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Simple code in the mind of God

Simple code in the mind of God

Reading | Computer Science

River Kanies | 2023-06-04

Woman hand touching The metaverse universe,Digital transformation conceptual for next generation technology era.

Insofar as the activity of the mind of nature can be modeled as computation, the complexity of our physical universe is an inevitable, emergent outcome of nature’s computational potentialities, even if its innate, fundamental ‘programs’—basic ‘thoughts’ in the ‘mind of God’—are extraordinarily simple. River Kanies makes this point by leveraging Stephen Wolfram’s notion of ‘ruliad.’

The core tenet of metaphysical idealism is that only consciousness exists irreducibly. It follows that all of reality is generated within, and experienced by, a universal consciousness. We may call this universal consciousness ‘God,’ provided that we avoid anthropomorphizing it. Under idealism, because anything conceivable is possible within imagination—an inherent and spontaneous activity of consciousness—instead of asking ‘what is possible in nature?’ we must, instead, ask ‘why do things seem to follow such rigid laws?’ And ‘why does God seem to be playing dice?’ (as in microscopic quantum phenomena). The purpose of this essay is to hypothesize intuitive answers to these questions, by leveraging Stephen Wolfram’s concept of the ruliad. After all, at the end of the day, it is our intuition that we act upon, not so much our beliefs; and certainly not some sort of ‘objective’ truth, which we as mere humans cannot access directly.

Wolfram defines the ruliad as

the result of following all possible computational rules in all possible ways … it’s something very universal—a kind of ultimate limit of all abstraction and generalization. And it encapsulates not only all formal possibilities but also everything about our physical universe—and everything we experience can be thought of as sampling that part of the ruliad that corresponds to our particular way of perceiving and interpreting the universe.

As such, insofar as we can model the universe as a computational system, the ruliad is the maximum expression of its potentialities.

If we go back to the ‘beginning of the universe’ from the perspective of idealism, we start with the mind of God in the form of infinite untapped potential. We can conceive of the nascent God-mind imagining at whim, no holds barred. Then, at some point, God becomes interested in creating a (computational) structure within which realities can be constructed. There is still infinite potential, but now there are constraints at least within this ‘slice’ of the activity of the God-mind. In a sense, we could say that the idea of computation itself is a sort of structure, or a class of structures (there can be different types of computation, but they all have structure and constraints). If we accept Wolfram’s claim that the ruliad is an “inevitable” formal construct that follows directly from the existence of computation, and must therefore “necessarily exist” (as a concept in the mind of God, let’s say), then as soon as God decides to create a structure, that structure is the a nascent version of the ruliad by default: the collection of all possible computations run on all possible states.

This is still a very amorphous view of the nature of reality. However, Wolfram’s work has more to say on the subject, particularly the concepts of computational equivalence and computational irreducibility, which are related. Wolfram has been able to demonstrate that there is a class of very simple programs that generate truly complex behavior—behavior that cannot be predicted with any formula and can only be determined by running the program in full. For this reason, we can say that the patterns generated by such programs are computationally irreducible. This means that, once we have the ruliad, the next step is to trim it down to the most ‘interesting’ parts—i.e., the computationally-irreducible patterns. Wolfram also demonstrates that all such complexity-generating programs are essentially equivalent in terms of the complexity of the patterns they generate. This means that we can focus on any one of these complexity-generating programs and expect to get comparable insights as with any other.

Furthermore, Wolfram and his team were able to demonstrate that these programs are able to generate high-level patterns that correspond, in certain ways, to both quantum mechanics and general relativity. So we can hypothesize that physical reality is just a high-level construct of one such a program being run at a much lower level of reality. This provides huge insight into the nature of emergent phenomena by demonstrating that a trivial program, when run long enough, can produce patterns that seem fundamentally unrelatable to it and its initial conditions (when viewed by a human observer). If we think of the world we experience as being the pattern that such a program generates, we can understand reality in terms of layers of emergence. We start with a simple program, run it until we get the foundations of physics, and then run it until we get physical reality as we know it.

Looking at the ‘timeline’ of the ‘evolution’ of reality, we start with the infinite potential that is the mind of God. Then God creates some structure—the basis for computation—and we get the ruliad. As God ‘plays around’ with the ruliad, God focuses on the programs that generate complexity. Then let’s say that God picks one and runs the program until an entire universe is generated through layers of emergence, and so we get reality as we know it.

