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Idealist stones hurt too

Idealist stones hurt too

Reading | Philosophy

Dino Alfier, PhD | 2022-02-06

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Physical realism is a leap of faith compelled by fear induced by a failure of the imagination, argues Dino Alfier. He provides a comprehensive take-down of Samuel Johnson’s attempt to refute Bishop Berkeley’s idealism by famously kicking a stone and proclaiming, in a peculiar display of circular and illogical reasoning, “I refute it thus.”

Samuel Johnson, ‘striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it,’ said, ‘I refute it thus,’ James Boswell tells us. What Johnson claims to be refuting with his kick is ‘Bishop Berkeley’s ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of matter, and that every thing in the universe is merely ideal.’ [1] Johnson’s ostensible refutation of idealism is certainly energetic, but is it also persuasive?

Imagine Berkeley standing beside Johnson and witnessing the scene. Johnson strikes the stone hard and says, ‘I refute it thus.’ Unperturbed, Berkeley strikes the very same stone just as hard and says, ‘I refute you thus.’ Berkeley’s ‘you’ stands by proxy for realism, that is, the idea that there exists a mind-independent reality.

It seems fair to suppose that Johnson believes that much of the force of his supposed refutation comes from the pain he experiences when striking the stone (note that Johnson’s foot rebounded from the stone, and, no matter how thick his boots might have been, it must have hurt some). As Berkeley is 24 years older than Johnson, it is highly probable that Berkeley’s kick hurts Berkeley’s foot more than Johnson’s kick hurts Johnson’s. Therefore, if the experience of how much it hurts to kick a stone could be adduced as evidence in support of a particular metaphysical view, then in this scenario Berkeley’s idealism would win the day.

However, if Berkeley had been standing by Johnson’s side at the moment of his purportedly fateful refutation, he would most likely have spared himself the pain, for Berkeley knew that the fact that it hurts to kick a stone cannot be adduced as evidence in support of any particular metaphysical view. Perhaps, Berkeley would have even seized the opportunity to make a little joke at Johnson’s expense: ‘I can see that you get a kick out of it,’ Berkeley might have said, ‘but, I’m afraid, that’s all you get.’

Berkeley is right, since Johnson’s attempt at refuting idealism is question-begging. Johnson is implying that it is obvious that kicking stones hurts because stones exist mind-independently,* but since mind-independent existence is precisely what idealism denies, explaining the throbbing foot by the mind-independent existence of stones does not refute idealism. Sure, kicking stones hard hurts: Berkeley would not dispute that. But that proves nothing regarding the mind-independent existence of stones or anything else.

Be that as it may, would Johnson have been interested in hearing Berkeley out? That is improbable. Johnson displays that condescending impatience so typical of those who, oblivious to their own metaphysical assumptions, have no time for metaphysics. ‘No sophistical trifling around for me,’ Johnson seems to be saying with his kick. ‘I’ve got real work to do. Real stones don’t strike themselves, you know.’

And Berkeley does know: there are no striker-independent struck stones.

Realism’s mind-independent reality is as inconceivable as a circle-independent circle’s center, and yet most people will consider the latter idea nonsensical, while the former idea is believed by most to be not only faintly plausible but utterly self-evident.

A realist may say, ‘It is obvious that the redness of this apple exists whether or not I see it.’ But the only obvious thing here is that the realist could never prove this statement, since the realist could never even talk about the redness of this apple without having seen it.

You can say to yourself that color would exist even if there were no instances of seeing it, but note that in making this statement you do not dispense with the concept of seeing, that is, with the concept of a mind-dependent process. Try expressing the same idea of the mind-independent existence of color without resorting to the concept of seeing. Can you? ‘Colour would exist even if…’ Then what?

When you think about it, then, you realize that, conceptually, reality as you experience it stands to mind as a circle’s center stands to a circle; you realize, that is, that you cannot conceive one without also conceiving the other.

Still, no matter how nonsensical realism may turn out to be upon reflection, realism’s pull remains strong—at least for me. It is almost comical that I should have to keep reminding myself not to make assertions that time and again I have proven to my intellectual satisfaction to be nonsensical. What am I afraid of? That if I turn my back for a second, the world as I know it will vanish forever? Or that one day it will transpire that my life has been—as in a fantastical story written by a primary-school pupil who cannot think of a better ending—all just a dream?

Realism is a leap of faith compelled by fear induced by a failure of the imagination. But the idiom ‘leap of faith’ can mislead: realism is in fact a holding on, seemingly for dear life. Realists believe they must hold on to a mind-independent reality as flat-earthers believe they would have to hold on to the edge at the end the world if they ever got there. Unsurprisingly, they never reach the end of the world. Realists, likewise, never reach the end of mind.

It seems to me that no amount of empirical evidence will ever weaken the pull that realism has for me. I hope that I will eventually be proven wrong on this score, that I will come across empirical evidence that convinces me once and for all that idealism is true, as I have been convinced by reflection. At any rate, it has not happened yet. And intellectual reflection does not stick for very long: you have to keep reapplying it, as it were.

… and it was just a dream. Yes, idealists may say that reality is a dream that our minds share [2], but idealists will not say that reality is just a dream: that is an addition realists tend to make. You can imagine Samuel Johnson saying, ‘Do dreams hurt when you strike them, eh?! Just a dream! Pouah!’ Perhaps, struck stones in dreams do hurt. But, alas, as I am not much of a dreamer, I would feel I stand on shaky ground, were I to pursue this line of thought.

Therefore, leaving aside whether or not dreamed struck stones hurt dreamed feet, the idealist can object to the realist’s addition of ‘just’ to ‘dream’ as follows: since reality as a whole is a dream that our minds share, there is nothing outside the dream in comparison to which the dream could be downgraded to being just a dream. The realist may say there is something outside the dream: namely, mind-independent reality. But, as we have seen, this is a nonsensical, albeit strongly attractive, idea.

It is as if realists believed that the use of words such as ‘dream’, ‘idea’ or ‘mind’ have the power to vaporize reality, to take away its solidity by some kind of dreadful ontological wizardry that must be exorcised. When Johnson strikes the stone and says, ‘I refute it thus,’ what he means is that the stone is solid, not thin air. But the violence of his gesture also smacks of ritualistic purging: ‘Get the idealist demon out of my head! Thud! Ouch! That’s better.’ There is no reason, however, for idealists to deny that reality feels solid. But solidity is not independent of experiencers.

You can sense Johnson’s frustration, as if he were kicking a car that has run out of petrol in the middle of a trip. The kicks will not help. The car refuses to restart, and at most what will be ‘achieved’ is a dent or two. By striking the stone, Johnson only manages to show that the stone refuses to dispense with his foot.

That must hurt, thinks Berkeley.

 

* Editor’s note: by inferring that the hurt implies a mind-independent reality, Johnson is presupposing the very thing he is attempting to argue for, which is the well-known logical fallacy of question-begging, also known as circular reasoning.

 

Bibliographical references

  1. Boswell, J. (1791). The Life of Samuel Johnson. Project Gutenberg: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1564/1564-h/1564-h.htm (accessed 24th January 2022).
  2. Kastrup, B. (2011) Meaning in Absurdity. Winchester, UK & Washington, USA: iff Books, p. 29.

Is intelligibility a pre-condition for existence? (The Return of Metaphysics)

Is intelligibility a pre-condition for existence? (The Return of Metaphysics)

Reading | Metaphysics

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Today we kick off a brand-new series of heavy-weight essays, produced in collaboration with the Institute of Art and Ideas (IAI), to mark the present-day resurgence of metaphysics as a serious intellectual endeavor in the Western cultural dialogue: The Return of Metaphysics. After many decades of a kind of stupor, the fundamental questions of what we are, what nature is in its essence, have re-awoken in academia and demand to retake their role in orienting our lives. In this first installment of the series, University of Chicago’s Prof. Robert Pippin returns to Kant and Hegel to ask the question: is intelligibility a precondition for existence? Are our thought processes and their inherent capabilities and limitations fundamentally linked to what can or cannot exist in nature? He reviews German Idealism to ponder what it could mean for us today, in the early 21st century. This essay has been first published by the IAI on the 21st of January, 2022.

Philosophy is not an empirical enterprise. Its traditional claim is to be a form of knowledge about reality, even though it does not rely on observation about that reality. If there is philosophical knowledge, it is a priori knowledge, and if it is knowledge, it claims something true about reality not accessible to empirical observation or confirmation. Philosophy’s claims to a priori knowledge seems to lead us inevitably to what has always been, until the last two-hundred and fifty years or so, the center of philosophy, its inescapable ‘big’ question: metaphysics.

So, what happened two hundred and fifty years ago? Kant happened, in 1781. His The Critique of Pure Reason indicated, by its very title, bad news for the metaphysical tradition. There was no such power as an intuitive reason with access to any non-sensible realm of reality. Reason, thinking generally, was exclusively an activity, in no sense a perceptual power. Its main activity was inferring, deducing, systematizing, unifying, and was in no sense open to the world. The only such openness available for finite human beings was through our sensory powers and thinking’s task was the discriminating and unifying our experience. Assuming otherwise was the main reason philosophy had achieved no settled results in over two thousand years of speculation and had, instead, produced only unresolvable conflicts with equally good and equally paradoxical positions on either side of classical issues. Hegel, however, perhaps the most influential of the post-Kantian philosophers, took seriously Kant’s claim that, even if thought can’t know the world, it can know itself. That led him to a revival of the very enterprise Kant sought to eliminate: metaphysics, the study of the necessary features of existence.

 

What was metaphysics and Kant’s critique

Metaphysics claims to be knowledge of reality attained by pure reason alone, by ‘pure thinking’ unaided by empirical observation. This assumed, from the time of Plato and Aristotle until the great rationalist metaphysicians of the seventeenth century, that we possessed a capacity, a power of thinking, capable of doing so. The idea was that pure reason could determine “what the world could not but be,” in other words, what the conditions are for there to be a possible world at all. If there is metaphysical knowledge, it deals in necessity. The most famous instance of such a claim was and remains Plato’s theory of Ideas, but the medieval concept of realism, Descartes’s res cogitans and res extensa, Leibniz’s monads and Spinoza’s substance are obvious successors. This, in turn, assumed that there must be something like a “light of reason,” a capacity to grasp what could not be grasped in sensory experience. In Plato this meant “noesis,” in Aristotle the cooperation of the active and passive intellect, in Descartes, “clear and distinct ideas,” and so forth.

Kant’s critique of traditional metaphysics was not welcome news, and not just to philosophers. It had been a matter of great importance in the Christian inheritance of the Greek metaphysical tradition that unaided human reason was indeed capable of establishing such claims as that there was a God, there was an immortal, immaterial soul, and that human beings were free and so morally accountable as individuals. Kant conceded that there may indeed be a realm of non-sensible reality, a “noumenal world,” but once we begin with a rigorous examination of our power to know, we had to conclude that we could know nothing about it.

But Kant did not completely deserve his reputation as the “all-destroyer.” He left pure reason one possible object: itself. Reason could establish the categorial elements of any thinking at all, elements without which no experience at all could be possible. We know only appearances, not things in themselves, but we could know something a priori about the objects of experience. We could at least have what one commentator called a “metaphysics of experience”: the necessary features of human experience. The philosophical labor needed to establish all of this amounted to a demonstration of such staggering brilliance and originality that it took many decades before its full power could be appreciated, but its immediate effect was devastating and changed the course of philosophy forever. It seemed to mean the death of metaphysics, pure reason’s attempt to know reality as it is in itself. And this left very unclear what there was left for philosophy to do.

 

Hegel’s resurrection of metaphysics

Despite Kant’s rejection of traditional metaphysics as impossible, it was essential to this enterprise that pure reason could know itself; pure thinking could determine what pure thinking must be such that determinate objects of thought were possible. But when pure thinking knows something about what pure thinking requires, what does it know? Does it know “how the human mind works, must work, in shaping the material of experience”? That would be a piece of substantive knowledge about… what exactly? A mental substance?

Enter the post-Kantian idealists, especially Hegel, and a certain sort of retrieval of metaphysics. Hegel’s basic claim had three components. The first is the claim that a priori knowledge of the world, the ordinary spatiotemporal world, is possible; knowledge about that world, but achieved independently of empirical experience. The second component is where all the interpretive controversies begin. It is the claim that this a priori knowledge, while in some sense ultimately about the world, consists in thinking’s or reason’s knowledge of itself; thinking’s understanding of thinking or, as Hegel designates, a “science of pure thinking.” This is what distinguishes classical rationalism from idealism, as Hegel (and Kant) understood it. The former holds that reason has access to its proper objects outside itself; the latter that the object of pure thinking is itself.  But there is clearly a question to be answered: how could we have a priori knowledge of reality, while the only object of our thinking is thought itself?

One long dominant interpretation of this apparent paradox holds that these two claims can be both assertable only if what there ‘really’ is, the ‘really real world,’ what is accessible only to pure reason alone, is itself thoughts, non-sensible objects;  something like the Absolute’s or God’s thinking itself, an inherent, evolving noetic structure, unfolding in time from the human perspective. Pure thought thinking itself is the manifestation of the noesis noeseos, God thinking himself, or it is the divine-like apprehension of the noetic reality that underlies experienced appearances. I cannot do so here, but I have argued for thirty years that that interpretation does not fit the text.

But apart from the interpretation issue, the most important critiques of idealism all hold that any such project is doomed from the start, that there is not and cannot be such a self-sufficient “pure thinking.” Such a broad counter claim is often summarized as a doctrine of “radical finitude.” This is an apt title since Hegel insists that, to use an Aristotelian formulation, “thinking thinking thinking” is not the thinking of any object (even “the subject’s forms”). Pure thinking’s object is itself but not as an object or event, rather its object is the thinking also interrogating thinking; a circle, not a dyadic relation; hence the provocative notion of “infinity,” without beginning or end.  The later anti-idealist criticism holds that thinking must always be understood as grounded on, or dependent on some sort of non-thinking ground, or materiality or contingency or the unconscious instinct or drive of the thinker.

