psychoanalysis for this entanglement. It primarily refers not to being desired by the Other, but desiring as the Other. What we think of as our own desires often consist of the wishes and messages of parents, grandparents, great-grandparents, etc., most of which are unconscious.

Therefore, to be satisfied, the need must pass through the grid of language. It must be expressed in claims or symbolically articulated demands. To be understood, these claims must be expressed in a predetermined code.

The left intersection point is labeled ‘M’ for ‘message’: communication, message, news. Like the chains of signifiers on the conscious level, those of the unconscious also have a message, a meaning, a signified. The aim of psychoanalytic practice is to bring to light the messages of the unconscious: the meaning of dreams, symptoms, parapraxes, etc.

The graph represents how need is captured by language and how this, in turn, is connected to the formation of the ‘I.’ This ‘I’ ideal is not only made up of signifiers, but is also a modification of the drive structure, since it acts back on the need. The symbol $—a crossed-out S—stands for the subject shaped by language and therefore excluded from the unconscious, the seat of desire.

This is to remind us that needs have always already passed through these stations and been shaped by language; that the assumption of a whole, unsplit subject as the bearer of a pre-linguistic need is thus a mythical construction based on the desire for imaginary wholeness. As discussed in the previous article, the split is constitutive for the subject. It is what makes the subject possible.

 

The master signifier

The I(-ideal) must be seen in connection with what structural psychoanalysis refers to as the ‘master signifier’: a signifier that seems to have an absolute meaning, but in an illusory way. For instance, the ‘I’—with which the speaker refers to themselves—is a master signifier. It forms the basis of the myth of the ideal I. In this myth, the I appears as an entity that is identical to itself. Self-identity—the absoluteness of meaning—is thus illusory because signifiers only function differentially. The master signifier, therefore, relies on an illusory blocking of the differential nature of the signifier. And since meaning is based on the difference of signifiers, the master signifier is without meaning.

Master signifiers are about identification; more precisely, a certain form of identification: the one whose result is called the I-ideal. When one seeks to clarify the meaning of a signifier, one is referred from signifier to signifier, and thus the meaning shifts anew. So how can it be that spoken words are still understandable? This is the function of the aforementioned master signifiers. They have no meaning themselves and are limited to the function of bringing the movement of referring from meaning to meaning to a halt. In this way, they sort of sew the signifiers with the signifieds. Signifiers that realize this stop function are the master signifiers or quilting points (as above) of structural psychoanalysis: they prevent the signified from constantly slipping under the signifier.

If one focuses on the functioning of sentences, the meaning—which shifts with every added word—is stabilized by the end of the sentence; the signifier in quilting-point function is, in a sense, the period.

 

The phantasm

Another important aspect in this context is the concept of the phantasm, already described in the previous article. The phantasm allows the subject to locate itself in the context of its desires. In the phantasm, the split subject ($) relates to an object in which it projects what it has lost by entering the world of language. The subject, attempting to grasp itself in its desire, can initially only grasp itself in what it desires. And here, again, the I or I-ideal at the end of the vector of desire plays a central role, as it causes the split subject to locate itself as an object and to fix itself in an illusory manner.

 

Self-similarity in biology and psychoanalysis: Discoveries at the intersection of protein biosynthesis and the unconscious

Protein biosynthesis—a central biological process in which proteins are synthesized from amino acids according to the template of genetic information in DNA and RNA—is surprisingly analogous the concepts of the unconscious in structural psychoanalysis.

At the heart of protein biosynthesis is messenger RNA (mRNA), which acts as a messenger transporting genetic information from the DNA code in the cell nucleus to the ribosomes, the sites of protein production. There, the sequence of the mRNA is translated into a specific amino acid chain that folds into a functional protein. This process involves several steps: transcription, translation, and folding. The mRNA plays a key role by translating the ‘language’ of DNA into a form that can be ‘read’ by the ribosomes and translated into proteins via tRNA.

The attentive reader will have already noticed the similarity here. The processes of the unconscious are conveyed to us (as a dissociated ‘part’ of the split subject) in a parable-like manner in the form of protein biosynthesis. Put in different words, the processes of the unconscious appear to us as protein biosynthesis from a dissociated (imaginary spatiotemporal) perspective.

The words and sentences in the signifying chain (S to S’ in the graph of desire above) can be easily identified with the molecular chain in messenger RNA, the element that transmits the genetic message. Thus, from a topological perspective, mRNA may correspond to a chain of signifiers in the unconscious. If this is the case, one would expect that the synthesized protein emerges from the vector of desire; that the signified corresponds to the protein.

The embodiment of the subject—the biological organism—is shaped by proteins. From the perspective of structural psychoanalysis, the subject is split, dissociated, or excluded, which is represented by $ in the graph of desire. The crossing out of the S symbolizes that the subject is marked by the signifiers. This marking results in the subject being excluded from a part of itself, a part that constitutes it and is referred to as the unconscious.

Such a split is also reflected in our body, which is ‘marked’—among other things—by the language of DNA: processes within our body that are not directly accessible to us. As such, we are also physically ‘split’ between the part to which we have access (our Imaginary body surface) and the inner part from which we are both psychologically and physically excluded because we are ‘barred outside.’

 

The ribosomal quilting point

As discussed, in the graph of desire two intersection points arise between the signifying chain and the vector of desire, which we labeled as ‘A’ for Other and ‘M’ for Message. This means that the satisfaction of need is subjected to a code in language (A) and tied to the formation of a message (M). Let’s compare this with the processes at the ribosome.

At the so-called A-site of the ribosome, the tRNA loaded with an amino acid binds—through its anticodon—to the corresponding codon of the mRNA. What does this so-called codon recognition represent? Or, in J. W. v. Goethe’s words, how does it present itself to the “contemplative power of judgment”? For the process of protein biosynthesis to make sense, it must submit to the rules of a code. This submission takes place at the A-site of the ribosome, which we can therefore topologically align with the intersection point A of the graph of desire.

At the intersection point ‘M’ of the graph of desire, the signified is formed. Where can we locate this in the ribosome? As already discussed, the signified corresponds to the synthesized protein. The site of this synthesis, where the elongating protein emerges, is the P-site. Thus, we find the two topological intersection points in a self-similar manner at the corresponding positions in the ribosome.

Another connection is equally clear: we mentioned the so-called master signifiers, which are necessary to finalize the stitching of the chain of signifiers (in this case, the mRNA) with the signified (the protein biosynthesis) in the form of a quilting point. These master signifiers have no meaning themselves. They are limited to the function of bringing the movement of referring from meaning to meaning to a halt. Now, what brings the translation—the reference movements of the ribosome from which the protein (the meaning, the signified) emerges—to a halt? The so-called stop codon! And for this stop codon—also called ‘non-sense (!) codon’—there is no corresponding tRNA, so it remains empty; it has no meaning itself, just as the master signifier itself has no meaning.

From the perspective of the quilting point, the role of the tRNAs, which represent adaptors in the sense of code biology4—i.e., those molecules that establish a relationship between two different types of molecules—also becomes clear: the adaptors (the tRNAs) execute the quilting point by sewing the signifiers with the signified. It’s probably no coincidence that the structure of this ‘quilting point tRNA’ is referred to as a hairpin structure: the needle with which the quilting point is executed.

 

The Levinthal Paradox

In connection with the quilting point, there is another remarkable analogy: the so-called Levinthal Paradox. The molecular biologist Cyrus Levinthal came upon this paradox while elucidating the process by which a chain of amino acids quickly achieves its folded state as a protein. The paradox is that the combinatorial multitude of possible foldings increases exponentially with the length of the amino acid chain and should require immense time. Yet, protein folding happens rather quickly in the body.

Can we better understand this paradox with the help of the self-similar structures of the unconscious? We have already discussed the retroactive determination of the signified of a chain of signifiers by the end of the chain: the signifier also intervenes in the signified on the diachronic level—i.e., in the temporal succession of the chain of signifiers. Here, the last element of a chain—somewhat like the period in a sentence—retroactively determines the meaning of the entire sentence. There is a feedback loop from the last element of the chain to the signified of the entire chain.

Protein biosynthesis similarly involves the creation of a signified, which is precisely brought into its overall desired form—i.e., folded configuration—by the last element of the chain of signifiers, just as the meaning of a sentence is retroactively determined by its end.

 

Hidden messages: the unconscious as the discourse of the Other in psychoanalysis and biology

In structural psychoanalysis, the unconscious is understood as the ‘discourse of the Other.’ This means that the unconscious is more than just a collection of signifiers; it is an ongoing discourse, a form of communication consisting of prohibitions, instructions, and rules. The author of these messages is not the subject itself, but the ‘Other’ in its symbolic function. This ‘Other’ represents the Symbolic order that sets limits for the subject.

The subject must persistently repeat the misunderstood part of the discourse of the Other, which is inherently fraught with lack, manifesting in symptoms and transferences. The unconscious manifests itself in this repetition, in the symptoms and transferences.

Similarly, our bodies, our cells, speak within us persistently, without our consciousness. In constant repetition, organisms emerge from their ancestors and their genetic messages, to reproduce and carry forward the messages. These consist of misunderstood codes, of rulebooks, of prohibitions and commands. And these messages act within us, whether we want them to or not. They speak incessantly and are exchanged in a network of organisms.

We do not understand this language, these messages; they are not conscious to us. And because we do not understand them, we are forced to repeat them constantly. In doing so, we produce symptoms. One of these ‘symptoms’ is our body, which also speaks without our understanding the messages.

Therefore, embodied organisms themselves can be understood as quilting points, as repeated attempts of the subject to sew itself together, to find itself as a self, and finally come to a halt. In this process, new signifieds, meanings, proteins, organisms continually emerge, seen from an Imaginary perspective as an evolutionary process in time and space, from plants to animals and up to the human ‘I.’

 

References

  1. https://www.essentiafoundation.org/the-subject-beyond-the-i-on-structural-psychoanalysis/reading/
  2. https://www.lacanonline.com/ or https://lacan-entziffern.de/ (German)
  3. https://www.lacanonline.com/2020/04/a-tour-of-the-graph-of-desire/
  4. Barbieri M. What is code biology? Biosystems. 2018 Feb;164:1-10. doi: 10.1016/j.biosystems.2017.10.005. Epub 2017 Oct 6. PMID: 28993248.