But, as you might suspect, there’s more to the story.

Let’s talk about the concept of an observer. To Wolfram, an observer is a persisting pattern within the ruliad that can be associated with some form of identity, but is not so cohesive as to resist influence from outside of itself. So it takes in external information in the form of representations of other local sub-patterns in the ruliad. Although the pattern as a whole is irreducibly complex, there are pockets of locally-reducible sub-patterns that can be observed and represented by a model inside of an observer within the ruliad. All patterns that we, as observers, can recognize are forms of local reducibility.

Idealism has a few things to say about this interpretation. One would be to emphasize the importance of the distinction between conscious and non-councious observers. If we consider Bernardo Kastrup’s interpretation of quantum mechanics, we understand physical reality as being manifested in relation to a conscious observer. There can be non-conscious observers in the loop, such as measurement devices, but ultimately they are just part of the relationship between the conscious observer and what is being observed.

One could claim that the existence of conscious observers within the ruliad means that consciousness naturally emerges from mere computation. To an idealist, however, this rationale is reversed: consciousness is the original ontological primitive, and computation is a subset of what is possible within the activity of consciousness. So an idealist will interpret Wolfram’s work as suggesting that there are sections in the computationally-generated patterns that represent consciousness, but not that consciousness itself emerges from that pattern. The idealist understanding is that it was the God-mind that generated the pattern in the first place.

One of the implications of Wolfram’s work from a philosophical perspective is that there is a case for faith and optimism in viewing the universe as emerging from a computationally-irreducible pattern. When observing these patterns as they evolve in layers of emergence, over time they only become more complex, not less. This suggests that nature will only continue to grow and expand. There is no suggestion, in Wolfram’s work, that the universe will, for instance, ever collapse in on itself. Furthermore, it seems that every step in the evolution of the universal pattern is necessary for the emergence of higher-level patterns. If, for example, there were some apocalyptic scenario in which all humans were wiped out, that would be a step in the creation of a yet more complex reality.

Wrapped up in this discussion are the implications of computational irreducibility and the interplay between that and optimism. If we understand all of reality, including people, to be computationally-irreducible and computationally-equivalent patterns, then it follows directly that all perspectives are valid, valuable and even necessary. As with all emergence, the higher-level patterns are dependent on all the nuances of the lower-level ones. All perspectives are valid because they are God living through us, as us, and so are inherently divinely interesting.

Perhaps the most powerful concept for bridging the gap between Wolfram’s work and idealism is what Wolfram refers to as universality. Wolfram demonstrates that any of these complexity-generating programs can be set up to simulate any other one. This means that, if we find a complexity-generating program that produces the laws of physics, that program can always be reduced—in principle—to another one, by having the latter simulate the former. No matter what pattern you are looking at, there can always be a deeper pattern from which it is being generated. Computationally speaking, no pattern is then fundamental.

For the idealist, this gives insight into the nature of the relationship between individual consciousness and the patterns generated in the ruliad. We could postulate that the job of individual consciousness is to observe the patterns of reality—identifying their regularities and constraints—and then choose a lower-level pattern to reduced them to, in a manner that conforms to the observed constraints but also enables the fulfillment of other, arbitrary constraints, as determined by the conscious being. This can be understood to be the process of manifestation: from the infinite conceivable realities potentiated within the ruliad, the job of individual consciousness is to actively make choices that steer the development of the patterns of interest.

There is a sense in which this interpretation suggests that every decision made by a conscious being adds an entire new layer to the ‘bottom of the stack’ of our emergent reality. But this should not be understood literally. Although the complex patterns we observe in nature do provide deep insight into its emergent character, they are still only a representation of reality. The claim is thus not that ‘reality is a cellular automaton,’ for example; instead, the purpose of my argument is to provide some intuition for the nature of reality at a deeper level than elementary subatomic particles. My interpretation seeks to reconcile the rigid regularity of nature’s behavior that we experience—i.e., the observed ‘laws’ of nature—with the inherently creative and generative processes of consciousness.