In Hegel’s treatment, the topic of pure thinking is presented as having nothing to do with the existing human thinker, the subject, consciousness, the mind. The topic rather raises, as a problem, the possibility of the intelligibility of even whatever is being touted as pre-conscious source or hidden origin of the “subject,” the intelligibility of what is assumed in any such determinate identification as a knowledge claim. That source is either something available for some kind of apprehension or it is not. If it is, it must be subject to some regime of intelligibility for this determinacy to be accounted for. So, Hegel’s project is thought’s determination of what thought must be, its moments (Denkbestimmungen) in order to be a possible truth-bearer, a result that, for Hegel, immediately involves what could be the object of any truth claim.

In the face of this, if someone simply persists in asking what we were asking above: “But where is all this thinking and explaining happening?” all one can reply is “wherever there is thinking.” This is not to say that there is not always a thinker or subject of thought; it is to say that thought that can be truth-bearing is constituted by what is necessary for truth-bearing, by any being of whatever sort capable of objective (possibly true or false) judgment. Any such determination of a source or ground or subject-object, must still—so goes the case for the possible explication of absolute intelligibility—make sense within a general regime of sense-making, or nothing has been claimed by the putative claim for any such material ground or source. Any such criticism, in so far as it is a thinking, a judging, a claim to know, is always already a manifestation of a dependence on pure thinking and its conditions.

Pure thinking, as Hegel understands it, is neither dependent on, nor independent from, the empirical, or from materiality or the brain or whatever new “absolute” comes into fashion. That anti-Hegelian question already manifests (for the Hegelian) a misunderstanding of the question of pure thinking itself. This is not to deny that any reference to thinking presumes a thinker, indeed a living, purposive, finite, embodied rational thinker. It is, rather, to argue for the autonomy of the question of “any thinking at all,” whatever the existential status of the thinker. That is, it is to insist on the priority and autonomy of what he called “logic,” and that means for him its complete self-determination of its own “moments.”

Hegel’s enterprise takes as its topic the categories or “thought determinations” (Denkbestimmungen) necessary for thought to have determinate objective content, an enterprise that at the same time specifies the determinations inherent in the possible determinacy of being itself. That means it is a metaphysics, one based on the “identity,” in this sense, of “thinking and being.” This is not a knowledge of any non-sensible reality, it is a knowledge of any intelligible reality, the only kind there is. It is a revival of the great principle of classical philosophy: to be is to be intelligible. Thinking’s knowledge of itself is knowing what could be intelligible and therewith a knowledge of what could be.

Put a different way, the intelligibility of anything is just what it is to be that thing, to be determinately “this-such”(tode ti), the answer to the “what is it” (ti esti) question definitive of metaphysics since Aristotle. To be is to be intelligibly, determinately “what it is.” In knowing itself, thought knows of all things, what it is to be anything, a determinately intelligible anything. As for Aristotle, the task of metaphysics is not to say of any particular thing what it is; it is to determine what must be true of anything at all such that what it is in particular can be determined by the special sciences.

Hegel, and to some extent Leibniz, was the first major thinker in modernity to attempt such a revival of Aristotle (for all their differences) after the scorn heaped on him by the likes of Hobbes and Descartes, and what he accomplished remains a relatively unexplored option in the fate of metaphysics.

What lurks behind spacetime?

What lurks behind spacetime?

Reading | Physics

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The cosmic riddle of structure without extension—of how complexity can exist outside space and time—is tackled by our Executive Director in this first edition of our Mid-Week Nugget.

Long gone are the days in which spacetime was regarded as an immutable, absolute, irreducible scaffolding of nature. Although our ordinary intuitions still insist on this outdated notion, since the late 18th century a series of developments in philosophy and science—such as Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s proposal that spacetime is a mere category of perception, Einstein and his block universe, Julian Barbour and his universe without time, Lee Smolin and his universe without space, loop quantum gravity, etc.—have relegated it to the status of persistent illusion. Spacetime is but a relatively superficial layer of nature contingent upon more fundamental underlying processes.

The problem is that spacetime seems to be a prerequisite for differentiation and, by implication, structure. Things and events can only be distinguished from one another insofar as they occupy different volumes of space or different moments in time. Without spaciotemporal extension, all of nature would seem to collapse into a singularity without internal differentiation and, therefore, without structure. Schopenhauer had already seen this in the early 19th century, when he argued that spacetime is nature’s principium individuationis, or ‘principle of individuation.’

Yet, it is empirically obvious that nature does have structure: its very regularities of behavior betray just that. Under certain circumstances nature does one thing and, under others, something else; repeatedly and reliably. Such distinguishable and consistent behaviors can only occur with some form of underlying, immanent structure.

So how are we to reconcile the empirical fact that nature has structure with the understanding that spacetime is not fundamental? How are we to think of the irreducible foundations of nature as both lacking extension and having structure? I submit that this is the least recognized and discussed dilemma of modern science.

To solve it, we must start with an admission: objects and events do indeed inherently require spaciotemporal extension to be differentiated; Schopenhauer was right about the principium individuationis. But we know of one other type of natural entity whose intrinsic structure does not require extension.

Consider, for instance, a hypothetical database of student records. Each record contains the respective student’s intellectual aptitudes and dispositions, so the school can develop an effective educational workplan. The records are linked to one another so to facilitate the formation of classes: students with similar aptitudes and dispositions are associated together in the database. Starting from a given aptitude, a teacher can thus browse the database for compatible students.

Now, notice that these associations between records are fundamentally semantic: they represent links of meaning. Associated records mean similar or compatible aptitudes, which in turn mean something about how students naturally cluster together. Therein lies the usefulness of the database. Even though it may have a spatiotemporal embodiment—say, paper files stored in the same box in an archive—there is a sense in which their structure fundamentally resides in their meaning. Spaciotemporal embodiments merely copy or reflect such meaning. After all, the semantic relationships between my intellectual aptitudes and those of others wouldn’t disappear if our respective paper files went up in flames.

I submit that this is how we must think of the most foundational level of nature, the universe behind extension: as a database of natural semantic associations, spontaneous links of meaning. This is similar to how a mathematical equation associates variables based on their meaning, whether such associations happen to have spatiotemporal embodiments or not. The associations can indeed be projected onto spacetime—just as databases can have physical embodiments—but, in and of themselves, they do not require spacetime to be said to exist. This is how nature can have structure without extension.

But what about causality? Its central tenet is that effect follows cause in time, so what are we to make of it without extension? Philosopher Alan Watts once proposed a metaphor to illustrate the answer: imagine that you are looking through a vertical slit on a wooden fence. On the other side of the fence, a cat walks by. From your perspective, you first see the cat’s head and then, a moment later, the cat’s tail. This repeats itself consistently every time the cat walks by. If you didn’t know what is actually going on—that is, the existence of the complete pattern called a ‘cat’—you would understandably say that the head causes the tail.

Behind extension, the universe is the complete pattern of semantic associations—that is, the cat. Our ordinary traversing of spacetime is our looking through the fence, experiencing partial segments of that pattern. All we see is that the cat’s tail consistently follows the cat’s head every time we look. And we call it causality.

The notion that, at its most fundamental level, nature is a complete pattern of associations has been hinted at by physicists before. Max Tegmark, for instance, has proposed that matter is mere “baggage,” the universe consisting purely of abstract mathematical relationships.

We must, however, avoid vague abstract handwaving: every mathematical structure ever devised has existed in a mind, not in an ontic vacuum. The only coherent and explicit conception of mathematical objects is that of mental objects. To speak of mathematical structure without a mind is like talking of the Cheshire Cat’s grin without the cat. Unless you are Lewis Carroll, you won’t get away with that.

Meaning—such as those of the variables in a mathematical equation—is an intrinsically mental phenomenon. In the absence of spacetime, this betrays the only possible ontic ground of a cosmic semantic database: the universe is a web of semantic associations in a field of spontaneous, natural mentation; for mind is the only ontic substrate we know of that isn’t indisputably extended.

Indeed, dispositions and aptitudes are palpably real—in the sense of being known through direct acquaintance—yet transcend extension. What is the size of my aptitude for math? What is the length of my disposition to philosophize, or even of my next thought? Whatever theory of mind you subscribe to, the pre-theorical fact remains: you can’t take a tape measure to my next thought; mentation is not indisputably extended.

As such, within the bounds of coherent and explicit reasoning, a structured universe without irreducible extension is per force a mental universe—not in the sense of residing in our individual minds, but of consisting of a field of natural, spontaneous mental activity, whose intrinsic ‘dispositions’ and ‘aptitudes’ are known to us as the ‘laws of nature.’

Whirlpools in Universal Consciousness

Whirlpools in Universal Consciousness

Reading | Metaphysics

Nithin Nagaraj, PhD | 2022-01-09

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Dr. Nagaraj reminds us of the extraordinarily rich and long history of metaphysical Idealism in Indian philosophy, and of the power of metaphors to illustrate, to the common person, the simultaneously profound and simple truths of Idealism.

A picture is worth a thousand words. A good metaphor is worth a thousand ideas. Conveying complex metaphysical ideas to the layperson is a daunting task. This is where good metaphors can serve not just as an efficient pedagogical tool to drive the point home, but also to help us remember and recount. In elucidating the idealist worldview, Bernardo Kastrup1 employs a very handy metaphor: the image of whirlpools in the river of universal consciousness. In this metaphor, Universal Consciousness is imagined to be akin to a singular flowing river with ripples, curls, undulations and whirlpools. Dissociated alters (like you, me and other life forms) are like swirling whirlpools in this roaring river of Universal Consciousness.

As part of their teachings, ancient (and modern) Indian philosophers, sages and thinkers have skillfully devised metaphors borrowing from artifacts or examples encountered in daily living that were familiar to the lay public. The ‘rope and snake,’ the ‘pot and clay,’ ‘gold and golden ornaments’,’ the ‘ocean and its waves,’ the ‘theatre stage and the lamp’—these are but a tiny fraction of the large number of clever metaphors used by Indian philosopher-sages of yore to convey complex metaphysical arguments in very simple terms. Spiritual teachers, both ancient and contemporary ones, use several metaphors to expound the philosophy of ‘Not-Two’ (Advaita or non-dualism).

For example, the ‘gold and golden ornaments’ metaphor is used to account for the changing appearance of all manifestations (necklaces, bangles, rings) superimposed on a changeless background (gold). This dualism (gold vs. golden ornaments) is ultimately unreal, the only reality being non-dual, gold, which is the substance of all ornaments. Similarly, individual body-minds (akin to golden ornaments) are made from the one substance that is real: Universal Consciousness (akin to gold).

The metaphor of the illusory appearance of a puddle of water (a mirage) in a desert is equally efficacious to convey the same non-dual truth. More recently, the sage of Arunachala, Ramana Maharishi, employed the screen and movie metaphor2 to teach the same non-dual truth as he experienced it. In this metaphor, Universal Consciousness stands for the screen on which the movie of manifestations (the phenomenal world) appears and disappears.

 

The Whirlpool Metaphor

A whirlpool has no real independent existence apart from the river of which it is a part of. It is impossible to physically remove a whirlpool out of the river. Every whirlpool is nothing other than a ‘name’ given to a temporary modulation of the ‘form’ of the one undivided river. In a similar vein, each body-mind is a temporary modulation of Universal Consciousness with a name attached to it (‘Bernardo’, ‘Clara’, ‘Ravi’ etc.). Two whirlpools are seemingly separate and distinct with their own individual features, their own personal points-of-view. Yet, as part of the same indivisible river, they are essentially one. Similarly, individual body-minds with distinct personalities and points-of-view are essentially one, as a part of the singular Universal Consciousness.

In reality, however, there are no parts in Universal Consciousness. Talk of ‘parts’ is simply a case of appearances and has no real validity. How is this possible? The dream metaphor makes this quite clear. The one indivisible waking mind, as it falls asleep, projects within itself a dream of diverse dream characters, dream mountains, dream clouds, dream pain, dream hunger, dream joy and a multitude of other dream objects, all of which disappear into thin air upon waking up. This apparent division of our indivisible minds is something that each of us experiences every night.

The whirlpool metaphor has special features that make it suitable for Idealist metaphysics. A whirlpool is formed by special laws of hydrodynamics and has a center that remains stationary to the dynamic flow of water around it. The whirlpool also has a boundary that localizes the water molecules and creates the illusion of a stand-alone entity, seemingly separate and independent from the river in which it is embedded.

In fact, however, the whirlpool is neither separate nor independent from the river, but only appears so to the observer (or to other whirlpools, if they could perceive). It is made up of only water and nothing else. This boundary of the whirlpool that circumscribes a localized circular flow of water is also a temporary and illusory one.

In the same fashion, we can hypothesize the existence of universal laws that bring about dissociation in Universal Consciousness. This process of dissociation results in individual body-minds (whirlpools) that have a seemingly stand-alone existence separate from Universal Consciousness (river). Each of us has thoughts, feelings and bodily sensations that are completely private and personal (just like the water going round and round inside a whirlpool). We share some of our sensory perceptions with our neighboring body-minds (which is what creates the illusion of a physical world outside us), but each of us has their own point-of-view, habits, idiosyncrasies, preferences, likes and dislikes, dreams, hopes, ambitions, desires, fears, as well as their our own ideology and belief systems. We have a rich inner life. Yet, we can’t really separate ourselves from the Universe we live in.

Even in a materialist ontology, an individual body-mind can never be really separated from the Cosmos. We breath the outside air continuously, we are thermodynamically and quantum-mechanically coupled with the environment (with which we exchange heat and particles continuously). We even share ideas, hopes and dreams with others. We are deeply interlinked and interconnected even under a materialist worldview. We are not an isolated system unto ourselves.

However, the idealist metaphysical framework is more parsimonious in explaining the facts of reality than materialism. Relatively speaking, in the whirlpool metaphor, the circular and spiral patterns of different whirlpools happen in the same river without the need to posit a different substance. Both the river and the whirlpool have the same substance (water) as their essence, as their underlying reality. Similarly, under Idealism, dissociated body-minds and Universal Consciousness are both made of the same substance (mentality) without the need to posit a spurious second substance called ‘matter,’ for which we have no direct evidence.