Understanding collective self-consciousness in Hegelian pragmatism (The Return of Idealism)

Understanding collective self-consciousness in Hegelian pragmatism (The Return of Idealism)

Reading | Continental Philosophy

AI(Artificial Intelligence) concept. 3D rendering.

Hegel is usually thought of as defending an obscure metaphysics that claims reality is the manifestation of a collective mind, or Geist. But, as Prof. Terry Pinkard argues, Hegel has a lot in common with the more ‘down-to-earth’ movement of pragmatism. This essay is the second instalment of our series The Return of Idealism, produced in collaboration with the IAI. It was first published by the IAI on January 23rd, 2024.

Hegelianism is often thought of as the super-theoretical German mishmash of absolutist philosophy that is great in theory but ridiculous in practice, whereas pragmatism is often thought of a kind of philosophical version of ‘who cares whether it’s true, the question is whether it works,’ which is enough for some to reject it as crass and unphilosophical. Or, to reverse the joke ascribed to Sidney Morgenbesser: The problem with pragmatism is that it is great in practice but not in theory.

Given the diametrically opposed reputations these philosophical movements have, it might come as a surprise to many people just how close the two schools of thought actually are. Sure, people might know that Hegel influenced many of the early pragmatist thinkers, but the suggestion that he himself was a pragmatist of any sort has until very recently been out of bounds. That has all changed in the last couple of decades as many non-Hegelian pragmatists have been taking a new look at Hegelian thought, and Hegelians have been enticed to start working out an updated Hegelianism via a refreshed investigation of twentieth century pragmatism. Most recently, the noted contemporary philosopher of language, Robert Brandom, has taken to describing his own analytical work as pragmatist and Hegelian, a combination that only a few decades ago would have resulted in strict social sanctions against such intellectual heresy.

But this turn of fortune shouldn’t actually surprise anybody. If anything, Hegel shares with the pragmatists an opposition to misplaced abstraction in philosophical thought. “Man” as such doesn’t exist, he would tell his students, and “laws and principles have no immediate life or validity in themselves. The activity that puts them into operation … has its source in the needs, impulses, inclinations and passions of man.”

Like the pragmatists who (much later) came after him, Hegel opposed a tempting but ultimately false view of human action. On that view, we must distinguish sharply between the meaning and truth of thoughts taken on their own, and the force we give those thoughts when we do things like use them to make assertions. For example, many philosophers would hold that the truth or falsity of the abstract thought, “The state is best comprehended in terms of a social contract,” stands independent of whomever is asserting it and whenever it’s asserted. As the great logician-philosopher, Gottlob Frege, put it, the meaning and truth of a concept should be entirely distinct from the force we give it when we put it to use to assert things. Hegel, on the other hand, thought that this suggestion falsified the intricate way in which thought and action are linked to each other. In particular, in his practical philosophy, Hegel often spoke as if he were a pragmatist avant la lettre. What we do with the words and thoughts makes an enormous difference to the very meaning of the concepts themselves. The real meaning of a concept does not emerge until it gets put to use, and that means that its materiality in use makes a difference to its meaning.

In particular, Hegel rejected a hard and fast distinction between—to use the terms given to it in contemporary discussions—justifying and motivating reasons. Motivating reasons are the ones that can causally explain your actions, such as ‘She was really angry, which explains what she did.’ Justifying reasons are, well, the ones that justify (or don’t) your actions—such as ‘Yes, being angry may prompt you to say such and such, but it never justifies it.’ Sometimes the two—justification and motivation—may coincide, but it might seem as if that is just a happy accident when it happens. However, if we are to hold onto the idea that human life involves some measure of free action, it cannot be the case that justifying reasons are completely irrelevant when explaining one’s actions. What we think is right must have some explanatory value in accounting for our actions. For both Hegel and the pragmatists, there has to be a way in which the ‘ideal’ also explains the material course of human life and can make a difference as to what we do. ‘Concepts’ are not merely abstractions that don’t motivate and hence don’t explain actions. They link up with ‘passions and interests’ in very concrete ways.

This focus on the link between concept and action has been given a renewed twist in the writings of some recent Hegelian scholars who have looked for the link between Hegel and pragmatism to be found in terms of Hegel’s own concept of ‘life.’ Building on, extending and transforming some older work on Hegel, several younger philosophers—Karen Ng (Hegel’s Concept of Life: Self-Consciousness, Freedom, Logic), Thomas Khurana (Das Leben der Freiheit: Form und Wirklichkeit der Autonomie, soon to be translated into English), Dean Moyar (Hegel’s Value: Justice as the Living Good), and Andreja Novakovic (Hegel on Second Nature in Ethical Life)—have recently made the case that Hegel picked up on the idea of life as self-maintenance to give a unified shape to the more abstract and dualistic distinction of explanation and justification. It is when life on earth becomes self-conscious life in its human form that Hegel’s own conception of Geist—mind or spirit, depending on the translator—comes into view. Geist is a specific type of unity of self-conscious lives. It is not merely the sum of various individuals. You don’t just add up individuals as if they were all just separate little individual data points and arrive at Geist. On the other hand, Geist is also not some super-entity swallowing everything else into itself and thereby obliterating the individuality of the individuals within it. Instead, it is the non-additive collection of self-conscious individuals whose individuality emerges only in terms of their being those individuals within that collective life. Or, as Hegel puts it, Geist is the unity that shapes the individuals contained within it, but it does not exist without those individuals, and the role of self-consciousness in all this makes, according to Hegel, all the difference in the world.

An analogy that might help to make this more intuitive would be that of the relation between a language and its speakers. English is a language that shows itself in the individual speech acts of its speakers, and each of us English speakers manifests the entire language as we use it in on our day to day lives. Each of us is carrying around, as it were, the entire language with us as we make our way through daily life. To use Hegel’s own rather inimitable vocabulary, if the language is a ‘universal,’ we, as its individual speakers, are ourselves also ‘the universal.’ Without the speakers, the language could not exist; without the language, we could not be its speakers. Each is bound together as an ‘I’ that is a ‘We,’ and a ‘We’ that is an ‘I’ (as Hegel defines Geist). An abstract language (‘English’) is not fully real unless it is lived and developed by its speakers. It is no accident that Hegel himself stated in a couple of different places in his 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit that language in fact was the very existence of Geist: if no language, then no Geist; if no Geist, then no language.

Hegel’s conception of Geist—neither additive nor subsumptive, not just a heap of atomized individuals nor a state swallowing and abolishing individuality—led him to develop his version of an idealist conception of world history. The very nature of self-conscious life is always to be beyond itself, to be striving to determine what it would be best to be and to make sense of what it is doing. Ultimately, that means that self-conscious life strives for a kind of self-determination, a comprehension of itself as existing only in the self-conscious apprehension of itself as an I that is a We, and a We that is an I. In other words, a conception of not just a species with individual exemplars, but a species that lives in its social practices where the practices themselves are a form that unites the people who bear that form. Hegel calls that form, variously, a form of life, a shape or Gestalt of consciousness, even a shape of a whole world (as a kind of culture or civilization). Those forms of life as ensembles of social practices, held together by various shared commitments and meanings, are articulated in the materiality of its technologies, the institutions of its political lives, and in the art, religion and philosophy. Like the languages we speak, those deep meanings and commitments show themselves in our activities, and they are all implicated in our collective self-consciousness.

The history of the world was the history of the ways that these different forms of self-conscious life developed. And they developed by gradually uncovering the ways that their own deep commitments to doing things were at odds with themselves, which in turn had led them into a more and more uninhabitable world of their own making. Their shared life, their living in the light of what ultimately mattered to them, had turned out to be ultimately contradictory. As the realization of this set in among its members, that form of life began to lose their allegiance and started breaking down. In that setting, the people living in the rubble of the breakdown had to pick up the parts that still worked, discard the parts that did not and put together a new form of life. (Hegel called that an Aufhebung—an activity of both cancelling and preserving.) The new form in turn developed itself up to its own limits and at those limits where the contradictions became more glaring and unconcealed, broke down again. The history of the world was the history of whole ways of life breaking down in this way and being succeeded by others. But this was not a cyclical process—that of kingdoms come, kingdoms go—it was a more linear and progressive affair as Geist—self-conscious life, humanity—learned from its failures and improved on its past.

This historical learning process did not always go smoothly. Progress almost never proceeded without bumps in the road, and in too many cases it did so in darkly comical and sometimes violently sinister ways. But, so Hegel argued, all in all it did mark progress. We were getting better at collectively shaping our shared lives in terms of what ultimately matters, and what we had learned by the modern period was that what had turned out to matter to us absolutely in the course of history was the idea of freedom itself. Freedom not just as an abstract ideal but as what Hegel called (again in his own inimitable way) the “Idea”, as the unity of the concept of freedom and what was required to put that concept into practice – the concrete, material shape of specific arrangements of property rights, moral commitments, family life, social and economic organization and a political life conceived around the idea of a universal equality of freedom among all people.

For both Hegel and the pragmatists, one had to determine what to do with the concepts at stake in world history. For some of the pragmatists, Hegel had turned to be a great philosopher but not much of a prophet. Thus, some of them—most notably John Dewey—tried to give Hegel’s idealist philosophy of history a more down to earth and “naturalized” feel. What history as a learning process really did with its ideas is create what Dewey called “permanent deposits”—conceptions of life and the world that once laid down and articulated proved very resistant to being cast aside. Modern science was one such problem-solving “permanent deposit.” In the practical realm, in the 19th and 20th century, one had the idea of democracy as just such a “permanent deposit.” Updating and correcting Hegel, Dewey called democracy a “way of life”—not just a matter of suffrage and voting, nor just a matter of unicameral versus bicameral legislatures. Democracy concerned itself with much the same kinds of things Hegel thought—laws, morals, family life, economic organization and political association, and as Dewey wrote in 1919 in a short piece, “Philosophy and Democracy,” democracy had to do with “a conviction about moral values, a sense for the better kind of life to be led.”

However, whereas in 1820 Hegel had thought history was pointing toward a kind of British constitutional monarchy staffed by ultra-efficient Prussian bureaucrats, for the twentieth century pragmatists, history was pointing at democracy as a way of life, even if it’s not where history sometimes seems to be going. Updated by modern pragmatism, democracy is thus a Hegelian Idea demanding its own actualization.