In summary, idealism is entirely consistent with Wolfram’s findings. Furthermore, Wolfram’s work seems to go a long way in answering some of the most difficult questions for the idealist, such as ‘if all is mind, then why do things seem to follow rigid natural laws?’ and ‘why does there seem to be an objective physical reality?’ For someone entrenched in the popular physicalist metaphysics, the goal of this argument is to show that all of physical reality can be explained within the possibility space of the ruliad, which can ultimately be embedded in a universal mind.

The subject beyond the ‘I’: On structural psychoanalysis

The subject beyond the ‘I’: On structural psychoanalysis

Reading | Psychology

Dr. Ludwig Sachs | 2023-05-28

Illustration of man walking on Penrose triangle, surreal concept

A careful investigation of our phenomenal inner life reveals a self indistinguishable from the world and others, and yet impossibly beyond both, argues Dr. Sachs. This realization constitutes a challenge to our need to self-actualize as individuals, with significant psychological (and perhaps even metaphysical) implications.

The challenge of this article will be to create an awareness of the unconscious from the perspective of structural psychoanalysis, which was developed by the French psychiatrist Jacques Lacan1 in the 20th century based on the insights of Sigmund Freud. Ideally, it should also be visually appealing, so to cater to modern vision-oriented sensitivities.

But is it not an impossible task to try to illustrate unconscious structures in any way? Yes, it is! We literally see this impossibility of visualization every day, if we just look closely. And precisely because of this paradoxical circumstance, we can almost ‘see’ the unconscious.

 

The three registers of structural psychoanalysis

Look around you; what do you see? You naturally assume that objects are out there and that you, as an ‘I,’ a human observer with a body, are somehow ‘in your head,’ at a certain distance from the objects. If you’re outside or looking out the window, you may see the blue sky. You know and have learned that you are on Earth, surrounded in all directions by the vastness of the universe, along with your fellow human beings and other living creatures. You also know, of course, that you and everything else exist in a three-dimensional space, which surrounds you and in which you can move. You can simply turn around and see the space that was just behind you, and when you turn back in the original direction, you see the same space again. Perhaps you also have a mirror nearby, in which your body, your ‘I,’ can be reflected. And while you see all of this out there, a certain amount of time passes, which runs independently of you, just as the objects around you and the space in which you move exist independently of you. With this familiar, pictorial conception of space, time and self-consciousness, we have just described the first of three registers or orders of structural psychoanalysis: the Imaginary.

Next step: the things out there will mean something to you. The whole situation is part of your life story and somehow it all relates to you; maybe it even makes sense to you. You can tell your life story using the language you have been taught. You have also been taught what the words and sounds of that language mean. So, the objects out there have names and meanings for you: table, wall, window, magazine, laptop, light, sky, tree, etc. These words, in turn, have further meanings that can be explained with words, which themselves have meanings that can be explained with further words, and so on. For you to be understood, you must follow rules when speaking. In general, everything you see out there seems to be subject to order and structure. Some of these structures may also be hidden or not fully accessible to our descriptions. And yet, what is subject to these orders and laws apparently does not have to be aware of this order itself. One could say that nature has a knowledge of the laws of nature while not being aware of them.

We, too, obey the laws of nature without having to know them. We are subject to the reference system of designations and meanings described above, without knowing its endless network. It is therefore a knowledge of which one is not aware: an unconscious knowledge. There are structures and laws in societies and interpersonal relationships, in living beings, nature, and matter, but also in language, with which we can then speak about these structures. Structural psychoanalysis calls these never-ending structures of words, designations and meanings, which in turn create words, designations and meanings, the Symbolic.

Let’s take a step further. Forget for a moment what you think you know about your situation in space and time, the structure and functioning of your eyes, your brain, and so on. Look again closely. What do you really see? What do you perceive when you simply describe what appears in your consciousness? In front of you, you see an image that looks like a space with certain things in it. But what is behind you? Can you see it without turning around? It is neither dark nor bright, it is simply not conscious to you. Only when you turn around can you observe this image and become aware of it. But what is there before that?

Now imagine that you might not actually be in a three-dimensional space that exists independently of you. After all, you don’t see space as a whole, from all sides. Stay with what you really perceive, not what you supposedly know. As a first approximation, you might imagine that you are in a dark room and your eyes are like flashlights that only illuminate a part of the darkness. What lies in the darkness before you look remains hidden from you. Perhaps the image of space only arises in the moment you look or direct your consciousness towards it. At least this idea would correspond more to what you perceive: an image in front of you that becomes blurrier towards the edges, and behind you, in the dark, a ‘nothing’ or a ‘something’ that is not conscious to you.