Swami Vivekananda, the cyclonic Hindu monk from India who created quite a ripple in the West starting from his groundbreaking 1893 speech at the World’s Parliament of Religions, in fact used the whirlpool metaphor to good effect. In his lectures on Raja Yoga3, where he expounds on the mysteries of Prana, he says:

In this universe there is one continuous substance on every plane of existence. Physically this universe is one: there is no difference between the sun and you. … Each form represents, as it were, one whirlpool in the infinite ocean of matter, of which not one is constant. Just as in a rushing stream there may be millions of whirlpools, the water in each of which is different every moment, turning round and round for a few seconds, and then passing out, replaced by a fresh quantity, so the whole universe is one constantly changing mass of matter, in which all forms of existence are so many whirlpools. A mass of maker enters into one whirlpool, say a human body, stays there for a period, becomes changed, and goes out into another, say an animal body this time, from which again after a few years, it enters into another whirlpool, called a lump of mineral. …when the action of Prana is most subtle, this very ether, in the finer state of vibration, will represent the mind and there it will be still one unbroken mass. If you can simply get to that subtle vibration, you will see and feel that the whole universe is composed of subtle vibrations. Sometimes certain drugs have the power to take us, while as yet in the senses, to that condition. Many of you may remember the celebrated experiment of Sir Humphrey Davy, when the laughing gas overpowered him—how, during the lecture, he remained motionless, stupefied and after that, he said that the whole universe was made up of ideas. For, the time being, as it were, the gross vibrations had ceased, and only the subtle vibrations which he called ideas, were present to him. He could only see the subtle vibrations round him; everything had become thought; the whole universe was an ocean of thought, he and everyone else had become little thought whirlpools. (emphasis added)

In his speech in San Francisco, titled “The Science of Breathing” (29 March 1900),4 he proclaims:

… The whole universe is a tremendous case of unity in variety. There is only one mass of mind. Different [states] of that mind have different names. [They are] different little whirlpools in this ocean of mind. We are universal and individual at the same time. Thus is the play going on … In reality this unity is never broken. [Matter, mind, spirit are all one.] (emphasis added)

He further adds: 

All these are but various names. There is but one fact in the universe, and we look at it from various standpoints. The same [fact] looked at from one standpoint becomes matter. The same one from another standpoint becomes mind. There are not two things. (emphasis added)

The above passages are enough to convince us that the worldview espoused by Swami Vivekananda is virtually identical to Analytical Idealism and the whirlpool metaphor does a fantastic job in conveying the same. He not only introduced Hinduism and Vedanta to the United States but was also a champion of religious tolerance and called for an end to all forms of fanaticism. This could be directly attributed to his firm adherence to the philosophy of Advaita or Non-dualism, both in theory and practice.

 

What makes a good metaphor?

One can ponder on what constitutes a good metaphor. There are several features that it should contain. The metaphor must employ objects, things, events, phenomena that are very ordinary and familiar, which are encountered often in one’s daily life. Furthermore, the relationship between the elements of the metaphor must be a matter of common knowledge. This makes the metaphor relatable to a large number of people (adults and even children beyond a certain age and basic education). The simplicity of the metaphor is equally important. The obviousness of the truth of the metaphor typically makes any further explanation redundant and unnecessary. All that a teacher does over and beyond the metaphor is to provide the connecting link from the elements in the metaphor to elements of reality that she desires to convey. A good metaphor in philosophical discussions is one that, upon deep reflection, succeeds in catapulting the mind into silence, into the ground of our shared Being. The whirlpool metaphor does precisely that; it delivers us the experience of Swami Vivekananda’s words: “we are universal and individual at the same time.

 

References

  1. Kastrup, Bernardo. Why materialism is baloney: How true skeptics know there is no death and fathom answers to life, the universe, and everything. John Hunt Publishing, 2014.
  2. Maharshi, Ramana. Talks with Sri Ramana Maharshi (compiled by Munagala S. Venkataramiah). Talk No. 199 and 453. Sri Ramanasramam, Tiruvannamalai, 2006.
  3. Vivekananda, Swami. The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda-Volume 1. Raja Yoga. Chapter III. Prana. Advaita Ashrama (A publication branch of Ramakrishna Math, Belur Math), 1963. URL:https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Complete_Works_of_Swami_Vivekananda/Volume_1/Raja-Yoga/Prana
  4. Vivekananda, Swami. The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda-Volume 1. Lectures and Discourses. “Breathing”. Advaita Ashrama (A publication branch of Ramakrishna Math, Belur Math), 1963.

Conscious storms and the origin of life

Conscious storms and the origin of life

Reading | Philosophy | 2021-12-26

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This surprisingly coherent and empirically well-grounded essay argues that, although governed by blind, purposeless laws of nature, the Earth’s atmosphere—just like biological brains—may be associated with a subjective first-person perspective, and may have therefore purposely created life on Earth. The essay coherently brings together a compatibilist approach to free will, an idealist metaphysics and speculations about abiogenesis.

The mind-body problem is typically thought to concern the relation between mind and brain in humans and perhaps other animals. However, Thomas Nagel—in his famous and criticized book Mind and Cosmos (Nagel, 2012)—wishes to show that “the mind-body problem is not simply a localized problem that affects the relationship between mind and brain in living animal organisms, but rather it pervades our understanding of the whole cosmos and its story.” Although we—like many other authors—remain skeptical of Nagel’s ill-defined natural finalism, we too do believe that the gravity of the mind-body problem is currently underestimated. In this essay, we will follow a completely different approach with respect to Nagel’s one.

The purpose of this essay is to show that the mind-body problem does not only concern the relationship between mind and brain in humans and other animals, but rather affects the current neo-Darwinian  conception of the whole phenomenon of life.

The Neo-Darwinist thesis is typically the following: although living organisms seem, prima facie, to be the product of a creative mind, given that a naturalistic explanation for the origin of life has been found or can be found in principle, life is not what it appears to be; i.e. it is not the product of a creative mind. In The Blind Watchmaker (Dawkins, 1986) Richard Dawkins clearly states that life is, instead, the result of a blind and unconscious process. With the term ‘blind’ he basically means that the process is ‘purposeless’, and with the term ‘unconscious’ he really means that there was no mind that intentionally created living organisms.

We believe that these conclusions are somewhat hasty and drawn without observance of the current debate on the mind-body problem. Consider, in this regard, that the present essay also gives the strong impression of being the product of a mind. Yet, there is certainly a naturalistic explanation for its appearance, given that the brains of its two authors operate according to the laws of physics. The laws of nature, including the neuronal electrochemistry that regulates our brains, are by definition purposeless: opposite electric charges tend to attract each other without any purpose. Yet, in the second paragraph of this essay you have read the words: “The purpose of this essay is to…”. This is one of the most fascinating aspects of the mysterious relationship between mind and matter: although neuronal discharges simply happen by virtue of purposeless laws of nature—just as e.g. lightning in the sky—corresponding to the activity of these discharges there are mental contents experienced from the first-person perspective. Among these contents there is the belief that what is happening in nature (the writing of this essay) is not simply happening without purpose, but instead results from our free will. Therefore, the existence of a description of a process, in physical terms, as the ‘blind’ (i.e. purposeless) unfolding of natural laws does not exclude the conscious experience of a creative, purposeful act. Consequently, the fact that a naturalistic explanation for the appearance of living beings exists (or at least can exist) does not necessarily support the thesis that living beings appear by virtue of a ‘blind’ and ‘unconscious’ process. Just as we, the authors of the present essay, experienced its creation as a purposeful process, so may nature experience the creation of living organisms, according to its own laws, as a purposeful process as well.

So let’s consider the classic story we learned in school books about the origins of life on Earth. The story typically emphasizes the central role of lightning in the causal chain that led to the emergence of the first living organisms. The idea arose from the famous Miller-Urey experiment, in which electrical discharges simulated lightning strikes in the primordial atmosphere. Lightning discharges happen in the sky just as neuronal discharges happen in our brain, and they are both phenomena involving electromagnetic interactions. The question we pose is therefore the following: is it possible that, on the primordial Earth, the purposeless activity of lightning discharges was associated with a conscious experience of purposeful creation? If so, the creator could be identified with our own planet, and its brain with the Earth’s atmospheric system. As bizarre as this hypothesis may seem, we cannot exclude that there is conscious experience associated with any physical phenomenon, for we have no idea of how or why conscious experience accompanies the activity of a biological brain in the first place.

The generic nature of such an answer may leave one unsatisfied. However, the appearance of life on Earth as the product of a mind is at least as plausible as the other known hypotheses. Such a hypothesis—which, like the others, makes no claim to have been proven—has an epistemological advantage over the others: it describes living organisms exactly as what they appear to be, i.e. the product of a mind.

In this regard, let’s consider C. R. Woese’s theory, according to which it is far more likely that life originated from a prebiotic medium that is intrinsically ‘cellular.’ The best candidate for this medium is given by atmospheric clouds made up of water droplets whose size is typically tens of micrometers, thus comparable with the size of living cells. Furthermore, the formation of amphiphilic double-layer membranes—think of soap-bubbles—can occur around these droplets, so a primordial cellular membrane can spontaneously form. The forces acting on these microsystems go beyond just gravity and winds, because of the presence of generally non-uniform electric fields in clouds. The dimensions of the droplets are precisely those for which dielectrophoretic forces become important, whereas for smaller dimensions Brownian motion dominates and for larger dimensions gravity dominates. The clouds’ electric fields reach values in the order of 10-100kV/m, which are consistent with the values involved in everyday dielectrophoresis techniques at submillimeter scales. Such techniques are useful in many fields because of their high selective power. Therefore, such forces can have the same selective action in clouds.

These considerations serve to further underline the possible causal power of the entire atmospheric system on the appearance of the first living organisms, admitting that by virtue of the forces that the entire atmospheric system exerts on its microdroplets the first living organisms could at some point appear on the primordial Earth.

It must be admitted that no one is currently able to reproduce this process, i.e. nobody is currently able to create life from chemicals. But when we succeed in doing so, we should admit that life will have been created again in a way similar to how it was created about 4 billion years ago on our planet: a living organism appeared by virtue of blind (purposeless) electromagnetic forces that regulated the creative, conscious activity of something akin to a non-biological brain. This creative consciousness would have been aware of what it was doing, fully living the creative experience. It would have believed, from a first-person perspective, to be the intentional creator of a form of life. Corresponding to the blind forces that operated on its brain—in the third-person perspective—there would have been a conscious experience—in the first-person perspective—of a creative process.

As we have already argued, since we have no idea of why there is conscious experience corresponding to the activity of a particular physical system (biological brains), we have no way of refuting the hypothesis that there was conscious experience associated with the electromagnetic activity of the primordial atmospheric system. And since we have no idea of what is so special about a biological brain, we are forced to formulate the following conjecture: if a system has similar physical or structural characteristics to those of a biological brain, then it is plausible that its activity is associated with conscious experience. Such a conjecture is based on the observation that my brain and your brain are different but quite similar in many ways, and we are both conscious.

So let’s see what characteristics are common to a biological brain and the Earth’s atmosphere, based on a long tradition of comparative studies between the two, aimed at determining possible interactions between environmental electromagnetism and brain activity. Both the brain and the atmosphere are self-organizing, complex, non-isolated systems at thermodynamical disequilibrium. The main constituent of both is water, and both have a cellular structure at the lowest organization level: in the scenario we have referred to for the origin of life, cloud water droplets are the most ancient ancestors of living cells, and therefore also of neurons. Regarding the global organization of the two systems, at the highest level the atmospheric system, like the brain, is organized in two hemispheres. The two hemispheres are characterized by opposite values of Coriolis force resulting from opposite latitudinal motion. Independently of the physical reason for such an organization, let’s just note that the brain and the atmospheric system share a bilateral symmetry.

Furthermore, in these two non-isolated systems the free-energy—which for both systems ultimately comes from the Sun—is involved in establishing electromagnetic potential differences across the membrane of each cell. In the case of the brain, the electrochemical membrane potential is maintained by virtue of the action of the ATP-dependent Na-K pump. In the atmospheric system, the free energy absorbed by the Earth is stored in differences of electric potential within clouds, between clouds, between clouds and the surrounding air, and between clouds and the ground. Regardless of the specific charge separation mechanism, because of the cellular structure of each cloud, it is likely that an electric potential gradient is present across the surfaces of the cells of the system, which can generally consist of liquid water droplets or frozen water crystals. For both systems, the free energy absorbed and stored in such potential gradients is dissipated in the process of electric discharge, which consists of an electrostatic discharge for the atmospheric system and of an electrochemical discharge for the brain.

Cloud charging is the phenomenon responsible for lightning events. The physical mechanism through which a lightning discharge begins is the so called ‘stepped leader,’ which is constituted by a channel of free electrons typically branching in a tree-like configuration. When the stepped leader approaches the positively charged region of the cloud, its relatively large negative charge sets the condition for the ‘return stroke,’ a large flow of positively charged ions from the positive region to the negative region of the cloud. Persinger (Persinger, 2012) compared conduction in a neuronal axon with the stepped leader. He recognized similar wave shape characteristics between neuronal action potential and lightning discharge, as well as the coincidence of different physical quantities, such as the power and current densities of the respective discharges. Moreover, once a lightning discharge has occurred, if additional negative charge is shortly made available to the upper portion of the previous stroke channel, a train of impulses can be produced. Similarly, trains of impulses in synchronously firing neurons generally occur in a brain.

At this point, it is natural to question whether different atmospheric discharges can be related events, just as distinct synchronous discharges of neuronal clusters are related in a brain. In other words, we are asking whether the atmospheric system can be regarded as a computing machine, a neuronal network of some kind. In this regard, while an enormous amount of study has been devoted to the initiation of a single lightning flash, the characteristics and the properties of a sequence of consecutive flashes has received little attention. Dennis (Dennis, Jan. 1970) visually recorded twenty thunderstorms in New Mexico and conducted a statistical analysis on the timing of consecutive flashes. He concluded that the occurrence of an individual flash must be considered a random phenomenon. However, the reliability and limited amount of observations suggests that there may have been a different way of interpreting the inter-arrival times of flashes. In a different study by Mazur (Mazur, Nov 1982), many cases were reported of ‘associated discharges,’ namely flashes occurring within 200ms of one another. Mazur determined that the hypothesis that all observed flashes were independent events is refuted with a significance level between 0.1% and 5%. A similar phenomenon of closely spaced flashes was reported by Yonnegut et al. (B. Yonnegut, Jan. 1985), who noted the clustering or convergence of lightning flashes as they appear in nocturnal space shuttle video images. They just offered a conceptual explanation similar to that of Mazur, stating that the release of electrical energy in one portion of the cloud eventually triggers the breakdown process in another portion. In another study using space shuttle lightning images, Yair et al. (Y. Yair, Aug. 2006) analyzed footage from six storm systems and showed that, in storms exhibiting a high flash rate, lightning activity in a region displayed transient synchronization with bursts of nearly simultaneous flashes in other regions. Although the electromagnetic coupling mechanism is not yet fully understood, the authors explained the phenomenon by borrowing a model from neuroscience (Y. Yair, Aug. 2006): the adaptive network of leaky-integrate-and-fire oscillators (LIF), a classical electrical model of a neuron or a synchronously firing neuronal cluster. They attempted to explain the synchronous lightning discharges of remote thunderstorms in terms of synchronously firing neuron clusters.