Or at least that’s the theory. But, as Hegelians and Pragmatists both say, what we have to do now is see if it can be put into practice.

The science of consciousness after death

The science of consciousness after death

Reading | Metaphysics

Laleh K. Quinn, PhD | 2024-01-21

Life after the death. Man walks over clouds and tiny light.

When the results of observations and experiments designed to investigate the possible continuance of consciousness after bodily death are interpreted according to standard scientific criteria, they strongly indicate the reality of the hypothesis. We fail to acknowledge it because of metaphysical biases ingrained in our culture and, in particular, academia, argues Dr. Quinn.

There has never lived an honest soul who could tolerate the thought that everything ends with death, and whose noble sentiment did not rise to a hope for the future.
Immanuel Kant

Charles Howard Hinton, a brilliant mathematician living in the late 1800’s, believed in, and eloquently mathematically described, a fourth spatial dimension alongside our 3-D reality. That is not so odd in itself. What is odd about him is that he believed that, if we focused our attention enough on this spatial dimension, if we worked diligently at attempting to visualize it, we would directly encounter the “spirit world.” William James, the father of American psychology and well-known Harvard professor, attended seances and became president of the Society for Psychical Research, dedicating a large part of his life to understanding and proving the existence of parapsychological phenomena, describing it as “established fact.” Carl Gustav Jung, the founder of analytical psychology and one of the most impactful minds of the 19th and 20th centuries, also attended seances and believed in forces beyond those that constitute our normal reality, arguing for the existence, along with space, time and causation, of a fourth acausal force, “synchronicity.”

How could this all be? How could such brilliant, rational minds believe in things that are so seemingly irrational?

I believe it’s because they all had experiences that they couldn’t explain under the standard materialist understanding of the world. For Jung it was prophetic dreams and prima facie impossible synchronistic events, along with having a cousin who worked as a professional medium and for whom he had great respect. For James it was a deep curiosity into the world of mediumship, after having tragically lost his son. Surprisingly, even for him, after meticulously testing a well-known medium, Leonora Piper, the theory that mediumship is impossible was rendered false by his direct experience with the capacities of an extraordinarily accurate one. James called this his “white crow.” To disprove the hypothesis that all crows are black one only need discover a single non-black crow. Similarly, for James, to disprove the hypothesis that mediumship is false, one need only experience one extraordinarily accurate medium. Both James and Jung came away with a worldview that was much more mysterious than the dominant materialist understanding of reality allowed for.

We could pass all of this off as crazy. And a lot of my colleagues would. There is a deep adherence to a worldview among materialist academic intellectuals that disallows the continuation of consciousness after death. This is really a shame. It dictates that we are nothing but a body that houses a brain—the producer of our sense of self and all our experiences. Our hopes, our joys, our loves, our sense of beauty, all reduced to a series of computations performed by about 80 billion neurons and their patterns of connectivity. What a dull, lifeless account of the miracle we truly are.

This view was not always held on to so vehemently. There was a period of open-minded investigation into the nature of who we are among the intellectuals and scientists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when honest, respectful debating on the continuation of consciousness after death was the norm. But, like the politics of today, academia has become extremist, respect for alternate views has become scarce.

As a skeptical academic scientist myself, I was nonetheless always intrigued by those rare, highly intelligent people who held non-materialist positions. I was raised in the materialist academic tradition that poo-pooed anything having to do with the continuation of consciousness after death. Even though this was not possible on the worldview I was indoctrinated into, I still secretly devoured the words of those brave, iconoclastic voices. When I first read The Varieties of Religious Experience, by William James, I experienced a mixture of extreme joy coupled with anger. Joy because James was suggesting that mystical experiences were valid and worthy of exploration, pointing to the reality of a world unseen. And anger because my academic colleagues were dead set against even discussing such possibilities. Buoyed by my dead intellectual forebears, I fully immersed myself into the search for evidence that consciousness continues on after death; and the evidence is overwhelming: as strong, or even stronger, than for any of the scientific claims that I, as a neuroscientist, have encountered.

Here’s how I came to that conclusion. I decided to go about it in the way that I was trained to do as an academic. The scientific method requires several steps. First you must have an understanding of the existing knowledge within the field you’re interested in. This includes having a grasp of both the already existing data and the theoretical background. Then you perform scientific experiments in order to further the knowledge within the field. This involves both observational studies and the creation and testing of hypotheses. Good science also requires an open mind to observations that do not fit into current theory. The history of science is full of overthrown theories that were held onto just because people have a tendency to be adverse to change. We need to ensure we’re not throwing out observations just because they don’t fit into the current theoretical understanding; that’s how theories are modified and evolve.

As a neuroscientist, I attempt to discover how the brain functions, how different brain regions perform different tasks, and what the underlying neural signatures of different behaviors might be. This field is wide open. It’s like being an explorer, since so little is known. We all gather data and, if our techniques are sound, we present what we find, which adds to the growing corpus of understanding. We set up our hypotheses and test them. And, most importantly, we make observations with open minds, so not to be blinded by theoretical biases. Then, others may accept our findings; not as absolute truth, but as probable truth. That’s how a lot of science works.

I attempted to do the same with the hypothesis that consciousness continues after death, and I tried to do it as rigorously as I do my neuroscience research in the lab. Scientific exploration of a subject requires an understanding of the already extant data. And it turns out that, just like studying any other field in depth, there is a vast amount of literature and data on consciousness after death, which needs to be read and sifted through; a vast literature and huge corpus of data that I had no idea existed.

The information fell into a few different categories: personal accounts of near death experiences, gathered by researchers such as those at the Near Death Experience Research Foundation (NDERF) and the International Association for Near-Death Studies (IANDS); parapsychological research performed in research institutes such as William James’ own Society for Psychical Research, the American Society for Psychical Research, and the Institute of Noetic Studies (IONS); mediumship studies performed at laboratories such as the Windbridge Research Center and the Schwartz Laboratory at the University of Arizona; and departments devoted to the scientific exploration of parapsychological phenomena such as the University of Virginia’s Department of Perceptual Studies (DOPS). I studied it all, as if I was in graduate school again. For many years. The evidence is impossible to dismiss.

Armed with such plentiful evidence, I felt excitement and hope. But, as it turned out, even though my research unearthed an overwhelming amount of evidence, there was still something blocking me from taking that leap to full belief. I realized that I was still under the materialist stronghold that has always dictated to the rest of us what can be deemed real. To most of my academic colleagues, the phenomena I was researching was not possible and, therefore, not worthy of my efforts to study it. The continuation of consciousness after death is not possible for them because of their presumption of materialism, not because they have researched the topic and found the research to be faulty. Materialists who deny the continuation of consciousness after bodily death by and large have not looked into the phenomenon with any degree of rigor. Again, for them, it’s impossible a priori, so why would you research it? To do so is as worthless as dedicating one’s life to discovering whether the Easter Bunny is real; and as intellectually vacuous.

I recently watched an interview between Steven Pinker, a well-known and staunchly materialist Harvard professor, and Sadhguru, an Indian spiritual teacher. Their discussion was on the nature of consciousness. One of the questions raised was whether consciousness could survive bodily death. Pinker gave the standard materialist response: of course not. The brain is responsible for consciousness and, once the brain dies, consciousness dies. He stated his reasoning for that position: conscious experience always has a brain signature, which we can read out by using brain imaging techniques. And because we can do so, there can be no consciousness without our brains.

As a neuroscientist, I know full well how the brain and consciousness are tied together. Damage the brain, or infuse it with a hallucinogen, and consciousness is very impacted. Ask a subject when they are conscious of a stimulus and the brain acts differently from when they are not. Does this prove that the brain is the cause of our consciousness and that without it consciousness cannot continue? No. And the materialists know that. They only take it as proof because the alternative doesn’t conform to their belief system.

Pinker continued with the other side of the argument: he said, if it were true that consciousness survives death, then we should be able to have seances and communicate with the dead. But, he claims, “We all know now that this is flim flam, stage magic.” He continued with what he assumed is the final word on the matter: “Ask Aunt Hilda where she hid her jewellery. She should be able to tell you. If that happened I would believe that consciousness could survive the death of the brain. That has never happened and I would be able to bet a lot of money it never will.” I wish Pinker were serious here. For, if he were, I and many others could point him in the direction of people who would be able to do just that.

I don’t expect to have provided proof to anyone but myself through my investigation into the continuation of our consciousness after death. My hope is only to have shown that a rigorous path of exploration into the phenomenon points very strongly to that fact. The rest is up to you to do your own work and study for yourself, but understand that it is misguided to rely on the dictates of the materialists who have never bothered to perform the proper research on this topic. The truth is out there to be discovered with an open mind and open heart.

The birth of Idealism in the West (The Return of Idealism)

The birth of Idealism in the West (The Return of Idealism)

Reading | Metaphysics

Thinking Man

Parmenides’s cryptic claim that thought and being are the same has echoed throughout Western philosophy. In this first instalment of our new series, The Return of Idealism, in partnership with the Institute of Art and Ideas (IAI), Prof. Tom Rockmore argues that in making this claim, Parmenides set the foundations for the struggle between idealism and realism, and suggests that unlike many interpretations, Parmenidean idealism ultimately supports the view that we cannot know a mind-independent reality. This essay was first published by the IAI on the 4th of January, 2024.

Philosophy seeks to arrive at, analyze and choose between different views against the background of the ongoing philosophical tradition. Many exponents of philosophy, talented or otherwise, believe that, in at least some instances, there is a correct answer to the difficult questions that continue to attract philosophers. Others, including myself, believe that we cannot go further than framing or at least seeking to frame philosophical questions in the most useful ways possible. This includes what we might consider to be the correct approach to answering a question. But it need not include anything so grand as proposing a solution to any philosophical concerns.

According to Plato, Parmenides, a sixth century pre-Socratic thinker, invented what has since been known as philosophy or perhaps more narrowly Western philosophy. Numerous other qualified observers also believe that Parmenides began Western philosophy, and that once it began, philosophy has always been and still remains Platonic. The relationship of Parmenides to Plato is crucial but complicated. Parmenides advances a theory of knowledge according to which we can, or at least hope to know in some general way. He famously believed that thought (or thinking) and being (or reality) are the same. The meaning of this claim is uncertain, but one way it can be read is as a defense of philosophical idealism. Parmenides then can be seen as the first idealist in the Western tradition. What is more, his idealism is a form of anti-realism, the view that we cannot have direct knowledge of reality.