But is it really true that there is a front and a back? Or an inside and an outside? And am ‘I’ really in between front and back? Or inside? Let’s take a closer look.

Forget for a moment what you think you know about your body in space, optics, the structure of your eyes, and so on, and assume that you have no problems with seeing. Then the image that appears in front of you is reasonably sharp in the center, directly opposite you, and becomes less clear, less sharp and blurred towards the edge. In contrast to the edge of the image, you can focus on individual objects in the center and thus isolate them from the overall image. One could also say: your ‘I’ is in the center facing the isolated object. If you look at the image more closely, you will also notice something peculiar: the image converges exactly to this center. You can observe this particularly well if you position yourself exactly in line with an elongated object, such as a straight path or the end of a long table. No matter where you look, there is always a central point in the distance, a point towards which everything seems to converge, exactly opposite you.

But wait a minute; that’s strange: ‘I’ should actually be the center of my perception, the (central) point from which I perceive space and the image, not that point over there, in the distance! Why does the image always center there, exactly opposite my ‘I’?

Stay with your perception, not what you think you know about distances and optics. So, if the image converges at that point over there, and not here, then maybe ‘I’ am not really where I thought I was. ‘I’ am actually another—another point, not here, but over there!

But then isn’t inside also outside? Isn’t here and there actually one point, which converges with the one in the distance, in infinity? A place where ‘I’ repeatedly face different objects? And what about the ‘I’ of others? Doesn’t that also mean that we are all one ‘I,’ at the same point, in the same place, in the same hole? But that’s impossible! And with this somewhat frightening approach to the impossible, we have experienced the third register of structural psychoanalysis: the Real.

The three registers or orders (the Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary, abbreviated as RSI) are not independent of each other but, from a psychoanalytic perspective, are interconnected like the so-called Borromean Rings. These three rings are so interconnected that their links fall apart when one ring is opened. In an analogous manner, all human experiences irretrievably disintegrate into this RSI structure.

Given these frightening impossibilities and abyssal infinities, you will quickly retreat into your habitual conception of space, time and self-consciousness, that is, into the Imaginary, using your psychological defense mechanisms. But try to linger for a moment with these paradoxes and impossibilities. What does all this mean? Can it also be visualized?

The human—in psychoanalytic terminology, the subject—is apparently decentered. One might say, ‘I’ am not where I actually am, where I myself am; in a sense, ‘I’ and ‘self’ are disconnected. Let’s stay in the visual field to illustrate this again. We must focus only on what we really see and set aside our beloved knowledge for a moment. Can you see yourself when you see? No, you cannot see yourself. You may see parts of your body, your legs, arms, etc., but all of these are only objective parts of you, not yourself. Usually, one would say, “I have arms, legs, etc.,” and not “I am arms, legs, etc.” But perhaps we can see ourselves through detours? For example, you could stand in front of a mirror to see your reflection. But that is not you either! That is only your reflection, an image that you identify with and say, “That’s me!” So ‘I’ am actually someone else. And when you are standing in front of a mirror, very close to the mirror, do you see what gradually emerges there, in your pupil, in this black ‘hole’? What is looking at you from the darkness, from within you, from this hole? What appears when you want to see yourself very clearly? Your reflection! I am someone else! And in that person’s eyes, your reflection appears again, in which you are reflected again, and so on.

So ‘I’ am condemned to be someone else. Again and again, facing other objects, reflecting in them to reflect them, trying in vain to fill the hole in the same place, this impossibility; the hole in the same place where I cannot be myself; an infinite mirror cabinet without ever coming to myself.

How did we come to this inherent sense of lack? What traumatic event assailed us in our past? Is there perhaps a story about it? Yes, there is. Most people will know it. This story has been told since ancient times, whispered from generation to generation, to tell of the unimaginable, the trauma of humanity in distant times.