Koenig (H. Koenig, 1954), who was a leading expert in the effects of environmental electromagnetism on biological systems, noted remarkable congruencies between the waveforms of electroencephalographic activity recorded from the scalps of human subjects and patterns of naturally occurring electromagnetic activity generated by global lightning. In particular, the Schumann resonances, which are traditionally defined by spectral peaks at approximately 8, 14, 20, 26, and 33 Hz, show striking consistency with electroencephalographic activity both in terms of frequency and intensity. In this regard, in 2006 Pobachenko et al. (Pobachenko, 2006) reported evidence of real time coherence between variations in the Schumann and brain activity spectra within the 6–16 Hz band for a small sample. The experiment was successfully repeated by Saroka (K. S. Saroka) for a larger sample.

From this brief comparative discussion between the brain and the atmospheric system, it appears that, although the two systems are certainly different, they present various similarities in the aspects we have illustrated. Basically, there may be a way of asserting that a brain is a scaled-down version of the atmospheric system, based on electrochemistry rather than electrostatics.

A topic of this magnitude cannot be exhausted in these few paragraphs. We let the reader reflect on the possibility that the appearance of life on Earth, although it plausibly occurred by virtue of the blind forces that rule the behavior of the atmospheric system, is likewise the product of conscious experience. On balance, we can’t rule out that, corresponding to the activity of the atmospheric system, there has been conscious subjective experience of a creative process. Without claiming to draw any definite conclusions on the nature of life or the possibility that our planet is thinking and experiencing, we simply hope to have shown how serious the mind-body problem is.

 

Bibliography

Yonnegut, J. V. (Jan. 1985). Mesoscale Observations of Lightning from Space Shuttle. Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society vol. 66 , pp. 20–29.

Dawkins, R. (1986). The blind watchmaker. Norton & Company, Inc.

Dennis, A. S. (Jan. 1970). The Flashing Behavior of Thunderstorms. pp. 170–172.

Koenig, W. O. (1954). Uber die beobachtung von “atmospherics” bei geringsten frequenzen. Naturwissenschaften, vol. 8 , pp. 183–184.

S. Saroka, M. A. (n.d.). Quantitative evidence for direct effects between ionosphere schumann resonances and human cerebral cortical activity.

Mazur, V. (Nov 1982). Associated lightning discharges. Geophysical Research Letters vol. 9 , pp. 1227–1230.

Nagel, T. (2012). Mind and Cosmos: Why the neo-Darwinian materialist conception of nature is almost certainly false. Oxford University Press Inc.

Persinger, M. A. (2012). Brain electromagnetic activity and lightning: potentially congruent scale-invariant quantitative properties. Front. Integr. Neurosci. 6:19. doi: 10.3389/fnint.2012.00019 .

Pobachenko, S. V. (2006). The contingency of parameters of human encephalograms and Schumann Resonance electromagnetic fields revealed in monitoring studies.

Shumann, W. O. (pp. 149–154). Uber die strahlungslosen eigenschwingungen einer leitenden kugel, die von einer luftschicht und einer ionosph¨arenh¨ulle umgeben ist. Zeitschrift fur Naturforschung A, vol. 7, no. 2 , 1952.

Yair, R. A. (2009). , Clustering and synchronization of lightning flashes in adjacent thunderstorm cells from lightning location networks data. Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres, vol. 114 .

Yair, R. A. (Aug. 2006). Evidence for synchronicity of lightning activity in networks of spatially remote thunderstorms. Journal of Atmospheric and Solar-Terrestrial Physics, vol. 68 , pp. 1401–1415.

The spirit of the universe

The spirit of the universe

Reading | Ontology

Steve Taylor, PhD | 2021-11-28

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The gap between panpsychism and idealism is bridged if one infers that fundamental consciousness, instead of being a property of elementary material particles, pervades the fabric of space itself, from where it is then canalized into living beings. In this essay, Prof. Taylor limits himself to presenting his philosophy of panspiritism, as opposed to providing an argument for it. We believe this presentation appeals to enough intuition to justify its standalone publication.

In recent years, it has become increasingly clear that materialism – our culture’s standard view of reality – is inadequate as a way of explaining the world and human experience. As well as being fundamentally nihilistic, materialism can’t offer viable explanations of phenomena such as human consciousness, the effect of the mind on the body, altruism, near-death experiences, psi phenomena and even evolution.1 As a result, a number of “post-materialist’ philosophical approaches have been put forward as alternative explanations of the world, including varieties of idealism, panpsychism, and dual-aspect monism.

In this article, I would like to propose another nonmaterialist perspective, which I call panspiritism. It is an approach that—in different variants—has a long and rich philosophical history. Here I will set out some of the most salient features of the approach, then suggest how a contemporary panspiritist perspective conceives of the emergence of mind, the relationship of mind to matter, and the relationship between the mind and the brain.

 

An overview of panspiritism

Panpsychism suggests that the most basic particles of matter have some form of inner being, and some form of experience, even if this is so basic that it is impossible for us to conceive of it. Panpsychism may literally mean that “mind is everywhere,” but usually this just means that mind exists in all material particles. However, panspiritism suggests that there is a fundamental quality, which is inherent in all space as well as in all material things. This quality—which could be called fundamental consciousness (or spirit)—is all-pervading. (For me, the terms fundamental consciousness and spirit are equivalent.) It is everywhere and in everything, a subtle and dynamic nonmaterial principle or quality, which existed prior to the universe and gave rise to it. It enfolds and immerses the whole universe (and possibly other universes), pervading all space-time and matter and continually flowing into the inner being of life forms.

In contrast to panpsychism, panspiritism does not hold that all material particles have an intrinsic nature of matter. Panspiritism suggests that although consciousness is in all things, all things do not necessarily have their own individuated consciousness. Although fundamental consciousness pervades everything, all things are not conscious. Only structures that have the necessary complexity and organizational form to canalize fundamental consciousness into themselves have consciousness as their intrinsic nature. There is a similarity here with cosmopsychism, which assumes one essential form of consciousness: cosmic consciousness. As in idealism, the individual consciousness of macrosubjects such as human beings somehow derives from cosmic consciousness. Panspiritism suggests that this derivation occurs through organized groups of cells (in the form of brains in human beings), which act as a receiver and transmitter of fundamental consciousness.

According to panspiritism, the entire universe is animate and conscious, since all things are—and all space is—pervaded with fundamental consciousness or spirit. But there is a difference in the way that rocks and rivers are animate and the way that an insect or even an amoeba is animate. Rocks and rivers don’t have their own psyche and so aren’t individually conscious or animate. Fundamental consciousness pervades them, but they aren’t conscious in themselves. Material forms are externally animated with fundamental consciousness; the bodies of life forms are also animated with fundamental consciousness, but life forms are also internally animated with some degree of individual consciousness. Interior consciousness doesn’t go all the way down, as panpsychism suggests. It only goes as far down as the first simple life forms.

Briefly summarized, we could say that my variant of panspiritism highlights three ways in which living beings are related to fundamental consciousness: pervasion, immersion, and subjective sentience (or internal animation). Nonliving things are pervaded with and immersed in fundamental consciousness. Living things are also pervaded with and immersed in fundamental consciousness—but in addition, they are internally animated by fundamental consciousness, through the process of canalization (which will be discussed in more detail shortly), providing them with subjective sentience. And, since living beings exist in different levels of complexity, fundamental consciousness internally animates them to different degrees of subjective sentience.

Why is it necessary to see matter as pervaded with spirit? Couldn’t we simply see matter and spirit as wholly distinct, in dualistic terms? However, panspiritism is a philosophy of oneness (although at the same time it is not wholly monist). It is the all-pervading nature of fundamental consciousness that brings all phenomenal things into oneness—not simply the oneness of living beings who share the same essential internal consciousness, but also the oneness of all nonmaterial things, which are one because they are products of, and are pervaded with, fundamental consciousness. Certain interactions of the mind and the body (such as the influence of mental intentions over the form and functioning of the body, as illustrated by the placebo effect or healing under hypnosis) would be inexplicable without an intimate interconnection between the mental and physical.2 A sense of unity—or at least intimate connection— between one’s own being and the material world is also one of the core elements of mystical experiences. Significantly, mystical experiences also sometimes feature reports of a radiance or energy, which pervades all space and objects, bringing them into oneness.

One might also wonder: how can matter have a different ontological status to fundamental consciousness and yet be pervaded with it? How can matter be both of the same nature as spirit and different to it? However, it is important to remember that matter consists primarily of space. Nuclei are around 100,000 times smaller than the atoms that contain them. All space is pervaded with fundamental consciousness, so the space within matter (strictly speaking, the space within atoms) is pervaded with fundamental consciousness too.

We should also remember that, in the natural world, it is common for one phenomenon to generate another, in such a way that the generated phenomenon has its own ontological status but is also of the same nature as the generative phenomenon. The relationship of material particles to fundamental consciousness may be analogous to children created by parents, or plants that emerge from seeds, where a distinct phenomenon emerges from a preexisting one, but retains the essential nature of the latter.

 

Panspiritist perspectives

Of course, what I am here describing as panspiritism is by no means a novel perspective. In fact, the idea that the essence of reality is a nonmaterial, spiritual quality seems to be one of the oldest and most common cross-cultural concepts in the history of the world.

In addition to their animistic beliefs in spirits that could inhabit and influence phenomena, many indigenous groups developed concepts of a fundamental spiritual principle, which has some similarity with panspiritism. For example, many native American groups developed concepts of a “great spirit” or “great mystery.” The Tlingit of the Pacific North-West refereed to this spiritual principle as yok, the Hopi Indians called it maasauu, the Pawnee called it tirawa, the Dakota called in taku wakan, the Lakota called it wakan-tanka, while the Haudenosaunee called it orenda, the eastern Algonquians called it manitou, and so on. Elsewhere in the world, the Ainu of Japan—an indigenous tribal people of Hokkaido in Northern Japan—developed a similar concept of ramut, while in parts of New Guinea there was a similar concept of imunu. The similarity of these concepts with each other and with the panspiritist concept of a fundamental spiritual force is striking (and demands further investigation than I am able to devote to it here3).

Panspiritist ideas have clearly been a feature of certain Eastern philosophical traditions too. Many spiritual traditions feature concepts of an all-pervading spiritual force, such as the brahman of the Upanishads, the Tao of Taoism, the dharmakaya of Buddhism, Plotinus’s concept of “The One” and the Kabbalistic concept of en sof. These concepts differ in some senses, but all refer to a fundamental and universal spiritual principle, similar to what I refer to as fundamental consciousness.

The Indian philosophical tradition that allies most closely with panspiritism is Bhedabheda Vedanta. This approach can be seen as an attempt to integrate the monist and dualist traditions of Indian philosophy. The term Bhedabheda literally means “difference and non-difference,” suggesting that material forms are both identical and distinct to brahman. Like Kashmiri Shaivism, Bhedabheda Vedanta describes the phenomenal world as a real manifestation (or parinama) of a fundamental spiritual principle (brahman). But Bhedabheda goes further than Kashmiri Shaivism, by suggesting that material forms are not identical with absolute consciousness, but have their own distinct identity (while at the same time existing in brahman). In Bhedabheda Vedanta, various metaphors are used to illustrate the relationship between fundamental consciousness and material forms, including a wave and the ocean, a fire and the sparks that arise from it, the sun and its rays, and a father and his son. Individual subjects and material forms are of the same nature as brahman, but have their own distinct form and identity. This is an identical perspective to panspiritism, which sees material things are distinct from fundamental consciousness, at the same time as being pervaded with it and grounded in it.

(Note that there are some panspiritist trends within the western philosophical tradition too—for example, the Stoics, Plotinus, the Italian sixteenth-century philosophers Bruno and Patrizi, and later figures such as Spinoza and Johann Gottfried Herder. Unfortunately, I do not have space to discuss this here. See my book Spiritual Science for a fuller discussion.)

 

The emergence of matter

In panspiritism, there are two distinct developmental stages: the emergence of matter and the emergence of mind.

I suggest that fundamental consciousness has a dynamic quality that enabled it to generate the physical universe. There is a similarity here with some forms of “source idealism” (or “product idealism”), which see the world as an emanation of absolute consciousness. Some forms of panpsychism imply that consciousness came into existence with the universe, as one of the properties of subatomic particles (alongside others such as mass and charge) or as the intrinsic nature of matter. But panspiritism suggests that fundamental consciousness is more fundamental than the universe, in the sense that the universe came into being as an emanation of it.

In Kashmiri Shaivism, the universe came into being through the primordial vibration of siva. Kashmiri Shaivism claims that siva has a dynamic impulse to express—in Wallis’ words—“the totality of its self-knowledge in action.”4 Plotinus is also very clear that the One is the source of the world, as a dynamic force which is—in Plotinus’ own words—the “productive power [dynamis] of all things.”5

I admit that the process by which fundamental consciousness generates matter is obscure. One could term this the “generation problem” in parallel with the “combination problem” of panpsychism. Panpsychism faces the challenge of explaining how the subjectivity of single material particles combine to produce the more intense consciousness of larger beings. Likewise, idealism faces the problem of explaining how absolute consciousness manifests itself in discrete living organisms. Chalmers terms this the “fragmentation problem” of how universal mind divides into individual minds.6 Kastrup refers to the condition of dissociative identity disorder, in which consciousness fragments into different personalities.7 However, it is not clear to me whether this is a mere analogy, or whether it is meant to describe the actual process by which individual consciousness arises from universal consciousness.