 

Parmenides on Thought and Being

There is a difference between Parmenides, who began philosophy, and later thinkers beginning with Plato, who sought to build on the Parmenidean view. Parmenides formulated what according to Plato and others became the initial view of philosophy which echoes through the entire tradition, that thought and being are the same. In his claim that thought and being are the same, Parmenides seems to be suggesting that cognition depends on either or both of two basic claims. One possibility is that he is making the ontological claim that when we know something we know mind-independent being, that is, the way the mind-independent reality is. The other possibility lies in the view that we do not and cannot grasp the mind-independent world as it is, but cognition is still possible through an indirect grasp, by the construction of the cognitive object.

At this point in many texts, one might anticipate a series of learned remarks, often of a philological nature, since Parmenides wrote in ancient Greek, intended to demonstrate the true meaning of the Parmenidean view.  This seems unnecessary in the present context. Suffice it to say that Parmenides neither demonstrates nor attempts to demonstrate his thesis which, since pre-Socratic philosophy, continues to function as the only universal criterion of knowledge.

Rationalists like Descartes and empiricists like Locke agree we can know the mind-independent real but differ about how to do so. Others believe that at the end of the day there has never been any progress towards that goal. The alternative to these options of naive realism and extreme skepticism is epistemic constructivism, which I will understand as a three-fold claim: (1) we must avoid cognitive skepticism; (2) though we cannot demonstrate or otherwise show that we know the mind-independent real; (3) we can avoid skepticism since we can at least demonstrate that we know what we construct.

 

Plato’s development of Parmenides

It is often said that Western philosophy begins in Plato, not Parmenides. But if Plato is a post-Parmenidean beyond just coming after him time-wise, then he does not break with, but rather builds on and further develops the Parmenidean theory. Philosophy then starts with Parmenides, as Plato himself thought.

Plato states a version of the relation of his view to Parmenides in several places, perhaps most famously in the tenth book of the Republic. According to Plato, knowledge is based on mimesis, or imitation. He claims that we apply a single form to the things to which we apply the same name.

Take the example of a piece of furniture. Socrates believes craftsmen who, in the process of making things, for instance beds and tables, rely on pre-existent images, which they do not create, but only use as a model for different kinds of furniture. According to Socrates, no individual makes the form of the thing, such as the table or a chair.

The suggested demonstration culminates in a three-fold distinction on three different levels between three kinds of beds. They include (1) the form of a bed that no human being but only a god can make; (2) for instance, the work of a carpenter who relies in turn on whatever the god creates in the process of naming, and (3) the painter who depicts one or more pre-existent objects he does not create.

Parmenides sees the problem, which he formulates but does not solve, and which in turn Plato also sees and also does not solve.  According to Parmenides, cognition is possible if and only if thought and being are the same. In the theory of forms, Plato seeks to show that there is cognition if there are mind-independent forms, which at least some gifted individuals can know. The required demonstration of the identity of thought and being lies in the Platonic view, which is intended to solve the Parmenidean problem. Plato’s suggested solution is his theory of forms, namely the identity between the object we do not make or construct and the object we can know or think.  If this is true, then thought and being are indeed the same, and cognition is possible. Plato is attracted to this argument as a possible solution to the problem of knowledge, since he suggests, some exceptional individuals – men of gold-  can grasp the forms, and therefore the mind-independent world. But the solution fails since even in the Republic itself, we never find out who these exceptional individuals are supposed to be – there are no men of gold.

 

Thought and being after Plato

The Parmenidean problem of cognition, which Plato failed to fully solve, arguably remains on the agenda of the entire later philosophical tradition, still unresolved. The Parmenidean view suggests there are two and only two general ways to know the world.  Let us call them i) materialism (or realism), the view that we can and do grasp the mind-independent real, and ii) idealism (or anti-realism), the view that we can only interact, but never know the mind-independent world as it is.

Materialism is often described as a naïve doctrine that asserts, but cannot demonstrate, claims about the mind-independent world. Materialism is a strategy for cognition through the immediate or direct grasp of the way the world is. Materialists seek to demonstrate that we can have a direct, immediate grasp of the mind-independent world.

Philosophical idealism on the other hand is often understood as the view that mind is the most basic reality, whose inner essence is in some way mental. There are numerous kinds of philosophical idealism, including British and German varieties. Idealist thinkers claim we can only infer, but never know what appears to be the case. In modern philosophy, arguably the best-known idealist is Berkeley. The latter was an immaterialist, who denied the existence of matter in favor of a view of finite mental substance that he understood as a collection of ideas.

 

Kant and Idealism as Anti-realism

In following the path opened by Parmenides, we have distinguished two main cognitive strategies, namely materialism and idealism. The difference between the two cognitive strategies is clear. Materialism is a version of the familiar, realist correspondence view of truth. Materialists think, but cannot show, that our grasp of the real corresponds to what is. Idealists, on the contrary, think that, though we cannot grasp what is, through the interaction between the knower and the knowable, we construct cognitive objects that we know.

Idealist thought arises in Parmenides and continues in modern philosophy. The term “idealism” was initially used by Leibniz in 1702. Berkeley thinks idealism favors immaterialism, or the view that substance does not exist. Idealists, for instance the later Kant, are constructivists, not realists. Kant began as a representationalist, initially favoring the view that cognition requires the correct representation of the object. He later gave up representationalism in favor of constructivism. In the Preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant suggested that metaphysics, which previously assumed that knowledge must conform to objects, “must [now] suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge” (CPR B xvi).

If this is correct, then the complicated link between Parmenides, who precedes Plato, and Plato, who succeeds Parmenides, turns on demonstrating either one of two general claims. We recall that Parmenides believes that thinking and being are the same. This suggests that thinking and being are two names for precisely the same thing. On the other hand, it paradoxically also suggests thought and being are not similar but utterly different in every way.

Parmenides’s view that thinking and being are the same echoes throughout the tradition from the pre-Socratic beginning of the tradition right up until today. A turning point arises in the transition between two phases in the development of Kant’s position. The turning point occurs in the Inaugural Dissertation (1770). In his initial view, before the Dissertation, Kant defends a pre-idealist representationalist approach to cognition. In this early phase, he understands cognition as requiring an apodictic grasp of what is. After the Dissertation, Kant gives up any claim to apodictic knowledge in favor of his famous Copernican revolution.

In On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres (1543), Copernicus proposes that geocentric planetary motion can be replaced by a heliocentric explanation. In the Preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant suggests that metaphysics, which previously assumed that knowledge must conform to objects, “must [now] suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge.”

Kant was a physicist. In the process of the development of his position Kant changed his mind. He initially held that there is a mind-independent world that we know to a later view and we know it. An example is Newton’s laws, which are supposedly unalterably true or necessarily correct about the mind-independent external world, and will never be superseded.  In other words, Kant’s early view defends a view of science that claims but cannot show that we know the way the mind independent world is. In this initial phase of his development, Kant holds that we know what is necessarily correct since it cannot not be true. This view restates in different language the Parmenidian belief that knowledge requires a correct grasp of being.

Kant later changed his mind in adopting the basically different view according to which the cognition requires no more than the construction of what is on the level of thought. In this later phase Kant no longer believes that cognitive claims are unalterably true or even true at all, a view he abandons in favor of the belief that cognitive claims are not necessarily true but rather depend on our experience.

The evolution of Kant’s conception of knowledge runs from a stronger claim about the mind-independent external world before his Inaugural Dissertation to a weaker claim after the Dissertation about the way we merely experience but cannot know the world. More recent scientists think that cognitive claims are historically limited. In an informal statement, Einstein, the physicist, writes:

Physical concepts are free creations of the human mind, and are not, however it may seem, uniquely determined by the external world. In our endeavor to understand reality, we are somewhat like a man trying to understand the mechanism of a closed watch. He sees the face and the moving hands, even hears its ticking, but he has no way of opening the case. If he is ingenious, he may form some picture of a mechanism, which could be responsible for all the things that he observes, but he may never be quite sure that his picture is the only one which could capture his observations. He will never be able to compare his picture with the real mechanism and he cannot even imagine the possibility of the meaning of such a comparison.

 

Parmenidean idealism

Coming back to Parmenides and his claim that thought and being are one. Plato understood Parmenides to mean that the condition of knowledge is to grasp the unity of thought and being. Following that idea, Plato suggested that knowledge would be possible only if we could know the mind-independent world as it is. But ultimately his theory of forms failed.

The ancient Parmenidean claim runs through the philosophical tradition, returning in different forms in German idealism (e. g. Kant, Fichte and Hegel) in the canonical choice between thinking and being. But if demonstrable knowledge of the mind-independent real is the main thrust of the philosophical tradition, in other words, if materialism/realism is the dominant strain of Western philosophy, then Western philosophy fails. On the other hand, if constructivism is a plausible alternative, cognition can in principle be redeemed through the ongoing interaction between finite human beings and their surroundings, above all in Hegel’s view of epistemology as circular. Though Kant did not invent epistemic constructivism, he gave it a powerful impulse in his later view of knowledge in context.  I conclude that we can and indeed must accept the Parmenidean unity of thought and being as a cognitive condition. But we must reject the unavailing effort to grasp the mind-independent real in favor of a constructivist account of objects as they emerge in experience.

Gödel’s Incompleteness and the Realm of Wildlife

Gödel’s Incompleteness and the Realm of Wildlife

Reading | Philosophy

Yaakov Lichter | 2023-12-24

Four funny ant with their bellies. Ants dancing. Glade, moss. Beautiful rainbow background. The concept of performance, dance, show, concert

Humans relate to nature through the intermediation of abstract linguistic concepts that aren’t themselves part of nature. Animals, on the other hand, relate to nature through actions—gestures, secretions, sounds, etc.—that evoke meaning in a manner directly grounded in the elements of nature. The potential power of this more direct approach has been illustrated by Kurt Gödel, who used elements of mathematics—natural numbers and arithmetic operations—to model mathematics itself and investigate its nature, thereby unlocking great insight. This is analogous to how animals relate to their world. Could Gödel’s insight help us transcend the artificial boundaries created by our abstract concepts and, thereby, better understand reality?