Once upon a time, people were completely themselves and one with what made them whole and holy. So they lived in peace with themselves and in harmony with life, and knew the word and name of everything alive. But then the unthinkable happened, a traumatic experience so terrible that humans had to repress the memory of it for all time. It was said to be a fatal mistake, a great guilt that humanity took upon itself. And so humans were banished and expelled from themselves. Since then, one wanders through space and time like Isis in search of the dismembered Osiris, hoping for redemption, driven by an unconscious knowledge to find the lost and remedy the lack.

 

The unconscious is structured like a language

Humans are characterized by an insurmountable lack. This lack of being is referred to as the splitting/dissociation of the subject and is constitutive of human existence. This means that the subject is not capable of grasping itself or being itself, but only ever being another. The split leads to the fact that the subject has no access to a part of itself. This part, which Freud called the unconscious, is however indispensable for the constitution of the subject and its psychic structure. Paradoxically, the human subject can only constitute itself as a subject through its split or dissociation.

The split or dissociation of the human subject is based on a traumatic experience that is fundamental to human existence. However, this experience has been irreversibly repressed and was referred to by Freud as Urverdrängung, the primal repression. The primal repression remains unconscious and cannot be interpreted, therefore it makes no sense.

Structural psychoanalysis regards the split of the subject to be a consequence of its submission to language. The subject is not language itself but arises through the loss or lack that language brings about. The linguistic structures that constitute the subject are called signifiers. Unlike a sign, the signifier does not simply represent something for someone, but is what represents the subject for another signifier. In short, the subject is represented by the relationship between signifiers.

Thus, structural psychoanalysis does not describe the subject as being characterized by a particular meaning, but rather by an infinite referral of meaning and significance. This referral structure is called the Symbolic and consists of an infinite, mostly unconscious structure of designations and meanings. Structural psychoanalysis calls the elements of this structure signifiers, which means that the transitions between them are discontinuous, i.e., abrupt or discrete; in the language of quantum physics: quantized, rather than continuous.

Structural psychoanalysis asserts that the signifiers influence and transform the subject’s natural needs into the so-called signified: the designated or object of meaning. It postulates the primacy of the signifier over the signified, a concept that was adopted by the French ethnologist and anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss. This means that the signifying element precedes the signified and that the signified cannot exist independently of the signifying element.

The transformation of needs by the signifier has an overall effect: the lack. In psychoanalytic theory, this lack is symbolized by the phallus signifier. Therefore, the subject has an interest, a desire, a longing for the signified, i.e., the object of meaning.

The chaining of signifiers creates a dynamic of lack and desire that refers back to itself without coming to a halt, without coming to itself. This iterative, self-referential search leads to emergence, self-similarity and self-organization, or fractal patterns/geometries as observed in complex systems.

This dynamic arises from the fact that the signifier is not identical with itself; instead, it is always distinguished from itself. Therefore, the signifier cannot repeat its original meaning. However, the subject desires to rediscover the original meaning, that is, ‘itself,’ since it is represented by the relationships between the signifiers. Consequently, the signifier is repeated, and only through this repetition—which must occur at least once—does it become a signifier at all. Nonetheless, the repetition is futile because the same thing is impossible due to the marking of the subject by the signifiers. Hence, the repetition is repeated again, creating an endless loop of repetitions.

Structural psychoanalysis refers to this impossibility, that which is impossible to symbolize, as the Real. The Real is the traumatic, the causeless, the unfathomable, and the logically impossible, which cannot be imagined or symbolized. The Real is also what ‘keeps coming back in the same place.’

The Real can also be found in the sciences, where in every formalized, symbolized field, such as mathematics, logic, or physics, there are areas that cannot be proven but must still serve as a basis. In these areas of knowledge, the Real functions as an axiom. The Real can also be accessible through logical contradictions that may arise during formalization. In quantum physics, the Real manifests itself as a random event. And in psychoanalysis, it appears at the points where the procedure of free association and interpretation fails.

 

The Phantasm

Imaginary objects serve as illusory compensations for the subject’s unconscious lack of being. In psychoanalytic terminology, the subject split/barred by signifiers desires an object. This object designates and represents what is missing and is therefore desired by the subject. The search for the object in physics can thus be understood as a prototypical expression of this desire.