According to panspiritism, once the universe was generated, the creative and dynamic quality of spirit continued to operate in material structures. After arising from fundamental consciousness, material particles grouped together into more complex material structures, and eventually into structures that were complex enough to enable the “canalization” of fundamental consciousness into themselves, so that these structures became animate and sentient. From that point on, the creative and dynamic nature of fundamental consciousness was an important factor in evolution, impelling life forms to develop greater complexity over time. This allowed those life forms to canalize consciousness more intensely, and so to develop a more intense and expansive internal consciousness. Living beings became more sentient and autonomous, while still immersed in and pervaded with fundamental consciousness.

 

The emergence of mind

The “canalization” process mentioned above is main principle of panspiritism’s account of the emergence of mind. In these terms, the human mind is essentially an influx (or canalization) of fundamental consciousness. The brain receives fundamental consciousness and canalizes it into our individual being, so that we become individually conscious.

This view is similar to the transmission model of consciousness put forward by William James, who compared the brain to a “prism or a refracting lens,” which transmits a white light or invisible radiance.8 (James also used the metaphor of air passing through the pipes of an organ.) Forman has described this process more specifically, speaking in terms of a “canalization” of consciousness. As he has put it, “Consciousness is more like a field than a localized point, a field which transcends the body and yet somehow interacts with it … Brain cells may receive, guide, arbitrate, or canalize an awareness which is somehow transcendental to them. The brain may be more like a receiver or transformer for the field of awareness than its generator.”9 Panspiritism holds essentially the same view.

It is important to point out that the process of canalization of fundamental consciousness doesn’t just occur via the brain. The brain is the most complex cellular structure in the body, and so is the main receiver of consciousness. However, all of the cells in our body receive and transmit fundamental consciousness. Indeed, one the of the basic functions of all cells is to canalize fundamental consciousness. This is why we can sense consciousness flowing throughout our inner being, as life-energy, or chi.

It is also important to note that canalization isn’t just a human phenomenon. The process occurs in all life forms. In fact, canalization is one of the distinguishing features between non-living and living structures. Physical structures became internally conscious and sentient when they have developed sufficient complexity to canalize fundamental consciousness into themselves. When matter is arranged in complex and intricate ways—such as in cells and organisms—it facilitates the canalization of fundamental consciousness. Even an amoeba has its own very rudimentary kind of psyche and is therefore individually alive.

This relates to the different degrees of consciousness in life forms. As living beings become more complex—as their cells increase in number and become more intricately organized in groups—they become capable of receiving more consciousness. The raw essence of fundamental consciousness is canalized more powerfully through them, so that they become more alive, with more autonomy, more freedom, and more intense awareness of reality. This is why human beings, with our incredibly complex and intricate brains, are one of the most conscious beings (perhaps alongside dolphins and whales) in existence. However, the simplest forms of matter, which do not have cells, are not capable of canalizing consciousness, and so they are not individually conscious or alive. Simple forms of matter do not have an interior and are not capable of experience or sensation. These qualities only emerge at the cellular level and above.

In human beings, once the “raw material” of fundamental consciousness has been canalized, the brain enables and organizes the various psychological functions and processes that constitute the mind, including memory, information processing, intention or will, concentration, abstract and logical cognition, and so on. In this way, the brain is the facilitator (but not the causal generator) of mind. The relationship of fundamental consciousness to mind is like the relationship between a raw food ingredient and a meal that is prepared from it. Fundamental consciousness constitutes the essence of mind, but it is not equivalent to mind. Mind is what happens when fundamental consciousness is filtered through neural networks.

Another significant point is that canalization is an ongoing process. Life forms continually receive and canalize fundamental consciousness, for every moment of their lives till death. For me as a human being, fundamental consciousness is continually flowing into me like a fountain (to use Plotinus’ metaphor) via my brain and through the cells of my body, generating my inner life. From this point of view, death can be seen as the point where the brain and body are no longer able to receive and canalize fundamental consciousness. Due to a process of decay, or an accident or injury, their organism can no longer perform the canalizing role.

 

Conclusion

Unfortunately, I don’t have space here to examine one of the most important aspects of panspiritism: its explanatory power. In addition to offering explanations of the nature of consciousness and the relationship between mind and matter, panspiritism has explanatory potential in areas such as altruism, the influence of the mind over the body, mystical experiences, psi experiences and evolution. (Again, see my book Spiritual Science for more details.)

Of course, panspiritism has some problematic issues, such as the “generation problem” of how matter arises out of fundamental consciousness, and what might be called the “canalization problem” of how cells canalize fundamental consciousness. However, I don’t think these issues are any more serious than the combination problem of panpsychism and the fragmentation problem of idealism or cosmopsychism. Although there are still many details left to fill in, I think that panspiritism has great promise as a metaphysical alterative to materialism.

 

References

  1. Kastrup, (2019). The Idea of the World: A Multi-Disciplinary Argument for the Mental Nature of Reality. Ropley: Iff Books; Taylor. S. (2018). Spiritual Science: Why Science Needs Spirituality to Make Sense of the World. London: Watkins.
  2. Kelly, E. F., Kelly, E. W., Crabtree, A., Gauld, A., Grosso, M. and Greyson, B. (2007). Irreducible Mind: Toward a Psychology for the 21st Century. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
  3. For a fuller discussion, see Taylor, S. (2005). The Fall: The Insanity of the Ego in Human History and the Dawning of a New Era. Ropley: O Books
  4. Wallis, (2013). Tantra Illuminated: The Philosophy, History, and Practice of a Timeless Tradition. San Rafael, CA: Mattamayura Press, p.55.
  5. in Marshall, P. (2019). The Shape of the Soul. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 256.
  6. Chalmers, D. (2020). “Idealism and the Mind-Body Problem.” In The Routledge Handbook to Panpsychism, edited by W. Seager, 353–73. London: Routledge. http://consc.net/ papers/idealism.pdf
  7. Kastrup, B. (2019). The Idea of the World: A Multi-Disciplinary Argument for the Mental Nature of Reality. Ropley: Iff Books
  8. James, W. (1898/1992). “On Human Immortality”, In William James: Writings 1878 – 1899, edited by E. M. Gerald, 1100–27. New York: The Library of America.
  9. Forman, R. (1998). “What Does Mysticism Have to Teach Us About Consciousness?” Journal of Consciousness Studies 5, 85–201, p. 185.

Iain McGilchrist: “Consciousness is the stuff of the cosmos”

Iain McGilchrist: “Consciousness is the stuff of the cosmos”

Reading | Ontology

Dr. Iain McGilchrist | 2021-11-21

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Renowned psychiatrist Dr. Iain McGilchrist laid out his idealist metaphysical views unambiguously in the closing presentation of the ‘Science of Consciousness’ conference, 2021. His clarity, lucidity and almost hypnotically compelling style provided a spellbinding end to the conference. It left us craving for more; so much so that we decided to start our publication of the conference’s videos with it. Below you will find both the video and a transcript of Dr. McGilchrist’s talk. The video, however, contains a Q&A session not transcribed in the text, so it’s worth watching to the end. Enjoy!

In a very short presentation there is no possibility of arguing for a position on consciousness: so I will simply state my conclusions, argued for at length in my new book The Matter with Things: Our Brains, Our Delusions and the Unmaking of the World.  Consciousness is irreducible, primordial and omnipresent: not a thing, but a creative process. Matter is a theoretical abstraction that no one has seen.  The term clearly has meaning, however: it refers to the qualities of certain elements within consciousness which offer relative resistance and relative permanence as a necessary part of that creative process.

I cannot avoid referring en passant to the hemisphere hypothesis expounded in The Master and his Emissary, and greatly developed in The Matter with Things.  Again there is no possible way I can give an account of the argument here.  What one needs to know is that the two hemispheres have evolved so as to attend to the world, and therefore bring into being the only world we can know, in two largely opposing ways: the left hemisphere paying narrowly targeted attention to a detail that we need to manipulate; the right hemisphere paying broad, open, sustained, vigilant, uncommitted attention to the rest of the world while we focus on our desired detail.  This means that each hemisphere brings into being a world that has different qualities. These could be characterised in the simplest possible terms something like this.  In the case of the left hemisphere, a world of things that are familiar, certain, fixed, isolated, explicit, abstracted from context, disembodied, general in nature, quantifiable, known by their parts, and inanimate.  In the case of the right hemisphere, a world of Gestalten, forms and processes that are never reducible to the already known or certain, never accounted for by dissolution into parts, but always understood as wholes that both incorporate and are incorporated into other wholes, unique, always changing and flowing, interconnected, implicit, understood only in context, embodied and animate.  The left hemisphere is a world of atomistic elements; the right hemisphere one of relationships. Most importantly the world of the right hemisphere is the world that presences to us, that of the left hemisphere a re-presentation: the left hemisphere a map, the right hemisphere the world of experience that is mapped.

In this talk I have chosen to make some very simple reflections on one aspect of consciousness: its relational nature. Indeed I hold that everything is relational, and that what we call things, the relata, are secondary to relationship. Consciousness is always ‘of’ something: what is the nature then of that something that is both in part constitutive of, and in part constituted by, that relationship?

In the last century or so, there has been a tendency, at least in popular discourse, to pull reality in opposing directions. Some scientists, whether they put it this way or not when they are asked to reflect, still carry on as if there just exists a Reality Out There, the nature of which is independent of any consciousness of it: naïve realism. These are usually biologists; you won’t find many physicists who would think like that. In reality, we participate in the knowing: there is no ‘view from nowhere’. As John Archibald Wheeler put it: ‘this is a participatory universe’.  Of crucial importance is that this fact does not in any way prevent science legitimately speaking of truths – far from it. We desperately need what science can tell us, and postmodern attempts to undermine it should be vigorously resisted. Two important truths, then: science cannot tell us everything; but what science can tell us is pure gold. Any attempt to suppress science (I distinguish science sharply from technology), for whatever reason, is dangerous and wrong.

Meanwhile, on the other hand, there are philosophers of the humanities who think that there is no such thing as reality, since it’s all Made Up Miraculously By Ourselves: naïve idealism. Such people, by the way, never behave as though there was no reality. Nor of course, by its own logic, can they claim any truth for their position.

These viewpoints are closer than they look. One party fears that if what we call reality were in any sense contaminated by our own involvement in bringing it about it would no longer be worthy of being called real. The other fears that, since we manifestly do play a part in its coming about, it’s already the case that it can’t be called real. But just because we participate in reality doesn’t mean we invent it out of nowhere, or solipsistically project it on some inner mental screen; much less does it mean that the very idea of reality is thereby invalidated.

I take it that there is something that is not just the contents of my mind – that, for example, you exist. There is an infinitely vast, complex, multifaceted, whatever-it-is-that-exists-apart-from-ourselves. The only world that any of us can know, then, is what comes into being in the never-ending encounter between us and this whatever-it-is. What is more, both parties evolve and are changed through the encounter: it is how we and it become more fully what we are. The process is both reciprocal and creative. Think of it as like a true and close relationship between two conscious beings: neither is of course ‘made up’ by the other, but both are to some extent, perhaps to a great extent, ‘made’ what they are through their relationship.

The relationship comes before the relata – the ‘things’ that are supposed to be related. What we mean by the word ‘and’ is not just additive, but creative.

There is no one absolute truth about the world that results from this process, but there are certainly truths: some things we believe will be truer than others. The nature of the attention we bring to bear is of critical importance here. A maximally open, patient, and attentive response to whatever-it-is is better at disclosing or discerning reality than a response that is peremptory, insensitive, or – above all – shrouded in dogma.

Importantly, what we experience is not just an image of a world ‘outside’, some sort of projection on the walls of a Cartesian theatre inside our heads, and watched by an intracerebral homunculus on an intracerebral sofa. Such a viewpoint could be predicted to arise from the left hemisphere’s attempt to deal with a reality it does not understand, and for which everything is a representation. True, we can deceive ourselves by mistaking our own projections for reality – and we often do; but that does not entail that we are always victims of self-deception. When we are properly attentive, what we experience is the ‘real deal’, though it be only a tiny part of all that is. To appreciate that, you need the right hemisphere – and preferably, of course, both hemispheres – to be in play. It is true that we can see the world only partially, but we still each see the world directly. It is not a re-presentation, but a real presence: there isn’t a wall between us and the world. Our experience is of whatever-it-is and not another thing, even if we can’t get away from the fact that it is we who experience it.

Yet, I say, we take part in its creation. How can that be?

An analogy may help get closer to what I mean. There is such a ‘thing’ as Mozart’s G minor quintet. It is in a way quite specific. It certainly is not a fantasy, and it cannot be made up by me any way I want. However, it doesn’t exist in the closed score on my bookshelf (the potential alone is there). It doesn’t exist in Mozart’s mind, either, because he’s dead, and the moment when he died made no difference whatever to the existence or the nature of the quintet. And there isn’t a single ideal quintet that we are always imperfectly imitating in our encounters with it. It keeps coming into being, it keeps becoming, each time a mind, with all its history and preconceptions, encounters it, or when many minds do so together. Each time it will be real. And each time it will also be different, although it will be recognisably the ‘same’ piece of music. It is certainly not a matter of ‘anything goes’. Not every rendition will be equally good, or equally true to the spirit of the quintet. And saying so should not be a problem: in life we don’t find it difficult to discriminate between better or worse performances, and, crucially, we expect at least a degree of consensus on the matter among those who know enough to recognise a good performance when they hear one.

However, no-one would expect me to say precisely how I know that it is a ‘true’ performance of the work, let alone to prove to them that it is. At best I could point to certain aspects of the performance, and hope my fellow-listener picks up. And that’s not just because of the particular nature of music. No-one expects me to say how I know that my understanding of Hamlet is more or less true, either. As a critic of Hamlet I state what I see: people either ‘click’ with what I say – get an insight from it – or don’t. They either feel that I (and now they) know more about Hamlet, or they don’t. This is not to give a single crumb of comfort to the ‘my view is as good as yours’ types. There are, very clearly, better and worse interpretations. I could get it indisputably wrong, for example, by claiming it is really an account of peasant life in Azerbaijan in the tenth century, or, less dramatically, but nonetheless clearly, by claiming that it is primarily a critique of James I’s foreign policy. There are in fact an almost limitless number of ways in which I am free to get it wrong.

Philosophy may at times aspire to be, but cannot ever be, coercive: it cannot compel to a point of view. It can only allow an insight to dawn. Plato described the process as a spark that crosses the gap: ‘suddenly a light, as it were, is kindled in one soul by a flame that leaps to it from another’.[1]  The experience of understanding involves a shift from what seems initially chaotic or formless, to a coherent stable form or picture, a Gestalt – or from an existing Gestalt to a new and better one, that seems richer than the one it replaces.