In the spirit of Newton’s call to build more bridges rather than erect more walls, here an analogy is suggested between the stratagem of Gödel’s proof of his Incompleteness Theorems and the modes of behavior that enable animals in the wild to effectively be one with nature while still spreading their intentions and signaling their status. I suggest that Gödel’s most fundamental intellectual insight—which resides in the world of human thought—parallels what animals possess naturally.

The language in what follows is intended to be accessible to non-mathematicians and provide a preliminary introduction to Gödel’s revolutionary and profound work.

 

Direct sensations and language

Simone de Beauvoir proclaimed that “humans are the talking animals.” We do not know of any other animal that uses abstract symbols—such as written letters and spoken syllables—as a means of communication, which members of the species have deliberately pre-agreed on. It would be far-fetched for us to think that any other living creature uses abstract words such as mind, consciousness, justice, happiness, sorrow, and so on. In that respect, humans are a unique species. Dr. Doolittle, who allegedly conversed with animals using human concepts, existed only in Hugh Lofting’s fictional books. Being talking and thinking creatures ourselves, when we read Lofting’s books Dr. Dolittle’s talking animals become a sort of reality for us, but a reality in our mind.

Abstract symbols combine in linguistic formulations—such as words, sentences, formulas, etc.—to eventually create for us, humans, stories of various types, ranging from tag lists and simple accounts to legends, narratives, novels, and theories. These abstract symbols—whether written or spoken—do not mean anything to any other living creature.

A human baby is born devoid of language. However, the potential to understand language and use it is inborn in it. Babies start internalizing language the moment they first hear it. This rather cryptic, even mystifying, process is profoundly influential; it creates our framework of thinking. Humans are very self-reflective: they think about themselves, about their experiences and about their very existence. Language causes us to process all of this in a consistent way, thus creating one of the two sources of our knowledge.

Indeed, two essentially different human experiences feed, increase and sustain human knowing. One is our inborn, unmediated, direct natural sensory experiences that are naturally ‘engraved’ in our consciousness, very much like any other animal. This source is not conditioned by knowing any language or the products of language, such as tales, narratives, or theories. The other source emanates from our linguistic experience of becoming acquainted with an ever-increasing number of words, names, statements, etc.

Søren Kierkegaard spoke of the outstanding change that takes place in one’s mind when, for the first time, the fact that everything in their life depends on the way they think invades their consciousness, where they understand that the absoluteness of thought—which stems from the absolute definitiveness of language—takes the place of alleged reality.

Two essentially different realities—one stemming from our direct sensory experiences, and the other from our language-thought experiences—meet and interact in our consciousness in a very complicated, intricate and, in fact, mysteriously entangled way. This interplay yields tremendous human capabilities, with qualities that are unmatched by any other living creature. These unmatched creative capabilities span from profound artistic, literary, and scientific works to horrendous acts of killing and destruction.

One of the most brilliant human achievements of all times is Kurt Gödel’s analyses of the foundations and structure of mathematics as a formal language, as well as its properties. Gödel published his revolutionary work in 1931, thus changing forever not only widespread popular beliefs about mathematics, but also shattering for good what world-leading mathematicians and logicians thought about it.

Gödel’s outstanding logical genius is discussed in a plethora of books, papers, essays, lectures, movies, and video clips. However, perhaps something unique has been overlooked in at least most of them. When comparing Gödel’s most fundamental stratagem—without which the very body of his work would not have been possible—to the way animals get along and ‘communicate’ in nature, an interesting and rather instructive parallel may be drawn.

 

Metatheories

When Aristotle wrote his teachings about nature—which he called “phusika” (φυσική, in Greek)—he realized that it was impossible for him to explicate nature’s concrete causes and effects, as discerned by the senses, without inventing abstract concepts indicating entities and properties that cannot be directly sensed by us. In order to formulate his philosophical teachings about nature, he had to incorporate these abstractions as an integral part of his text. His disciples decided to gather the definitions and explanations of these abstract terms in a separate section or volume, and then place it right after his physics teaching. The word ‘after’ in Greek is μετά (pronounced ‘meta’), and thus the word ‘metaphysics’ was created. As such, the metaphysics of a certain physical theory is concerned with the investigation, analysis, and description of the theory itself.

This is not exclusive to physics and metaphysics. Each theory can have a metatheory, which investigates, analyzes, and critically describes the concepts, symbols, and inference rules of the theory itself. A particular case of a metatheory is metamathematics.

Understanding that any theory is eventually a story made of language, Rudolf Carnap suggested the following definition for a metatheory: “if we investigate, analyze, and describe a language L1 [and call this study L2] … the sum total of what can be known about L1 and said in L2 may be called the metatheory of L1.”

For a variety of considerations, which are out of the scope of this essay, we will refer to mathematics not as a theory of quantities, but as a theory of abstract symbols free of any interpretation, practical agenda, or empirical experience.

We are now setting out on a journey that takes place solely in the world of human language and thought. Later we will contemplate this abstract world from a standpoint located in the concrete world of direct sensory experiences. Both these worlds constitute the contents of human consciousness.

 

Formality, consistency and completeness

Historically, the development of mathematical thought has always been accompanied by the emergence of  paradoxes. The intensity of this process surged during the 19th century, to the point of becoming a fundamental problem in mathematics and related sciences. David Hilbert, a leader in the community of mathematicians and logicians, called on them to prove that mathematics can be simultaneously a formal, consistent, and complete theory.

The adjectives ‘formal,’ ‘consistent,’ and ‘complete’ are not what mathematics—either as a theory of quantities or a theory of symbols—is about. They are, instead, metamathematical.

What do we mean when we say, ‘formal theory’? The Collins English Dictionary states that it is “a system of uninterpreted symbols and combinations thereof, whose syntax is precisely defined, and on which a relation of deducibility is defined in purely syntactic terms.” That is to say, the truth or validity of one such a theory stems solely from rules and laws related to symbol manipulations, which the theory considers legitimate. A famous example of a formal theory is the basic geometry of the plane, formulated by Euclid thousands of years ago without reference to drawings or plausible experiences. Euclid’s theory is taught in high schools to this day.

It is much simpler and seemingly more intuitive to define ‘consistency’: a theory is consistent when we believe that its text is free of contradictions (it will be understood later why we use the words ‘intuitive,’ ‘believe’ and ‘seem’ in this supposedly simple definition).

The third terms is ‘complete.’ We say that a theory is ‘complete’ if all of its propositions (or formulas) can be proven to be either true or false based on the theory’s axioms and inference rules.

We want to relate the above to mathematical theories. The root of mathematics is arithmetic, so we can widen our field of interest to any theory that includes arithmetic in it. Including arithmetic in a theory simply means that the list of symbols (alphabet) of this theory should include the symbols for the natural numbers (), plus the multiplication, addition, and equality symbols ().

For the sake of brevity, in what follows let the acronym FCAIT denote a Formal, Consistent, Arithmetic-Including Theory.

 

The fundamental stratagem behind Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems

In response to Hilbert’s challenge, Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead published their monumental three-volume book, Principia Mathematica, about the foundations of mathematics. Their book included their new “Theory of Types,” which emanated from their insight that paradoxes exist only in the world of language and thought, their source being self-reference, which language allows. In the context of language, a self-referential statement is one that entails a reference to itself. The ancient symbol of the Ouroboros—a dragon that eats itself—denotes self-reference and illustrates the paradox of something defeating itself.

Russell and Whitehead’s Theory of Types seemed like a complete solution free of self-referential propositions, thus avoiding the paradoxes that arise from them.

When Russell and Whitehead published their book, Kurt Gödel was a child. After having read their book not many years later, he felt—with his extraordinary intellect and mathematical intuition—that it must be impossible to get rid of self-reference in mathematics and, apparently, in any FCAIT.

Gödel’s brilliant intellect led him to a profound stratagem, which enabled the proofs of his revolutionary Incompleteness Theorems. He decided to adopt Plato’s philosophical view that natural numbers should be regarded as a special type of reality in themselves. Though they do not belong to kind of direct sensory experience that we intuitively accept as reality, we should still consider them ‘real’ in our world of language and thought, which ceaselessly interferes with our sensory experiences.

Thus, Gödel devised a code that converts any alphabetical statement or formal proposition into one unique natural number, and vice versa, in a one-to-one mapping. The code he suggested is very simple indeed, and based on the rules of arithmetic. For reasons of brevity, I will not go into its details here (in any case, there are many different methods to create such a code, so the details are less important). The profound point is Gödel’s understanding that such a code is a necessary condition for proving his theorems. It is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one. He came up with additional ingenious ruses, which are not mentioned here so we can focus our attention on the code only.

By converting formal statements into natural numbers in a bijective way [Editor’s note: i.e., in a way that ensures that each and every formal statement corresponds to one and only one natural number, and vice-versa], it becomes technically, or symbolically, possible for us to replace (a) the verbal concepts and statements with numbers and (b) the inference rules with arithmetic operations. That gets us from the world of regular verbal language, such as English, into the formal language of arithmetic.

This is a change of a medium; will it create a new message? Apparently, it did. It allowed Gödel to prove revolutionary theorems.

 

Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems

The first of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems claims that FCAITs are necessarily incomplete; i.e., an FCAIT always has statements that can be neither proven nor disproven, which are therefore called ‘undecidables.’ FCAITs necessarily include undecidables.

The second theorem, which is easily proven from the first, says that there is no consistent FCAIT that can prove its own consistency. This is the final fatal blow to Hilbert’s hope—as expressed in the challenge he posed to the global mathematics/logic community—to preserve the image of mathematics as both consistent and complete.

In even simpler language, what we can say with mathematical certainty, based on Gödel Incompleteness Theorems, about the concepts of completeness, consistency, and decidability for any given arbitrary FCAIT is as follows.

Completeness: does every statement that must be true in a theory have a proof in the theory? No.

Consistency: is a theory certainly consistent? Can we be sure that it is free of contradictions? We cannot know the answer to these questions from the theory itself; the property of consistency cannot be proven or refuted within the theory.

Decidability: is there a finite algorithm that can always determine whether a statement follows from the axioms of a theory? No.

 

Gödel’s realm and wildlife

Gödel’s code is a transformation between two human forms of description, both belonging to the human world of language and thoughts; both using abstract symbols. One form is our regular language, such as these sentences, which we ordinarily use to describe the world and think about it. The other entails the concepts of natural numbers and arithmetical operations.