These objects have an imaginary character, as they are oriented towards the idealized body image. Structural psychoanalysis calls the order of the body image the Imaginary. By referring to the idealized, closed and unitary image of the body, the split subject can conceive of itself as an imaginary unity, as the ‘I.’ We rely on this ideal of wholeness. It is necessary for us to mask our fragmentation/dissociation, which we could not bear.

The ‘I’ is the representation of oneself as a body or consists in the identification with the image of one’s own body. This identification process—i.e., the consciousness of the ‘I’—can be impaired, as in the case of depersonalization or out-of-body experiences. As a simple experiment, the so-called rubber hand illusion2 can be performed, in which one can experience an illusory spatial localization of the subject. This has been experimentally demonstrated by the philosopher and neuroscientist Thomas Metzinger.3

The relationship to the body image also structures our relationship to space, by orienting ourselves towards the opposition of inside and outside. This is also reflected in physical concepts, such as closed systems and internal/external observers. Freud initially described the psychological apparatus as a kind of sphere, in which the ‘I’ is structured as a modified surface of the id, shaped by the influence of the external world.

Structural psychoanalysis revised Freud’s concept of space in order to reduce the attachment to the Imaginary. Here, the spatial structure of the psyche is no longer viewed from the surface of a sphere, but is examined using topologies such as the torus, the Klein bottle, and the projective plane/sphere with a cross-cap, in order to critically question the imaginary inside/outside opposition. It is important to note that structural psychoanalysis does not view the topological structure as a mere metaphor, but instead understands the structures of the subject as the topological structure.

In topological structures that have self-referential properties, the Real becomes more apparent than in (imaginary) everyday life. The circle is the geometric paradigm for such a structure because, as we imaginarily draw a line to form a circle, we know that the line refers to itself from the beginning: the curve should close in the end, going back to where it started.

However, the circle is fraught with impossibilities that manifest themselves mathematically, as the Real, in the form of the impossibility of squaring the circle, as well as the transcendental number pi—the ratio between the circle’s perimeter and diameter—that encompasses an infinite sequence of digits, thereby being impossible to pin down with complete precision. That is why psychoanalysis does not illustrate the futile attempt to return to oneself as a circle.

Another example is prime numbers, i.e., numbers that are only divisible by one and themselves. From a psychoanalytic perspective, dividing by oneself is only possible imaginarily, because a repetition of the same is impossible.

The unity of the subject is only possible imaginarily, which is represented mathematically as the imaginary unit i: the impossible square-root of -1 in the space of complex numbers. And so the subject circulates in that space between the missing (the zero) and the unattainable unity (the whole number 1). The process unfolds around a center, namely the object of desire, which is lost and impossible to find, thus lying in the Real. In that center, prime numbers arise with every circling attempt to return to oneself. But they are impossible in terms of complete self-congruence and therefore lie in the Real, outside the number space. They can only be written imaginarily, in a continuous way of futile repetition.

Therefore, a purely symbolic, i.e., mathematical description cannot advance further here. A more comprehensive, holistic view is necessary, called a ‘biopsychosocial’ view in psychosomatic medicine.

 

The Apprentices of Sais

It remains to be hoped that “sisters of deep structures,” such as mathematics and psychology, will one day come together again and allow us to understand the mysterious cipher script that Novalis speaks of in The Apprentices of Sais:

Manifold are the paths people take. Whoever pursues and compares them will see strange figures emerge; figures that seem to belong to that great cipher script that one sees everywhere, on wings, eggshells, in clouds, snow, crystals, and rock formations, on freezing waters, inside and outside of mountains, in plants, animals, humans, in the lights of the heavens, on touched and stroked pieces of pitch and glass, in filings around a magnet, and in strange conjunctions of chance. In them, one senses the key to this miraculous script, its grammar…

 

Notes

  1. e.g. https://www.lacanonline.com/ or https://lacan-entziffern.de/ (German)
  2. e.g. Youtube https://youtu.be/xdxlT68ygt8
  3. Lenggenhager B, Tadi T, Metzinger T, Blanke O. Video ergo sum: manipulating bodily self-consciousness. Science. 2007 Aug 24; 317 (5841): 1096-9. doi: 10.1126/science.1143439. PMID: 17717189.

Panel discussion: the role of the observer, the double-slit experiment, the reality of physical laws, etc.