The flow of the universe is always creative, though it has order, and is not random or chaotic; the world is always a matter of responsiveness, though it is equally not a free-for-all. It is a process of creative collaboration, of co-creation.

In that spirit, I now want to modify my image of the quintet, which corresponds to some, but not all, aspects of reality. What if the music is not Mozart, but something more like some sublime jazz, or an Indian raga or Portuguese fado? Something we improvise – within bounds. Whatever it is will emerge from a balance of freedom and constraint. It won’t exist until it is being performed: no-one can know exactly what it will be like. But it will not be random: it will emerge from the players’ continuous interaction, and from the music’s own ‘history’ as it unfolds; what comes next will be anticipated by what has gone before. It will also be moulded by the imagination, skill and training we bring, our past experience of playing (together and apart), the conventions of certain traditions, and shared expectations, quite apart from the fundamental laws of acoustics. Our co-creation of the music does not occur ex nihilo, and is not just a projection of ourselves. Yet we, and you, partake of its making, even if we are only listeners.

Our immersion in a culture of recorded music, in which we are passive and inert consumers, encourages us to think of music as a ‘thing’, separate from the hearer and the musicians who make it. Yet any performer who has had the experience of being taken up by the flow of either music or dance, of being ‘in the groove’, knows this is a dreadfully reductive account. To be in the groove, in the flow, is to feel oneself played by, as much as playing, the music. As Yeats says, ‘How can we know the dancer from the dance?’[2]

Again, just because I use music as an example, I am obviously not making a point specifically about music. Music happens to be a very clear case of how what we take to be a thing emerges from a complex of relationships, both those between notes and those between individual consciousnesses. But all our experience, not just in music but in life, both mental and physical, is of such a complex flow, a constantly unfolding, responsive dance of reciprocal gestures. It exists in process and in relationship; our taking part in that reciprocity does not leave us inhabiting a solipsistic fantasy, but, precisely, confirms that it is not a solipsistic fantasy. We interact with one another and the world at large in a myriad ways without being able to have more than limited control of the outcome. What comes to be does so through an interaction of a multiplicity of elements, some ours, some not.

Whatever-it-is-that-exists-apart-from-ourselves creates us, but we also take part in creating whatever-it-is. By this I do not only mean the common sense view that I have an impact on the world, as the world has an impact on me: that I leave my footprints. That would lead immediately to the reflection that I am very small in relation to the world, and so effectively my impact is so small that for all intents and purposes it can be ignored. There is, it might seem, an inexpressibly vast universe and an inexpressibly tiny individual consciousness.  Such a reflection seems to posit an objective position – the view outside of history or geography, time or space – a view from nowhere, in which all can be measured and compared. It implies a Measurer of all the measurers, measuring the other scales and putting each part in its place according to its overall worth. But though that cannot be, the alternative is not just a merely subjective position, either: this very polarity – subjective/objective – is misleading. In the fado, in the raga, in jazz, it is what it is because of me, and I am what I am because of it.

Similarly whatever-it-is is potential until the encounter: in each authentic encounter – one in which the individual truly apprehends and is apprehended by this Other – the Other becomes fulfilled. Each time this comes about in a unique fashion; but one that is not alien to the coming into being of that Other as a whole. And the actualisation, which at first seems to be a narrowing or collapse of potential, positively adds to the now enlarged field of the potential, which only discovers itself through (the repetition of) such actualisations.

Within my experience of the world, very much can be changed by my response to whatever-it-is – in a sense everything can be changed. Though that may seem to be ‘just for me’, how big or small is that? We cannot weigh consciousness against the universe. It is like trying to say precisely how much you love someone, if you really love them. It is not fixable in space or quantitative, but qualitative and experienced in the living flow of time. And if things turn out to be interconnected, not atomistic – and they are – each consciousness has its impact on the universe that cannot be quantified.[3]

Does this mean that there is no such thing as being wrong? Of course not. Though there can be no rules for jazz – indeed if it merely followed rules it would no longer be jazz – there are many things that just can’t be done; much as in the middle of a flamenco dance, whose form is not predetermined, one cannot suddenly start balancing on one’s heels, or stop and scratch one’s nose, or do the can-can, without the dance ceasing to be. Flamenco is more formalised than jazz, but even in jazz there is literally no end to the list of what one doesn’t do. However, there’s no recipe, no procedure or algorithm to follow, for getting it right, either. An algorithm is what the left hemisphere wants; the recognition that it’s got to be free of any algorithm, yet not at all random, is characteristic of the understanding of the right hemisphere. We can specify what is not jazz, but not what is. Our knowledge of anything unique is similarly apophatic.

Just as ‘and’ is not merely additive, ‘not’ is not merely negative. Both are creative. Indeed resistance – ‘not-ness’ – is an absolute necessity for creation.

That of which I have no inkling – whatever I just don’t ‘get’ or ‘see’ – does not exist for me. That manifestation of whatever-it-is is simply not available in my world. But this doesn’t mean that things come and go from everyone else’s reality dependent on my understanding of it. If I can’t see the moon, that doesn’t mean it stops being there for others. If we are all tuned in to the same whatever-it-is – and I believe it makes no sense to assert we are not – something very like what I can’t see is probably being seen by others, and ultimately that will affect me. It is perfectly possible to be deceived about, or to be in denial about, an aspect of whatever-it-is.

Truth, like reality, is an encounter. It is in the nature of an encounter that more than one element is involved. And what I find in whatever-it-is does not pre-exist my encounter with it. There must be a potential, true enough, but it is actualised only in my encounter with it. The encounter is genuinely creative. The whole universe is constantly creative – but not out of nowhere.

We are dealing here with a phenomenon or process whose shape can be intuited, but to which our everyday language is not well adapted. When the world is viewed as a flow, albeit a differentiated one, rather than as a succession of points or a world of things, these problematic formulations can be approached from a fresh point of view, wherein many of the difficulties get to be resolved. The world, I suggest, is a seamless, always self-creating, self-individuating, and simultaneously self-uniting, flow that is only truly knowable as it comes to be known. (I say ‘it’, for convenience; it is a question worth considering whether this is the appropriate pronoun.) ‘It’ is like a stream, with its whirlpools and eddies, that come into being for a time, and resolve; while they are there they are present to all observers, even measurable up to a point; and yet, while distinct, they are inseparable from the stream, not just in the sense that without the stream they do not exist, but in the sense that they are the stream. We are just such eddies in the stream. And creativity is always discovery of the self as well as of the other.[4] Once one sees this, the objectivising, time-denying, change-denying, diagrammatic mentality of modern Western thinking appears as I believe it is: a hindrance, not a help, on the path to truth.

The world we know, then, cannot be wholly mind-independent, and it cannot be wholly mind-dependent. Once again, this leaves no room for a philosophy of ‘anything goes’. What is required is an maximally open, attentive response to something real and other than ourselves, of which we have only inklings at first, but which comes more and more into being through our response to it – if we are truly responsive to it. We nurture it into being; or not. In this it has something of the structure of love.

 

[In a panel following his presentation, Dr. McGilchrist added an important clarification of his metaphysical view, which we transcribe below:]

I think that all that exists, exists in consciousness; that consciousness is the stuff of the cosmos. Matter is a phase of consciousness. It is not a separate thing, any more than ice is separate from water; it’s a phase of water; it’s neither less nor more than water; it’s not separate from water; it’s a kind of water. And matter is a kind of consciousness—for a time—that has certain quite marked properties that are different from the way we normally think of consciousness, just as water is transparent and flows and all the rest, and ice is hard and opaque and can split your head open. So they’re different but they’re part of the same ontology. Consciousness and matter must be distinguished—I argue strongly that they are distinguished, just as ice and water are—but there should be no need to set the one against the other.

 

Notes and references

[1] Plato, Epistles, VII, 341c (trans J Harward).

[2] Yeats, ‘Among schoolchildren’.

[3] Heschel AJ, ‘Halakhah and aggadah’, in Between God and Man, Free Press, 1997, 176: ‘In the eyes of him whose first category is the category of quantity, one man is less than two men, but in the eyes of God one life is worth as much as all of life’.

[4] Thus Harold Bloom (Genius: A Mosaic of One Hundred Exemplary Creative Minds, Grand Central Publishing, 2003, 12) says of Shakespeare that he was ‘a consciousness shaped by all the consciousnesses that he imagined’ and ‘his consciousness can seem more the product of his art than its producer’. In a similar vein, Aaron Copland says that ‘the reason for the compulsion to renewed creativity, it seems to me, is that each added work brings with it an element of self-discovery. I must create in order to know myself …’ (Music and Imagination: Charles Eliot Norton Lectures, Oxford University Press, 1952, 41).

Essentia Foundation recommends Dr. McGilchrist's newest book:

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Idealism may not be what you think

Idealism may not be what you think

Reading | Editorial

The editors | 2021-11-14

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It increasingly strikes us that the reason why many scientists and scholars reject idealism—the notion that reality is essentially mental—is based on simple misunderstandings of what idealism states or implies. In this brief editorial, we would like to discuss and correct some of these misunderstandings.

An often-repeated criticism of idealism is that the obvious existence of an external world of tables and chairs, independent of our thoughts, wishes or fantasies, contradicts idealism. But this is just not true. Idealists—even subjective idealists a la Berkeley, let alone objective or analytic idealists—acknowledge the existence of an external world independent of our personal mentation; they simply state that such external world, in and of itself, is also mental in essence, just as the inner life of another person is mental, even though not constituted of our mentation. The external world is not in your or our minds alone, but unfolds instead in a spatially-unbound field of subjectivity underlying all nature, in the same sense that quantum fields are thought to span the entire universe. In other words, the external world is what the ‘thoughts’ of nature’s mind-at-large look like when observed from our vantage point, given the peculiarities of how our perceptual and cognitive apparatus represents the world internally. But in and of itself, the external world is constituted of transpersonal thought-like processes outside and independent of your and our minds.

Idealists also do not reject the self-evident fact that nature behaves according to certain patterns and regularities that we’ve come to call the ‘laws of nature,’ which are what they are regardless of whether we like them or not. Rejecting this obvious fact wouldn’t be profound, but just silly. Indeed, idealists are, by and large, naturalists: they do not postulate a puppeteer moving the pieces of the physical world according to some deliberate plan; instead, for them nature unfolds spontaneously, doing what it does because it is what it is. To frame this in psychological language, the so-called ‘laws of nature’ are, for the idealist, akin to the mental archetypes—the ‘instincts’—of a mind-at-large. ‘Laws of nature’ and ‘natural archetypes’ are just two ways of saying the same thing, in that ‘archetypes’ refer to the inherent templates of expression of a mind.

Often an opposition is suggested between reductionists and idealists, as if these were contradictory positions. But that, too, is a misunderstanding. To be a reductionist does not necessarily entail the claim that the universe is fundamentally just a heap of disjoint parts—a pile of elementary subatomic particles—even though many reductionists rather naively adhere to the latter view (on a side note, a proper understanding of quantum field theory flat-out contradicts such a view). To be a reductionist simply entails striving to explain complex and varied things in terms of less complex and less varied other things. For instance, we can explain the human body in terms of simpler organ systems; organ systems in terms of simpler tissues; tissues in terms of cells; cells in terms of molecules, atoms, elementary subatomic particles and, finally, quantum fields. Whatever is left at the end of this chain of reduction—that is, this chain of recursive explanations or accounts—is what is called the ‘reduction base.’ Reductionists attempt to explain as many things as possible in terms of as few things as possible, ultimately striving for a reduction base containing a single element: one thing in terms of which one can explain or account for everything else. As such, idealists are extreme reductionists in that they strive to account for all of nature in terms of one single entity: one spatially unbound field of subjectivity. All observable things and phenomena are then reduced to—that is, explained in terms of—particular patterns of excitation of this one field.

Strangely, although thoughtful critics of idealism understand that the latter is a monism, not a dualism, they still inadvertently adopt a dualist assumption in their criticism. They argue that physical things and actions—such as alcohol, other psychoactive drugs, a neurosurgeon’s scalpel or electric stimulation probe, head trauma, etc.—have a clear causative effect on our minds. Therefore—they reason—it is untenable to maintain that mind is primary. Do you see how dualism is not-so-subtly presupposed in this line of thought? The criticism assumes a distinction between physical causes and mental effects, as if they were two distinct ontological categories. But idealism is a monism: for idealists, only the mental exists, what we colloquially call ‘physical’ things being just a particular type of mental phenomenon; namely, perception (as opposed to thought, emotion, fantasy, etc.).

Idealists don’t deny the existence of what we colloquially call ‘physical’ or ‘material’ things: there are such things as what we refer to as scalpels, probes, psychoactive substances, head trauma, etc.; idealists are not in the business of denying the obvious. However, for the idealist these ‘physical’ things are internal cognitive appearances of what is, essentially, transpersonal mental processes out there in the world. In other words, the surgeon’s scalpel cutting through one’s brain is what a transpersonal mental process looks like on the screen of perception. That the scalpel has a clear effect on one’s conscious inner life is simply due to the fact that such transpersonal mental process impinges on the personal mental states whose appearance is one’s brain. And that one type of mental process can impinge on and influence another is empirically trivial: our thoughts influence our emotions—and vice-versa—all the time, even though thoughts and emotions are qualitatively very different from one another. The effect that a surgeon’s scalpel or a bottle of beer have on our conscious inner life is, in a general sense, akin to the effect of a thought on an emotion. The scalpel and the beer are what certain transpersonal mental processes look like, which—if forced into cognitive contact with our own personal mentation—influence our cognition.

Idealists do not deny what we colloquially call the ‘physical’ world. What they do deny is the theoretical interpretation of the nature of that world as something fundamentally distinct from mentation. Idealists do not deny that something very severe will happen to your conscious inner life if you throw yourself under a truck. But they maintain that the causative relation at play here is one of (transpersonal) mentation on (personal) mentation, not of a completely abstract, non-mental thing on our very concrete mental inner life. The idealist position is conceptually more parsimonious than both the dualist and the physicalist ones, in that the latter two postulate the existence of non-mental stuff, even though all we are ever directly acquainted with is mental stuff.