Animals, as we understand them, do not have a world of conceptual language and abstract symbols. They cannot describe or communicate to other members of their own species, or to other animals, in this fashion.

Originally, I had titled this section “How natural living creatures communicate.” On a second thought, I chose a different title, as you can see above. In my book, Life & Theories: Encounters of the Third Kind, I went even further, referring to animal interactions as messages of nature itself.

The reason I tried to avoid using the word ‘communicate’ is because communication ordinarily implies some form of human-like language—i.e., an ordered combination of abstract symbols like spoken syllables, written letters, mathematical formulas, formal logical statements, etc. Too many people think that we can interpret the way animals conduct themselves as analogous to human language, but animals in nature do not possess such capability. What they do, instead, is to use the objects of nature itself, such as bodily gestures, touches, sounds, tastes, odors, even bodily secretions, which can all be naturally discerned by the senses of living creatures.

For example, we are all familiar with the yawn reflex, which exposes the teeth of the tired animal, thus discouraging any predator that could otherwise take advantage of its fatigue. We see how the fur of a cat bristles and its back becomes curved when a dog attacks it, so the cat looks bigger than it is. Another interesting example is a procession of ants walking along a trail, coordinated by the secretion of various substances (like pheromones). Ants also exercise involuntary physical contact, which excite certain reflexive responses such as opening their mouth to let other ants sense what it carries. They sense the subtle but penetrative sounds of legs strumming the creases on the side of an ant’s stomach. And there are also tastes and smells that ants pass to one another. All these are concrete components of direct sensory reality; all are concrete—none is abstract.

 

Conclusion

In summary, the means that animals employ to effectively be one with nature, and yet spread their intentions and signal their status, are made of the very entities that nature is made of and do not entail indirection via pre-agreed abstractions. Is the resourcefulness and ability of animals to survive and reproduce in nature, as well as live in sustainable balance with it, a result of their being an integral part of nature?

It is clear that Gödel’s profound stratagem of using solely the very elements of the ‘reality’ of mathematics—natural numbers and arithmetic operations—to relate it to metamathematics itself served as a fundamental key to unlocking the unexpected results of his theorems. A parallel between Gödel’s stratagem and the behavior of animals in nature then seems to emerge: the use of elements of a given reality to relate it to its metareality. This may avoid the barriers caused by a language whose concepts are foreign and irrelevant to the reality it tries to describe. Can it be a clue to deeper insights?

Newton said, “We build too many walls and not enough bridges.” Can the above be the beginning of a bridge that will enable better theories?

 

This essay reiterates some of the ideas in the author’s book, Life & Theories: Encounters of the Third Kind, 2023.

Reconciling the dancing polarities

Reconciling the dancing polarities

Reading | Philosophy

Fred Matser | 2023-12-17

Orange and blue lightning, cold and hot electrical discharge, element danger

In an essay meant to give us food for meditation during the holiday period, as we take account of the year now behind us and the—tragic and otherwise—events that marked the year, our Founder and Chairman speaks to the importance of maintaining, in a mature fashion, the dynamic balance between the often extreme polarities that characterize human society.

In holding polarities apart, resistance creates continuous tension between opposites. By ‘tension’ I don’t mean something negative, but simply a force, a pull. In our case, we can think of this tension as the impetus underlying the interplay between (a) male and female modes of being, (b) intellectual and intuitive modes of cognition, (c) the felt urges to give and receive, (d) the raw power of assertiveness and the enchanting power of vulnerability, and many other polarities. Our very lives rest on the dynamic tension between these opposites being maintained, for without such tension we would live in a world of static aloofness. The tension is the driving force of both people and societies; it is what makes them move, even strive; it is the impetus behind every action, individual or collective; it is the engine of both personal and social growth, authentic growth.

Therefore, the secret to a healthy and functional life, as well as to a healthy and functional society, lies—it seems to me—in ensuring a dynamic harmony between the polarities, whereby neither pole dominates, subdues or overwhelms its opposite but, instead, the tension between them is maintained. This dynamic harmony can be best visualized as a dance performed by each pair of opposites. The better the dance is—that is, the more refined the balance and harmony of the choreography—the more functional is the result. The dance of the polarities isn’t meant to achieve a certain goal or arrive at a particular destination, just as two people dancing a tango aren’t trying to arrive at a specific place on the dance floor. The point is the dance itself, just as the point of sailing is to sail, not to go around buoys.

To grasp the value of life from this perspective requires a certain sense of aesthetics. As Plato suggested, beauty is truth. The most truthful, functional way of life is thus the one that entails the most beautiful dance, the most exquisite choreography. And no tango is beautiful if one of the partners is dominated or stomped into oblivion by the other, is it?

Yet, subduing one of the poles for the benefit of the other has been, consistently, throughout our history, the way we operate. Most conspicuously, we have put physical, assertive power on a pedestal, while neglecting the indispensable role of vulnerability in life, which we see as a weakness. But without the enchanting power of vulnerability life would be impossible. Think of all unborn and newborn animal life, insect larvae, fish fry, plant seedlings, etc.: how vulnerable, yet indispensable, they all are! To use assertive power is perfectly okay as long as it is dynamically balanced with the power of vulnerability, so as to maintain functional tension. Alas, even a cursory observation of our social dynamics reveals that we are far from achieving such an ideal.

There are many more examples of imbalance. Take, for instance, how we value the intellect much above feeling and intuition, as if only the intellect could convey valid information and arrive at valid conclusions. Already since early education, this bizarre and skewed notion is inculcated in children: whatever you know through feeling or intuition is only acceptable if you can persuasively argue for, or justify, it in conceptual terms, using words and numbers. Otherwise, it’s just fantasy, delusion, wishful thinking. Such devaluation of our feeling faculty amounts to a veritable amputation. It artificially and arbitrarily cuts us off from capabilities nature has endowed us with for a reason. It’s like voluntarily gouging out an eye and believing we are better off for it. Because the amputation is not as immediately visible as a missing limb or eye, we don’t realize the magnitude of our loss.

Moreover, the intellect expresses itself innately through discrimination: it is always attempting to draw a line between true and false, right and wrong, valid and invalid, appropriate and inappropriate, belonging and not belonging, etc. Choices made through intellectual mediation are thus intrinsically exclusionary: they exclude what we judge to be false, wrong, invalid, inappropriate or not belonging. In contrast, choices mediated by the feeling faculty—heart-based choices— tend to be inclusionary, to draw things and people together based on their unique strengths and relative value. Consequently, our tendency to value the intellect much above the feeling faculty leads to the myriad ways in which our society excludes people, communities, countries, animals and even nature at large.

One of the most recognized imbalances in our society and way of life is that between male and female modes of thinking, feeling and acting. Therefore, correcting this particular imbalance also gets most of our attention and effort. The problem is that, even in contexts or situations wherein women have managed to break through the glass ceiling and achieve positions of influence, the price they pay for doing so is often to sacrifice their very femininity by imitating the dysfunctional behavior of men. This is too high a price, for it defeats the very purpose of the effort to reduce the imbalance in the first place. Indeed, the detrimental imbalance here is not merely a question of gender, but of modes of being and acting.

If our society embodied a proper dynamic balance between male and female modes of being—regardless of gender—we would arguably be seeing less dysfunctional competition, less wars, less loneliness, more understanding, more sharing and compassion. There is much to be gained by working towards a dynamic balance.

But in order to do so, we must be prepared to revise our values. Balance can only be achieved if each pole is valued on its own terms, not in terms of the qualities of its opposite. This is a subtle but crucial point. For instance, male business leaders who sincerely want to contribute to a better balance between male and female principles at work may still value the intellect and assertive power above intuition and vulnerability; and so, they will support and promote women who think and act like men. At the end, no balance is achieved.

Proper dynamic balance requires a kind of cognitive leap that enables one to contemplate each pole from an Archimedean vantage point; a neutral perspective from which one can objectively assess the polarities within their total context, recognizing their respective contributions to the whole. It is extraordinarily difficult to attain such a neutral vantage point, for we are all immersed in the values we happen to embody. Yet, attaining it is essential if we are to live harmonious, functional lives. This is the key challenge at hand, and it is formidable.

Self-cultivation, individuation, and the mind-body problem

Self-cultivation, individuation, and the mind-body problem

Reading | Philosophy

Mark F. Rossbach, MA | 2023-12-03

Young woman performing Wing Chun stance on the beach at sunset time. Concept of sports lifestyle

If the fundamental layer of reality is understood to dissolve the seeming metaphysical differences between mind and matter, psyche and soul, then bodily practice becomes a direct means for psychological and spiritual development. Such development, in turn, conveys the direct experience of the unity between mind and matter, psyche and body, self and world. This is the central point of this short essay by anthropologist, Jungian analyst, and martial artist Mark Rossbach.

Could practices such as meditation and martial arts offer us a glimpse into a more fundamental layer of reality?

According to our modern, Western, materialist worldview, this cannot be the case. But if we look in other directions and other modes of thinking, we can find different answers. Eastern philosophies, for example, developed in radically different ways. One of the main differences lies in the understanding of mind and body as being ultimately one, the opposite perspective of our modern materialist worldview.

By regarding mind and body as ultimately one, Eastern philosophies understood that reality was not something outside, separate from ourselves, but something closer and more fundamental. This led to the understanding that reality could never be comprehended solely by thinking, but had instead to be lived through direct experience. In this worldview, thought was not divorced from lived experience, and philosophy developed with strong practical components to it.

The Japanese notion of Shugyo is a perfect expression of the way practice is understood as a means of achieving a lived experience of more fundamental layers of reality. At first, the concept was used to refer only to religious Buddhist ascetic practices, but with time it spread more widely thru Japanese culture, as religious thought itself permeated different layers of society.

Yuasa Yasuo was a Japanese philosopher who translated Shugyo as ‘Self-cultivation.’ He analyzed the concept through different perspectives and associated it with paranormal phenomena and Eastern metaphysics. In Carl Gustav Jung’s Analytical Psychology, Yasuo found a way to bridge this concept with the West, for Jung had developed a theory of psychological functioning that not only allowed a psychological interpretation of Eastern practices, but also understood that psychotherapy should offer a way for Western individuals to develop a symbolic understanding of life, recovering something that in essence is proposed by all religious thinking: a lived, individual experience of totality. This meaningful understanding of life is closely relatable to Eastern philosophies, as is pointed out by Yasuo, especially if we take the idea of Self-cultivation as a starting point.