Panel discussion: the role of the observer, the double-slit experiment, the reality of physical laws, etc.

Seeing | Quantum Physics | 2023-05-21

Training and research, concept. Pensive man and physical and mathematical formulas on the background

The Nobel Prize in physics in 2022 went to scientists who, for over 40 years, have carried out a series of experiments indicating that, contrary to materialist expectations, physical entities do not have standalone existence but are, in fact, products of observation. This result is extraordinarily relevant to our understanding of the nature of reality, and so Essentia Foundation, in collaboration with the Institute for Quantum Optics and Quantum Information, Vienna, of the Austrian Academy of Sciences (home to Prof. Anton Zeilinger, one of 2022’s Nobel Laureates in physics), organized a conference discussing the implications of this result. The conference was hosted by IQOQI-Vienna’s Dr. Markus Müller and featured seven other speakers.

The video below is the record of the Q&A session at the end of the conference’s second and last day. The participants discuss whether there are objective physical laws out there in nature, whether the double-slit and similar experiments capture the essence of quantum mechanics, whether the scientific method demands inter-subjective confirmation, and what constitutes an observing agent under Quantum Bayesianism. This video completes our coverage of the 2022 conference. Stay tuned for news about the upcoming 2023 conference, which promises to be even more exciting!

Because of the way YouTube works, to watch the video embedded below you need to select our Platinum privacy option (see fingerprint icon to the lower-left). Otherwise, you can always watch the video directly on YouTube.

Spinoza versus humanism (The Return of Metaphysics)

Spinoza versus humanism (The Return of Metaphysics)

Reading | Metaphysics

Young,Confident,Super,Businessman,In,Mask,And,Cape

Now that metaphysics has been rehabilitated in our philosophical discourse, Spinoza’s thought can help us overcome our last idol of delusion: humanism, the notion that humans are in some innate sense special and separate from the rest of nature. This essay is the final installment of our The Return of Metaphysics series, developed in collaboration with the Institute of Art and Ideas (IAI). It has been first published by the IAI on 12 May 2023.

A few years ago, I took part in a conference at Bochum University, and partly out of respect for the university which hosts the illustrious Hegel-Archiev, I decided to present a paper in which I argued that, not unlike Hegel’s Encyclopedie, one can profitably read Spinoza’s Ethics as a circular text which ends just where it begins. The Q&A session after my talk was lively and joyous, but one specific question still resonates with me. “This was an interesting talk. Still, if I may. What is the point of engaging again with Spinoza’s metaphysics? Has not Kant already proved that dogmatic metaphysic is obsolete?” asked one of the participants, a senior Kant scholar and philologist. Since the question was genuinely well-meant and fair, I asked the scholar whether he would mind repeating Kant’s proof, so that we could consider it jointly. At which point I was rewarded with a warm, generous, smile followed by a hand gesture which I interpreted as indicating certain desperateness or recognition that some ‘dogmatic’ philosophers are just incorrigible.

While few contemporary philosophers would be as blunt as this colleague and friend, one must admit that the underlying view that Kant killed off metaphysics dominated modern philosophy until very recently. This perception of Kant as the “all-crushing [Alleszermalmer]” destroyer of metaphysics, is not groundless.

Today, the main resistance to Spinoza’s return—but also the reason why it is urgent and necessary—is less the dismissal of metaphysics as dogma and more an attachment to a dogma of a different sort: humanism. To the extent that Anglo-American philosophy has opened itself to rigorous metaphysical thought, Spinoza has been well and truly rehabilitated—much of contemporary monist metaphysics is directly indebted to Spinoza. Overcoming the attachment of (not just analytic philosophy) to humanism—the belief that human beings occupy a uniquely prominent place in nature—has proved even harder than rehabilitating metaphysics. But given the crises that this ideology has given birth to, overcome we must, and Spinoza is the philosopher to help us do it.

As far as the return of Spinozist thought in metaphysics is concerned, the two centuries that followed Kant witnessed two major waves of attempts to rehabilitate metaphysics by overcoming Kant’s various bifurcations of reality: first, the German Idealism of the early nineteenth century, and then, toward the end of that century, British Idealism. The two movements were closely related and Spinoza’s metaphysical monism and systematicity were a major source of inspiration for both of them. Most of the key figures in both German and British Idealism presented themselves as either Spinozists or as attempting to provide an improved, or elevated, Spinozism.