In summary, thoughtful idealists are—by and large—naturalists, reductionists, strictly scientific in their approach to accounting for what is going on. They adhere to the principle of Occam’s Razor more consistently than physicalists. As such, idealism is not solipsism or New Age spirituality. It is important that critics of idealism understand this, so their criticisms can form part of a productive debate, as opposed to being straightforwardly dismissible straw-men. Easier as it may be to simply assume that all those educated idealists are just incredibly stupid people, unable to discern even the most obvious contradictions of their position, doing so is naive and maybe even facetious. Understanding the rather carefully articulated idealist perspective can help one open new horizons for their understanding of nature, without sacrificing reason or evidence; much on the contrary.

The Copernican Revolution of the human mind

The Copernican Revolution of the human mind

Reading | Systems thinking

Johannes Jörg | 2021-10-31

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Conceptual reasoning might seem as central to our understanding of self and world today as the Earth once seemed central in the pre-Copernican cosmos. But just as the Copernican Revolution repositioned the Earth in the orbit of a much larger system, an on-going revolution in our understanding of ourselves will dramatically expand the boundaries of our inner cosmos, argues designer Johannes Jörg. This essay emphasizes the importance of introspection to self-understanding. And although Essentia Foundation focuses on objective avenues to knowledge—empirical evidence, logical reasoning—we welcome Jörg’s argument as a useful counterbalance to our own biases.

Introduction

From an earthly perspective the Sun apparently revolves around the Earth. The matter was obvious and the geocentric model was the prevailing doctrine in the Western world for many centuries. During the Renaissance, however, scientific methods facilitated a profound shift in perspective. The Copernican revolution removed the Earth from the center of divine creation and placed it in the orbit of a heliocentric system. The change in perspective of the Copernican revolution brought about groundbreaking shifts to the human conception of the cosmos and of humanness itself. The Copernican revolution outlines a fundamental cultural transformation away from religious paradigms and towards scientific paradigms.

For centuries it was an obvious and unquestioned fact that the Earth is the center of the universe. And in a sense, this still holds true: intuitively, our own standpoint clearly and undoubtedly is the center of our perception of the universe. There is no getting around this experiential fact and stage of conceptual development in cosmology. And jet, today, any worldview that emphasizes any specific place in the universe as its center is generally considered outdated. It took hundreds of years of conceptual and cultural evolution to overcome immediate appearances [1].

It seems to me that Western culture in the beginning of the 21st century is facing a corresponding cultural situation regarding the inner cosmos as it once did regarding the outer cosmos. Looking inside the human intellect, one is faced with a similar, stubborn bias of perspective as when looking towards the stars five centuries ago. The perspectival nature of human cognition accounts for inevitable, systemic preconceptions in the development of conceptual models. It´s only natural that the bias of immediate appearance once more is hard to see through. And at the same time, it’s a tragedy of history that a well-known historical error once more is preventing the advance of human insight.

 

Distortion by perspective

The paradigm shift initiated by the Copernican revolution replaced the idea of a cosmos of divine creation by something else altogether. Today’s cosmos is free from divinity, has no center at all and is almost infinitely larger than anything that’s even possible to imagine. Accordingly, the paradigm shift of the inner cosmos would not only change the conceptual understanding of ourselves, it might also remove conceptual understanding from the center of human self-assessment altogether, opening up towards something almost infinitely larger. Consciousness, mind, mental conditions, cognition, emotions, feelings, dreams, memories, intuition, empathy, moral sense, aesthetic sensitivity, pain, orgasms, spiritual experience and creativity do not revolve around thinking.

The ineluctable perspective of human self-reflection leads to the same ineluctably wrong intuitions about mind, consciousness and self as once did the earthly perspective on the universe. The intellectual self-conception of human existence intuitively starts with thinking, simply because thinking is the vantage point of self-reflecting. That is what makes conceptual understanding as convincing and central to unexamined, immediate judgement as once did the geocentric model. The persuasiveness of this bias has famously been nailed by Descartes’ “Cogito ergo sum” and has dominated Western self-conceptions ever since. In reference to the larger inner cosmos Descartes’ statement sounds like Claudius Ptolemy´s statements in reference to the outer cosmos we know today. Building on a systems understanding of the human being, the central role of thinking for human self-conception is simply a hard-wired systemic bias. Thinking is merely the vantagepoint for reflecting the inner cosmos, just like the Earth is the center for reflecting the outer universe. Basically, “I think, therefore I am” is nothing more than a self-referential tautology. Thinking is only central to itself from its own perspective. Nevertheless, the self-reference of thought is a groundbreaking and necessary step in the cultural development of human self-conception. For the understanding of what it means to be human, however, it’s an immensely limited perspective.

When we look at the night sky, we only have one selective, dynamic perspective on the solar system, the milky way and the cosmic web, which hardly tells anything about the structure of the outer cosmos. In fact, historically, at some point the cosmos was conceived as a solid dome with embedded celestial bodies. Likewise, the self-reflective perspective is just one selective, dynamic perspective within the human system, hardly telling anything about the structure of the inner cosmos. With regard to the latter, Western civilization still lives in a pre-Copernican cosmos. Today’s notion of consciousness is probably immature to the same extent as the notion of the cosmos was in pre-Copernican times.

The general public’s conception of emotions, for example, is hardly more than what is experienced from the perspective of conscious cognition. But the appearances, of course, are thoroughly shaped by the perspectival view. Brain and behavioral data provide ample evidence that emotions are ubiquitous bodily phenomena in the processing of sensory stimuli, and that conscious awareness of emotions is only the tip of an iceberg that is completely submerged most of the time [2]. A scientific consensus on a definition of emotions across disciplines is not even remotely conceivable [3]. To date, each field of research pursues its own angle on emotions. Science is far from developing and agreeing on a systemic meta-understanding of the human system and its embodied cognition, in which mutually interrelated thoughts and emotions only constitute highly interdependent, integral parts of the bigger human system.

Emotions, feelings, consciousness, mind, mental conditions, cognition, dreams, memories, intuition, empathy, moral sense, aesthetic sensitivity, spiritual experiences, creativity, conscious and unconscious thoughts are not what they appear to be from the perspective of conscious cognition. They are all part of a vast and highly complex inner cosmos whose structures, orbits and relations are yet to be mapped out systematically.

 

Methodical limitations of perspectives

Even though conscious thinking might seem as unique and central to a human being today as the Earth once seemed central in the pre-Copernican cosmos, conscious thinking is merely a perspective on the human system, with no central role whatsoever. Ultimately, not even thinking orbits thinking. A smug self-exaltation of reasoning is an indication of a think-o-centric inner cosmology corresponding, in accuracy, to a geocentric outer cosmology. Thinking is only central to its own perspective. And this perspective is exactly what characterizes the scientific method and the predominant approach to knowledge and insight in Western culture. Science is a third-person method, matching quantitative concepts of experience with mathematical concepts. The first-person perspective is methodically and deliberately excluded from the scientific perspective [4]. This is what gives science the power of modeling the outer cosmos, while limiting its ability to model the inner cosmos. Science has a fixed and predetermined perspective on the inner cosmos; namely, the perspective of conceptual thinking.

The turning point of the Copernican revolution was to go beyond the perspective of immediate eyesight in exploring the outer cosmos, and to arrive at new knowledge through conceptual modeling instead. Similarly, in order to significantly advance one’s apprehension of the inner cosmos, one must go beyond the perspective of conceptual thinking. Insisting on scientific reasoning as the only valid method for exploring the inner cosmos is akin to sticking to eyesight alone, so to speak. The models for an appropriate description, and the observational technics for an undistorted study, of the inner cosmos are yet to be developed. Either a meta-conception of conceptual thinking would be necessary—which would put in perspective the very perspective of conception, thus enabling a comprehensive understanding of the scope of conceptual thinking [5]—or one would have to take an inner ‘first-person spaceship’ to move beyond conceptual thinking and gain genuine insight on the inner cosmos.

 

Recalibrating the inner cosmos

Introspective first-person methods of inquiry are intended to provide such inner spaceships. They aim to impart immediate experiences of changes in perspective on the inner cosmos. The trouble is that, even when these methods succeed and the perspective shifts for a while, it is hard to make sense of the corresponding experiences for reasons that are now obvious: a shift in perspective on the inner cosmos consists precisely in a non-reflective mode of self-experience. As such, the perspective of reasoning necessarily fails the essence of the experience and cannot take hold of it.

If, in the 16th century, an astronomer would have been taken to outer space to gain perspective on solar systems, galaxies and the structure of the cosmic web, there would have been no way to understand such an experience conceptually. Most certainly, our Renaissance space traveler would have had to dismiss the experience as illusory and unreal, so to maintain a stable and functional mind, to stay sane and fit for survival in the 16th century.

Quite the same thing happens today with psychonauts experiencing shifts in perspective on the inner cosmos, whether induced by meditative practices, psychoactive substances or spontaneous realizations. Contemporary conceptions of the self and the world are not fit to make sense of, and incorporate, such experiences in a coherent way. Even if introspective experiences are not dismissed and , instead, granted reality and significance, the ordinary intellect tends to not acknowledge the limitations of its explanatory conceptual framework and does not persist with puzzled contemplation. In order to remain stable and functional in its social environment, the intellect is more inclined to adopt ad hoc explanations and questionable beliefs, thereby preserving its established and deeply ingrained conceptual framework. To do its job and maintain the organism safe and functional, the intellect refuses to sacrifice its structure and risk a destabilization without urgent necessity. After all, a shift of worldview is a tenacious, elaborate and tedious intellectual process on the level of the individual. Collectively, such a shift is a multilayered, progressive cultural process that pushes against habit, power structures and emotional responses.

The proponents of the heliocentric model in antiquity did not have the mathematical apparatus and observational tools necessary to provide rigorous arguments and evidence for their model, which therefore could not catch on. Likewise, introspective insights may be feasible today for many, but a rigorous meta-conception of the inner cosmos and the introspective venture is pending and, therefore, cannot fully catch on in Western culture. In a culture guided by science and conceptual understanding, theory and practice must progress concurrently. Conceptual models advance targeted observations and the other way round [6]. The refinement of knowledge unfolds as a strenuous cultural process of iterative approximation. Without a concordant conceptual framework to operate on, the conceptual Western mind cannot introspect successfully. Although mathematical models and physical theories, in and of themselves, cannot take you to outer space, they can provide a reliable foundation to engineer safe and successful space travel. Analogously, although a meta-conception of the inner cosmos surely wouldn’t be enough to provide introspective insight, it would dramatically enhance the orientation and focus of introspection. Fully understanding the limitations of the conceptual perspective is the best prerequisite for a careful and targeted exploration.

Western culture has surely moved beyond the sovereignty of reason, proclaimed in the Age of Enlightenment. Few would seriously deny the great relevance of intuition, creativity or empathy today. Moreover, sages and spiritual teachers of all times and cultures have pointed at something of profound significance to being human, which is to be found beyond conceptual understanding. However, Western culture has not yet delineated clearly what that is, why it is, and how it relates to conceptual understanding.

 

Future prospects

Human self-conception has evolved in cataclysmic steps over the last centuries, and it is far from a place of ease, general satisfaction and overall agreement. It once was a big leap for humans to think of the Earth and themselves as marginal features of the universe they are part of. And again, it is a large venture for conscious reasoning to think of itself as marginal to the consciousness it is part of. The intellect is invited to be humbled in the same way piety was humbled by Copernicus. The revolution of the inner cosmos will unfold as the intellect steps down from its self-centered perspective and realigns with the larger, self-organizing human system it is created by. When the intellect puts itself in perspective, it allows for a richer, three-dimensional experience of the inner realm, whose structure then becomes palpable.

What mathematical modeling is for the outer cosmos, systems theory is for the modeling of complex living organisms. 400 years ago, nobody could foresee the impact of Galileo Galilei’s ideas about the scientific method. Today, complex systems understanding and methods of introspection are probably as immature as the scientific method was prior to Galilei. And maybe the Buddha comes across today like Aristarchus of Samos did in his time, proposing a comprehensive heliocentric model as early as 300 BC. But once the relational structure between thoughts and emotions, consciousness and the unconscious, conceptual understanding and the human system as a whole have been properly modeled, the dawning paradigm shift will fully unfold. When second-person empiricism, third-person explanatory models and first-person introspection mesh seamlessly and converge in a meta-perspective, the tipping point is reached to accelerate paradigm shifting to an exponential momentum.

By then, first-person introspection will no longer be considered spiritual practice, but rather a systematically developed, rigorous methodology for targeted readjustments of the human system. As the systematic understanding of the outer cosmos ultimately allowed for space travel, so the systematic understanding of the inner cosmos will equally inspire civilization-level advances, allowing us to navigate the inner cosmos in unprecedented ways. But unlike the Copernican revolution, the understanding of the inner cosmos will not entail an off-center inner life; on the contrary: it will naturally assist an inner unraveling, realignment and homecoming. Once thinking stops pulling the celestial bodies of the inner cosmos into its orbit, the inner cosmos can naturally balance itself out. Just as defective self-conceptions upset the balance of the human mind and bring about unprecedented global turbulence, an adequate self-assessment of conceptual thinking will balance the human mind and dramatically increase confidence in the future.

When survival is at stake, human cognition will be highly motivated to adjust. The alignment of self-conceptions with the natural systems that sustain it may soon become the critical factor for Darwinian natural selection of human societies. Sooner or later, the commandment might be to adjust or go extinct. In the long run, that which is in service to the evolving human system is self-stabilizing and procreates, while that which is dysfunctional to the human system is self-extinguishing. Self-conceptions that fail to align with the natural systems that bring forth the self-conception in the first place, will silently go extinct. The truth will always prevail.

 

References

[1] The trials and tribulations of this painful cultural process are described in much detail and insight by Kuhn, T.S. (1985): The Copernican revolution: Planetary astronomy in the development of western thought. Harvard Univ. Pr, Cambridge, Mass.

[2] An in-depth overview on unconscious aspects of emotions is provided by Barrett, L.F.; Niedenthal, P.M.& Winkielman, P. (2005): Emotion and consciousness, [Nachdr.]. Guilford, New York.

[3] Mulligan, K. & Scherer, K.R. (2012): Toward a Working Definition of Emotion. Emotion Review. Folge4(4): 345–357. The authors have little hope that a transdisciplinary, common definition of emotion can ever be found, due to sacred traditions of the disciplines involved and the egos of the scholars working in these disciplines. They propose a partial working definition instead.