But what does it mean to cultivate the Self?

According to Yasuo, Self-cultivation is a way of training the mind through the body, in meditative practices such as martial arts and crafts. The idea implied is that, alongside technical development, the practitioner should seek spiritual development throughout his practice. This spiritual development signifies a deep transformation of one’s personality, as well as the lived experience of deeper aspects of reality.

In contrast, in the West bodily practice has been regarded as having merely recreational or health value. Either way, bodily practice has not been considered a means to achieve profound spiritual transformation.

The reason for this contrast may be found in the mind-body problem, since our main Western religious traditions contributed to a dualist and dichotomous paradigm initiated in the Enlightenment period through Cartesian thinking. Such dichotomous understanding of reality considers mind and body two different substances. From this our current materialistic worldview was born, wherein objective reality (body) has higher value and importance than subjective, experiential reality (mind), as the former is thought to come first. The famous hard problem of consciousness is a direct consequence of such dualist thinking.

Eastern traditional philosophies have not been heavily influenced by Cartesian dualism. And neither have they divorced mind and body through a similar socio-political movement as the Enlightenment—at least not until the last century. In contrast, Eastern philosophies developed a nondual worldview, investigating the inner, experiential part of life by taking mind-body oneness as the starting point.

In notions such as Shugyo, mind-body oneness is an experiential state achieved through continuous practice. It leads to the experience of Satori, which is the individual enlightenment lived by Buddhas. Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that Satori is not a specific experience, but rather a broad term to refer to different experiential states achieved through the cultivation the Self. We could also say that Satori refers to different lived experiences of altered states of consciousness.

To claim that the experience of mind-body oneness is achievable through practice means that, although mind and body may be perceived as two different substances, both are in fact the same; there is but one substance perceived by us in two different ways. And the experience of this one substance can only be achieved through practice. As such, according to Shugyo, the seeming dualism of reality is not fundamental.

Yasuo maintains that mind-body practices show the difference between Western and Eastern metaphysics, the former being occupied with what lies behind the experience of nature (physis), whilst the latter is engaged with what lies behind our inner nature—that is, what lies behind the human ‘soul’ (psyche), as Yasuo puts it, which in turn is investigated on the basis of mind-body inseparability as the starting point.

Yasuo found in Analytical Psychology (developed by Carl Gustav Jung) a bridge to compare the aims and the psychological mechanisms entailed both in meditation practices and psychotherapy (as understood in Analytical Psychology). According to Yasuo, psychotherapy aims at restoring an individual afflicted with an abnormal state back to his normal state of behavior, by restoring the link between consciousness and the unconscious.

On the other hand, meditation aims at ‘transcendental’ states of consciousness, many times regarded as altered states, in which an integration of consciousness with the contents of the unconscious takes place, thus enabling one to learn how to control one’s emotional states.

According to Yasuo, while psychotherapy aims at helping someone deal with abnormal states of consciousness that cause suffering and meditation (Shugyo) at achieving higher states of consciousness, the underlying psychological mechanisms are the same. In this light, Shugyo can be understood as the way of seeking the experience of mind-body oneness through practice.

This transformation of the personality, according to Buddhist traditions, is accompanied or fomented by experiences of losing sight of oneself, of leaving the body, as well as hallucinatory experiences similar to psychedelics, near-death experiences, etc. What happens here is that the ego, which is closely related to the body, loses its place as the center of the personality, and the whole world starts to be comprehended as also being part of one’s psyche; inner and outer experiences start to merge in these ‘hallucinatory’ states, forcing the ego to surrender.

Jung also understood that the goal of life is to transform one’s personality, shifting the center of the personality from the ego to what he called the Self (Selbst). The concept of the Self simultaneously refers to the unique and most individual parts of oneself, as well as the whole of the collective unconscious. The latter, according to Jung’s cosmology, encompasses everything in nature. In Analytical Psychology, this process of integration between consciousness and the unconscious is called individuation.

According to Jung, individuation is a process that occurs naturally and is the telos (goal, purpose) of individual life. The problem is that, when our personality’s center is the ego, our lives become focused solely on strengthening consciousness, unilaterally, thus causing a split between it and the unconscious. The goal of Analytical Psychology is to help the individual to understand how to deal with the confrontation between consciousness and the unconscious, supporting the process of individuation, which results in a deep transformation of one’s personality.

But how is the idea of Shugyo related to Jung’s individuation process?

Shugyo means understanding practice as a way of achieving enlightenment through the lived experience of altered states of consciousness—through a continuous cultivation of the Self. It entails a deep understanding of the fundamental layer of reality, resulting—just as in individuation—in a profound transformation of one’s personality.

But although this transformation is something present both in Jung’s individuation process and Yasuo’s depiction of Shugyo, for Yasuo a key difference between Eastern Self-cultivation practices and psychotherapy is the idea of normal and abnormal states of being. Yasuo states that psychotherapy tries to restore the individual’s normal state of being, which corresponds to what is culturally expected—i.e., ‘normal behavior.’ On the other hand, Self-cultivation practices actively seek a transcendent mode of being, which usually corresponds to deep religious experiences such as observed in Buddhism, yoga, and even traditional martial arts.

The differences between Shugyo and Jung’s individuation might not only entail the specifics of the states they aim to achieve, but also the moment when their goals can be fulfilled. For according to Jung, the process of individuation can only be fully achieved in death, the completion of life.

Nonetheless, both Yasuo and Jung agree that there is a fundamental layer of reality that encompasses both mind and body. Both agree that the goal of psychological development is the integration of opposites—mind and body, psyche and matter—such integration being the lived experience of totality. According to both Yasuo’s understanding of Shugyo and Jung’s cosmology, the ego should not be the center of the personality, but instead play a merely mediating role. After all, the ego may be central to human meta-cognitive life, but not the center of life itself.

Shugyo offers a way to understand life as something containing meaning, and so does Jung’s Analytical Psychology. According to both Shugyo and Jungian practice, the fundamental layer of reality is experiential, and we are here to express or live it in its totality. Practice becomes not only a way of seeking leisure and health, but a means to transform our personality and express meaning through spiritual growth.

This worldview is radically different than the one provided by our post-Enlightenment paradigms, which deprive life of meaning. According to it, reality is fundamentally experiential and there is meaning to be found, expressed, and experienced during life.

Any practice can be Shugyo, as long as the goal of the practice is to develop oneself, thus achieving the experience of mind-body oneness. The fundamental layer of reality, and thus of ourselves, can only be understood in and through practice. Jungian psychology entails similar ideas, and a similar openness to different practices. In both perspectives, theoretical confabulations have limits, the totality of reality—with its paradoxes—being accessible only through direct experience.

 

Bibliography

  1. Yuasa, Yasuo (1987). The Body: Toward an Eastern Mind-Body Theory.
  2. Yuasa, Yasuo (1993). The Body, Self-Cultivation, and Ki-Energy. Suny Press.
  3. Jung, C. G. (1960). Collected Works of C.G. Jung, Volume 8/2: On the Nature of the Psyche. Princeton University Press.
  4. Jung, C. G. (1969). Collected Works of C.G. Jung, Volume 11/5: Psychology and Religion: West and East. Princeton University Press.
  5. Jung, C. G. (1968). Collected Works of C.G. Jung, Volume 12: Psychology and Alchemy. Princeton University Press.
  6. Jung, C. G. (1970). Collected Works of C.G. Jung, Volume 14/2: Mysterium Coniuntionis. Princeton University Press.

Light or Darkness? Suhrawardī’s philosophy of illumination

Light or Darkness? Suhrawardī’s philosophy of illumination

Reading | Philosophy

Natalia Vorontsova, MA | 2023-11-26

Lighthouse under the Milky Way

Is the conflict between good and evil—light and darkness—ultimately a false dichotomy? Could nature be best described as a hierarchy of illumination instead? This brief essay is an introduction to the illuminationist thought of Persian philosopher and theologian Suhrawardī. It will hopefully make you curious about the work of this great thinker, and motivate you to study his legacy further. The essay is a follow-up to last week’s theme: Islamic philosophy.

Perhaps no other metaphor in the history of philosophy and religion—not to mention our language and culture—is as widespread as that of light and darkness. People who like to say to each other: “Don’t turn to the dark side! May the Force be with you!” must have a special appreciation for this metaphor [1,2].

Darkness cannot drive out darkness: only light can do that.’ (Mahatma Gandhi)

In the midst of darkness, light persists.’ (Martin Luther King)

The metaphor is often associated with two polar opposites: good and evil, right and wrong. But if we turn to the Master of Illumination, Suhrawardī—a Persian philosopher and theologian who founded a new tradition in Islamic thought, that of Ishrāq (‘Illuminationism’)—then only Light is a fundamental reality.

According to Suhrawardī, all reality is Light, which no concept or proposition can adequately describe or convey. Only the experiencing of the reality of Light itself can reveal it. Whoever encounters it knows it immediately and directly, by presence and not by concepts, for it is axiomatic and self-evident.

Anything in existence that requires no definition or explanation is evident. Since there is nothing more evident than light, there is nothing less in need of definition [4].

What then is darkness? In the philosophical doctrine of Suhrawardī, it is the absence of Light: everything that is neither illuminated nor Light itself. Hence it is Light that is a basic reality, and everything must be defined in terms of it, expressed in varying degrees of intensity, ranging from pure immaterial light to darkness and shadow. In essence, the doctrine is a hierarchical and emanatory scheme based on two principles: light (independent ) and darkness (dependent). And every emanative act is an overflow from the Light above it as an act of luminescence whose reflective nature gives rise to another. Furthermore, no causal relation exists between emanative acts; there is no material or temporal precession. Here is a high-level outline of key emanations in Suhrawardī’s cosmology:

  1. Incorporeal (pure) Light: axiomatic, independent in and of itself.
    • Light of Lights: the Necessary Being, the Source of Light, God.
    • Immaterial Lights: Forms, Souls, Angels, Archangels and Platonic Archetypes.
  2. Accidental Light: Light inhering in another, such as the light of stars.
  3. Suspended Images: A special emanation that mediates between incorporeal and corporeal emanations, also known as Mundus Imaginalis. Autonomous images of the medium through which the incorporeal world of lights communicates and interacts with the corporeal world of shadow and darkness.
  4. Corporeal (pure) Darkness & Shadow: things whose nature is darkness in itself, an absence of Light, such as physical bodies (barriers, ‘dusky substances’).
  5. Accidental Darkness: depends on something other than itself, such as the shapes of physical objects. In also includes aspects of incorporeal lights that give rise to a corporeal

Similar to Avicenna’s concept of the incorporeal intelligences, the incorporeal lights are aware of their essence and their dependence on the emanating principle, namely the light above them in ontological rank. This establishes the relationship of dominion and love between all members of the hierarchy. Those of higher ontological rank exercise dominion over the lower members, while the lower members desire and love the lights above them. Thus, all existence unfolds in accordance with the underlying principles of love and dominion. In addition to this vertical hierarchy, the immaterial lights, through complex interactions, form a ‘horizontal’ layer to govern the multitude of emanations below them. These are the ‘masters of species,’ of minerals, plants and animals, but also of water, fire, earth and air [6].

For Suhrawardī, philosophy and mystical experience were inseparable. Thus, for him, the “pillars of wisdom” were Plato, Empedocles and Pythagoras, along with Zoroaster and the Prophet Mohammed [3,4,11]. His Philosophy of Illumination is thus deeply rooted in the metaphysical hierarchies of Neoplatonism, set in the context of Zoroastrianism and Shi’a Islam [5].

It is also important to bear in mind that Suhrawardī received his philosophical and theological insights as visions and revelations. In order to articulate them in a given language, pre-existing mental constructs are often used, even if they originally meant something different from what is being articulated. In Zoroastrianism, for example, the struggle of light against darkness is central and directly related to the forces of good and evil. In Islam, too, Allah is Light (nūr) and appears as light in the heavens and on earth [7].

Suhrawardī’s philosophical doctrine is certainly non-dual at its core, for here darkness has no independent existence and is merely the absence of light. But can his emanation cosmology be interpreted in the context of good versus evil? On the face of it, Suhrawardī is simply using an already conceptually available allegory of light and darkness to outline the creation by emanation from the omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient incorporeal reality that contains all that there is, to that of our corporeal universe, which is finite, ephemeral, limited and constantly changing. Incidentally, one can appreciate Suhrawardī’s intermediate emanations between the level of Light of Lights and that of Pure Darkness. For the gap between these two levels of reality is so great that without all the intermediate layers, such a scheme could be compared to lighting a light bulb directly from the sun.

But can light and darkness, with all the shades in between, be understood simply as colors with which Suhrawardī paints a picture of his illuminationist philosophy? It would seem that by conceptualizing emanation as a gradation of illumination and shadow casting, he is outlining proximity and relationship to the Divine, rather than a scale of good and evil. Nevertheless, the degrees of intensity of light seem to allude to the degrees of perfection: the closer to the Light of Lights or the Divine, the more perfect are the emanations [8]. In the Hermetic tradition in general, we find references, for example, to man’s re-conquest of his Perfect Nature—his soul, the ‘Illuminated Man’ or the ‘Man of Light’ in Zoroastrianism. And Suhrawardī is no exception, for in his view those on the mystical path who succeed in regaining their Perfect Nature become the disciples of Hermes [9].

Suhrawardī’s own visions and intuitive insights undoubtedly influenced his illuminationist doctrine. In his most important work, the “Wisdom of Illumination” (Ḥikmat al-ishrāq), Suhrawardī presents a unique conception of philosophy that combines the intuitive mystical path with rigorous philosophical discourse:

The best student is the student of both intuitive philosophy and discursive philosophy. Next is the student of intuitive philosophy. And then the student of discursive philosophy [4].

Nonetheless, he seems to value intuitive, direct knowledge over mere reasoning and rational speculation, since only direct experience guarantees the acquisition of true knowledge [8].

Theorising and rational arguments are like empty shells and are fruitless without grounding in the intuitive and direct apprehension of reality. [6]

In other words, discursive philosophy should be based on intuitive, direct insights communicated in images and symbols.

…symbols by their very nature are openings onto a mystery that can never be wholly explained and can never be exhausted [10].

For Suhrawardī, a symbol is a way of communicating what cannot be expressed in words. It is a way of bypassing the rational intellect so to arrive at an intuitive insight. Meditation on images and symbols can lead the soul to connect with a higher ontological reality. The soul ‘inhabits’ both the immaterial world of lights and the sensory world of physical forms simultaneously. Thus, the soul incarnates to acquire wisdom, but also remains in the world of the immaterial lights as the perfect nature of the initiate, as a guardian angel. The soul is therefore the microcosmic counterpart of the Mundus Imaginalis or the world of Suspended Images, which mediates between the sensory and intelligible worlds. The Imaginal World is neither corporeal—with a spatiotemporal existence in the sensory world—nor purely incorporeal, but rather comparable to images suspended in a mirror.

The mirror is the locus in which the form in the mirror is made evident. The forms are suspended and are in neither a place nor a locus. The imaginative faculty is the locus in which the forms of the imagination are made evident and are suspended [6].

It is on the plane of the Mundus Imaginalis that visionary events take place, which are more real than those in the sensory world. For they are more ‘illuminated’ or energized by their proximity to the world of the Immaterial Lights. The Mundus Imaginalis is the world that the spiritual pilgrim encounters in his mystical experiences, the “land of visions” and the “land of resurrection”, where it is possible to be reunited with the soul, with Perfect Nature. And man has access to it by means of a special faculty of the soul, namely the active imagination [6,11].

Suhrawardī has gone down in history as the founder of an illuminationist philosophical tradition—an influential philosophy that has been studied extensively both in the Islamic East and later in the West. But it is remarkable how far and wide in human history we can find references to what he outlined in his emanatory cosmology: the Imaginal World (Mundus Imaginalis), Perfect Nature and Active Imagination. Here are just a few examples [8,10,11,12]:

  • In the Zoroastrian tradition, Mundus Imaginalis is referred to as the “Land of the Emerald Cities” or the Eighth Region of the World.
  • According to a Sufi tradition originating in Yemen, Khezr-Elijah—the name of Perfect Nature, the Angel of Knowledge, man’s most luminous nature—dwells where the celestial and terrestrial oceans touch.
  • Paracelsus spoke of the faculty of imaginatio vera, true imagination, which he urged should not be confused with fantasy.
  • Martin Ruland, in his Lexicon alchemiae (1612), stated that “Imagination is the star in man, the celestial or supercelestial body.”
  • Jacob Boehme spoke of the Imaginal World in the guises of the “Holy Element” or the “Soul of the World,” where Sophia (wisdom) dwells.
  • Carl Gustav Jung observed that the Magnum Opus of alchemy was as much a psychological operation, concerned with self-transformation, as the transmutation of metals. For him, true imagination was a fundamental key to understanding the Great Work. The in-between reality of the Imaginal World he called psychic.

And didn’t even Newton write in his alchemical texts that the real truths are embodied in myths, fables and prophecies [11]?

 

References

[1] https://dictionaryblog.cambridge.org/2020/06/17/from-darkness-into-the-light-metaphors-of-darkness-and-light/
[2] https://www.britannica.com/topic/Star-Wars-film-series
[3] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/suhrawardi/
[4] Suhrawardi & The Philosophy of Illumination,  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XbD8vfzsEHA&t=861s
[5] Cheetham, T., All the World An Icon: Henry Corbin and the Angelic Function of Beings, North Atlantic Books, 2012.
[6] Suhrawardi’s Science of Mystic Lights, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01qrFgEYhqI&t=190s
[7] Surah An-Nur Ayat 35 (24:35 Quran).
[8] https://plato.stanford.edu/Archives/Spr2013/entries/suhrawardi/
[9] Rebisse, Chr., Rosicrucian History and Mysteries, Athenaeum Press Ltd, 2007, pp. 110-111, 115.
[10] Cheetham, T., All the World An Icon: Henry Corbin and the Angelic Function of Beings, North Atlantic Books, 2012, p.68.
[11] Rebisse, Chr., Rosicrucian History and Mysteries, Athenaeum Press Ltd, 2007.
[12] Harpur, P., The Philosophers’ Secret Fire: a history of the imagination, The Squeeze Press 2009, p.123.

Announcing ‘Time and Mind,’ a FREE online conference!

Announcing ‘Time and Mind,’ a FREE online conference!

Reading | Physics and Psychology

Poster with photos

Reserve the dates November 30th and December 1st, 2023, on your calendars, for our online conference is happening again! And it is unmissable. This year the theme is Time and Mind. The event will be guest-hosted by Prof. Bernard Carr, PhD, Professor Emeritus of mathematics and astronomy at Queen Mary University of London. Luminaries such as Lee Smolin, Paul Davies, George Ellis and many others will be giving live, free-to-watch talks on the edges of science, where physics and psychology come together. CLICK HERE to watch the conference live!

The role of time in mainstream physics—as it arises in Newtonian theory, relativity theory, quantum theory and the 2nd law of thermodynamics—is relatively well understood. However, there is a profound mystery concerning the passage of time associated with consciousness. Many physicists maintain that this passage is purely a feature of mind, going beyond physics itself, while others argue that it points to some new physical paradigm, perhaps associated with the marriage of relativity theory and quantum theory. Certainly, the status of time in any final theory of physics remains unclear.

The possibility that physics may eventually accommodate and elucidate the nature of consciousness and associated mental experience suggests the need to address issues that are currently viewed as being on the borders of physics and philosophy. It also impinges on developments in neurophysics, cognitive science and psychology. So this is an interdisciplinary problem and this conference brings together experts in all the relevant fields. There are contributions from the physicists Bernard Carr, Paul Davies, George Ellis and Lee Smolin, the neurophysicist Alex Gomez-Marin, the cognitive neuroscientist Julia Mossbridge, and the psychologists Jonathan Schooler and Marc Wittmann.

Although the conference is organized by Essentia Foundation—which is associated with the philosophical tradition of Idealism—it shall cover a wide range of approaches. Our vision is to cover topics that are relevant to Idealism, but not to exclude alternative views from the conference.

CLICK HERE to watch the conference live and for free, without registration!

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