[4] Goff, P. (2019): Galileo’s error: Foundations for a new science of consciousness. Rider, London, Sydney, Auckland, Johannesburg. Goff elaborates that Galileo, the father of physical science never intended it to be a complete account of the world but rather took qualitative experience out of the domain of inquiry.

[5] Schooler, J. (2015): Bridging the Objective/Subjective Divide: Towards a Meta-Perspective of Science and Experience. In: Metzinger TK, Windt JM (eds) Open MINDed. MIND Group, Frankfurt am Main. The author suggests the notion of meta-perspective, that potentially offers a vantage by which seemingly opposing perspectives of first-person experience and third-person science can be reconciled as different vantages on some deeper structure.

[6] Kuhn, T.S. (1996): The structure of scientific revolutions, 3. ed. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill. shows that paradigm shifts not only change the interpretation of data but also change the observations that can be made.

The eternal background of consciousness: An interview with Prof. Vyacheslav Moiseev

The eternal background of consciousness: An interview with Prof. Vyacheslav Moiseev

Reading | Ontology | 2021-10-10

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When a special kind of ‘beingness’ organizes itself by taking on form, it presents itself to itself, from within, against its own background, thereby igniting consciousness into existence. This is the fascinating proposal of Prof. Moiseev, which, although related to Western dual-aspect monism, doesn’t quite fit into any of the categories of today’s Western philosophy of mind. Prof. Moiseev shows that there are many more reasonable degrees of freedom in thinking about the nature of reality than our usual suspects of physicalism, dualism and panpsychism. This interview is literally mind-opening in that way. Although Prof. Moiseev’s ontology may seem to contradict the primacy of consciousness endorsed and advocated by Essentia Foundation, we find his ideas intriguing, particularly his notions of relativism and evolution, as applied to consciousness. Although difficult to understand at first, Essentia Foundation’s Natalia Vorontsova teases his argument out slowly, throughout the interview, so it is well worth to read it to the end.

What is consciousness?

Consciousness is a special kind of stuff given from within itself. For consciousness to arise, a special consciousness’ stuff is needed, i.e., a certain substrate, a certain medium that has special properties. For me this is not a substance, not exactly what Aristotle called “being.” Instead, being is the subject, the carrier of consciousness, since when we speak of consciousness, we always presume that there’s someone who possesses that consciousness. As such, consciousness is then a predicate. In other words, it is some quality that must always be linked to the one who possesses it, for it closely relates to the capability of some object or some subject to possess certain qualities.

I believe that, first, there must be a special medium, a special substrate, for it is impossible to reproduce consciousness on ordinary physical atoms and molecules, that is, on ordinary ‘matter.’ To manifest consciousness, you need a special carrier, and I call it conventionally the life matter or the consciousness matter. One may call it the substance or the substrate; the point here is not the use of words, but the special nature of consciousness. Therefore, all attempts of materialism to portray consciousness as the activity of the neurons, or the activity of the living body in general, are failed attempts in my view.

In summary, we need a special kind of object that can possess this property. This object has its own matter, its own substrate, and its own form, if we use again Aristotle’s philosophy and understand “being” as this unity of matter and form. When this special matter and special form merge, they produce a special being, one aspect of which is then consciousness. This aspect is given from within itself or, as philosophers also say, it is self-beingness; it is given as a kind of inner self. Perhaps it would even be better to describe it as given from within itself; it is given to it by itself, in the aspect of self-beingness, resulting in consciousness igniting into existence.

 

Is consciousness pre-existent and ever-present in one form or another, or can it appear and disappear?

I think that in an ordinary living being consciousness can both arise and disappear, and in this respect, it is tied to its substrate, to its medium. If we look at this medium from the outside, it is a certain thing with a special organization, and with its own specificity. That thing can be destroyed, and it also can arise. When it arises, consciousness emerges with it, and when it disappears, consciousness subsequently ceases.

But from within itself, when it starts perceiving itself as itself, then it perceives itself as the whole of existence, as the whole ontological infinity. And in that sense, it has an innate tendency to absolutize itself, to regard itself as some absolute substance that pre-exists and permeates all existence. Because it is such, from within itself, it models all of existence against its own background. In other words, when it looks at everything from within, it is as if everything is presented on some screen, against one total background, and this total background is the very self. And no matter what it tries to do, no matter how it tries to localize itself—within, it still localizes itself against the background of itself. That is, it kind of separates into a local state, but still on this total background of itself. Therefore, no matter what it does, it cannot destroy itself from within. In that sense it is absolute. It is what is called in philosophy the ‘Absolute’ or ‘absolute being.’

But, unlike classical idealists, I pay more attention to the receptive position of consciousness, connected with its specificity of perception, when it perceives itself from within itself, since it is some entity that generates images and perceives those same images. In this respect, it is like a kind of video camera that creates images, but shows them to itself. It’s what Leibniz called a ‘monad.’

From the outside, on the other hand, it is a certain self-conscious cluster of a special substrate, and it can very well be destroyed.

In my view, it is this dichotomy of internal absoluteness and external relativity that gives rise to a philosophy of subjective idealism, such as, for example, Berkeley’s solipsism, which assumes that the whole world is the Self, it is my consciousness, and so on.

But consciousness can evolve. Or rather, that carrier that bears consciousness, that subject and that substrate belonging to the carrier, can evolve, and become increasingly ontologically stronger. Just as in Leibniz’s philosophy, monads can develop and reach initially human, then superhuman states approaching the divine or the supreme monad. Similarly, here too, at a certain stage this subject can attain such ontological power—what we call cosmic consciousness—that it can create worlds and act as world consciousness for those worlds. But it still will not be the Absolute. It will be a very powerful ontological entity; what Plato called the Demiurge-creator of worlds, the builder of worlds. And when this Demiurge creates worlds, including the emergence of living beings inhabiting these worlds, then for these living beings this Demiurge-entity, its consciousness, is practically absolute; it is universal consciousness. But the Demiurge can become even more powerful ontologically, as it too keeps evolving, and there is no limit to this process. It can become so powerful that no one can destroy it, because first one would need to discover its boundaries. And if it is huge, if it is very powerful, its boundaries become increasingly harder to detect. And in terms of the status, its consciousness begins approaching the Absolute.

 

Is there really a separation between the outer and the inner world from the point of view of consciousness?

I assume that when consciousness separates from the environmental body, it does not lose its substrate and continues to be carried by it. The environmental body is our physical body, for it is molded from the same matter of which the environment is also composed. But consciousness is carried on its own special consciousness matter. It’s still that Leibniz monad, still the same entity, but existing in the reality of another world, where there can be other such entities separated from their environmental bodies. However, they are now open possibly to some other materiality, which could be governed by different laws and organizational principles than our incarnate world, as we know it.

 

How do you see the analogy in which consciousness appears as a pre-existent, eternal ocean on which the waves that rise and disappear represent the process of localization of consciousness? Or is this ocean the substrate of consciousness, and the ‘monads’ the waves?

This ocean is also a kind of global entity, which individual entities are part of. And this global entity can also have its own substrate and its own form. It interacts with local entities, but they all have their own consciousness, which is an expression, a property, an ability of all these entities. Consciousness is very often hypostasized and confused with the entity that has it.

 

Is this substrate that unknown philosophical ‘substance’ that resolves the question of the division between the material and the ideal?

We can think of the substrate as the pole of the materiality, or we can think of it as the entity itself possessing this materiality. And when we regard matter as a kind of philosophical clay, from which different objects are molded and on which different processes are running, then a form must be added to this matter for these objects to appear. Now we refer to matter not as an entity, but precisely as matter in this Aristotelian sense.

According to my theory, it would be better to use the concept of entity, and by matter to mean only the material pole of this entity. And then the entity is the matter plus the form, the structure that begins to organize matter. So, consciousness, in this sense, is an aspect of the entity.

 

Regarding the idea of the ‘divine spark,’ with which all human beings are supposedly endowed, how does this relate to your understanding of consciousness?

The divine spark can also be understood in various ways. One of the most common examples of Eastern philosophy is the concept of Atman, where Atman coincides with Brahman. It is the indestructible part of any consciousness. However, I believe that there is no such spark inherently present in any consciousness. To have that spark within you, you must evolve to a level where you can create it. It is not a pre-given, but a state that we can reach. At a very high level of evolution, we can achieve a kind of consciousness that possesses a quality of eternity and indestructibility. But then again, I am speaking in relative terms, since it could be considered infinite and indestructible from a human perspective.

The second understanding of the spark is this moment of the absoluteness of consciousness from within. It’s when consciousness looks at itself from within and sees itself essentially as God. From the outside, it’s an illusion. But from within, it contains an aspect of indestructibility for any consciousness, as I said earlier. So, if we understand this spark as an eternal background of consciousness for itself and from within itself, then it exists and indeed eternally accompanies any consciousness from within.

 

Does the Absolute exist?

There is a paradox associated with the concept of the Absolute, which has perpetually plagued different thinkers, and which finds expression in two equally valid positions:

  • If there is a relative, then there must also be an absolute. For the relative is the conditional being of the absolute.
  • If a relative exists, then there should not be an absolute. For why should there be a relative-imperfect when there is already an absolute-perfect?

I do not pretend to resolve this paradox. But I propose to tackle it by introducing two kinds of being. I conventionally call them background and on-background being, using the same ‘on-screen’ insight mentioned earlier. So, the relative and the absolute exist in different ways: the relative exists as on-background being—it is strong, convex, localized and conditional. The absolute exists as an all-pervading background, as it were, but elusive, which cannot be made into on-background being. You cannot, as it were, grab it and make it so obvious, as if visible against a different background, because to make it visible you must put something in the background. And this state cannot be placed against an even greater background because it is already the maximum background of everything. Therefore, I get out of the paradox in this way: the absolute on-background does not exist, but the background does exist.

 

And if we consider the Absolute or God in the context of Christianity?

The Christian God is not necessarily the Absolute in the philosophical sense. All these are anthropomorphic constructions that create, as it were, an image of God in the image and likeness of man.

I am a proponent of the scientific method in studying all levels of reality, including the highest level of the Absolute, even though nowadays the scientific method is defined narrowly, in that it only cognizes environmental matter. In addition to the matter of our environment, I suggest the existence of an infinite number of other forms of matter: life matter, mind matter, spirit matter, consciousness matter and so forth. And then, the scientific method must be expanded in relation to environmental matter alone.

The problem is that, as soon as we step onto the platform of this environmental materialist science and grab the instruments of comprehension that it has created, we systematically go blind. This is especially evident in the struggle between holism and reductionism in biology and medicine. Currently, it is completely dominated by reductionism in very rigid forms. It decomposes all living things into parts, and these parts into even smaller parts, all the way down to individual atoms and molecules. With these individual atomic and molecular processes, it tries to explain all living things. As a result, we miss the phenomenon of life completely.

Hence, all these major crises and huge schisms in modern culture: science and religion are split; spirituality and the scientific method are also split. Either you have an unscientific spirituality that is expressed by religions, or spiritless science, which is expressed by this materialist science. This atheism, materialism and reductionism that dominate modern science are, in fact, the new religion. That’s why materialist science is mostly about believers. They do not accept new facts and new concepts that are radically outside the main paradigm.

Therefore, the main task is to integrate the culture, to overcome these splits and to create a parallel scientific community of like-minded people. We may differ in emphasis, but in essence we will be striving for some deeper truth, where there is a place for the phenomenon of life, consciousness and spirit. And again, it is not a new religion, but rather rational constructs that we can comprehend. It also presumes a new scientific method, related to all this. We also need a theory that includes the reality of consciousness, i.e., the acknowledgment that consciousness is a real phenomenon irreducible to some material-environmental constituents.

So, if we are united by spirituality and science, rationality and the scientific culture of dialogue, it’s enough to create a community.

 

How do you understand time and space? Are they objective categories independent of consciousness?

I distinguish between the concepts of geometric and philosophical space and time. The geometric one is a multitude of points, a void that is filled with something. In the philosophical sense, space is that which is maximally compatible at a given moment in time.

For example, you come into a store, where there’s only one cash desk open. A queue forms and shoppers start asking to open other cash desks. And when the second and third ones open, then the queue at each cash desk decreases, and people pass through and buy goods in less time. So, the number of cash desks represents the cumulative number of times that the service of selling goods can be performed at a given point in time.

In other words, there is a process of some kind, and that process passes through some frames that can be narrow or wide. It takes more time to pass through the narrow ones and vice-versa. These frames are essentially the degrees of freedom determining how much of the process can be realized in a single moment in time. That’s how we can understand space in the broadest philosophical or ontological sense. And therefore, the more space, the less time, and vice-versa. In this respect, the ideal is the complete absence of time, when the process can fully realize itself in one go. But that requires a very spacious ontology, being a result of evolution. Therefore, the degree of maturity of a world is expressed by how spacious it is in its carrying capacity; how much existence it can let through in a single moment in time.

For instance, selfishness in ethics can be considered a form of ontological narrowness; it is my happiness at the expense of someone else’s happiness, and vice-versa. We can compare this to having only one cash desk that serves existence, and then only through me. It is as if the whole world were narrowed down only to me, leaving me with the choice: it’s either me or the other.

But if the world became ontologically spacious, we would rejoice in the joy of each other, and we would help each other. Then there are two cash desks or perhaps even three, and the process goes much faster, more spacious and freer.

 

So, time and space are then objective and independent of consciousness. But at the same time, they are relative to the degree or the dynamics of evolution of consciousness?

Yes. For example, compare an ontology with one cash desk to one that works with tens of cash desks. Something that, in the one-cash-desk ontology, would belong to the future, for the mind running tens of cash desks would exist now; that mind would see the future as the present.

The past, the future and the present are all relative states related to the nature of the world of being, for every world has a certain number of ‘cash desks’ through which it counts its flow of events. And consciousness, as a world-like system, as a mini-world, is also synchronized with the world’s bandwidth. Since this consciousness exists in this world, it belongs to a certain cross-section of this world.

There is however a huge ontological potential in us, and consciousness can in principle go beyond the number of cash desks and specific cross-sections (although this would already entail transpersonal levels of consciousness). As that happens, it might turn out that the flow of time is organized differently.

In summary, consciousness has an amazing ontological power. The mind at large is an ontological builder, it is the creator of worlds, and achieving greater ontological power is a matter of our own evolution.