As has been argued in previous installments of The Return of Metaphysics series, analytic philosophy began as a rebellion against what was seen as the metaphysical extravagance of the British Idealists. As a consequence, throughout most of the twentieth century, the shares of Spinoza’s philosophy plunged just as the entire discipline of metaphysics suffered from severe disrepute. Analytic philosophy had a lukewarm attitude toward Spinoza in spite of the fact that, from its very inception, analytic philosophy aspired to approximate the precision and clarity of mathematics, an aspiration that could hardly be better matched in any other major philosophical work than in Spinoza’s axiomatized Ethics.

It was just natural that the recent rehabilitation of metaphysics in the Anglo-American world over the past thirty or so years has been accompanied by a huge surge of engagement with Spinoza’s philosophy, first in North America, but more recently, also in all other quarters of Anglo-American philosophy. Apart from the re-emergence of metaphysics as a central discipline of philosophy in the Anglo-American world, one can also discern a few additional causes for this recent surge, not the least of which is the emergence of Spinoza as an icon in the French philosophical scene during the 1970s and 1980s. This latter event itself took place partly due the wide impact of the work of a few outstanding philosophers—most of all, Martial Gueroult (1891-1976), but also, Alexandre Matheron (1926-2020), and Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995)—and partly due to certain developments in the French left and the attempt to establish a Marxism free from humanistic illusions. While, traditionally, Marxism was built upon Hegelian conceptual foundations, the new French Marxism of the 1960s and 1970s attempted to offer a Marxism grounded in Spinozist metaphysics, and as such, free from the illusions of teleologically structured history, subjectivity, and humanism.

The impact of the work of a few outstanding philosophers was also crucial in the rise of Spinozism on the American shores of the Atlantic, and here, the works of Don Garrett and Michael Della Rocca had the most decisive role. Both figures showed that a careful and accurate reconstruction of Spinoza’s arguments reveals a metaphysical system which might well seem odd to us (at least at first sight), yet is still highly impressive in terms of its precision, ingenuity, boldness, and consistency.

It goes without saying that the development of various forms of monism in recent analytic philosophy—think, for example, of the works of Jonathan Schaffer and Galen Strawson, each of which could be considered as offering a certain kind of Spinozism (not Spinoza’s Spinozism, but Spinozism nonetheless)—provided auxiliary winds to the sails of the new Spinozist armada.

Overcoming the dogma that metaphysics must be dogmatic—i.e., inadequately motivated, and obscure—was one of the main challenges for the rehabilitation of Spinozism. To the extent that contemporary analytic metaphysics is open to philosophy that is precise yet bold, and to the extent that it is no longer captivated by blind obedience to common sense, Spinozism can and will flourish. But there is another dogma—one which is not unique to current Anglo-American philosophy—the overcoming of which is likely to result in an even more radical upheaval.

Humanism—in a nutshell, the view that humanity occupies a uniquely prominent place in nature (if it is part of nature at all), and that the human perspective should be justly considered as constituting the boundaries and structure of reality—has deep philosophical roots, going back as far as Protagoras’ dictum: “Man is the measure of all things: of those that are—that they are, and of the things that are not—that they are not.” Humanism dominated the mainstream of modern philosophy both before and after the advent of secularization. Figures as diverse as Pico Della Mirandola, Descartes, Leibniz, Hegel, and Sartre pledged their allegiance to its tenets. In a sense, we are all humanists today: we believe in the miracle of free will (even if we do not believe in any other miracle), we adore human dignity as an innate determination of all humans (war criminals included), and we do our best to point out allegedly unique features of human beings—consciousness, self-consciousness, unity of the self, freedom, rationality, the ability to act morally, or whatever—features that may help us justify our attitude toward other animals, as mere things. Our default humanism functions as a genuine ideology: for the most part it is invisible, seamless, and taken for granted, and one needs to train herself in defamiliarization in order to recognize the arbitrariness of these deep-seated convictions.

Of all modern philosophers, Kant was the most sophisticated, most systematic, most resourceful, and most influential advocate of humanism. In the opening lines of his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Kant writes: “The fact that the human being can have the ‘I’ in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person, and by virtue of the unity of consciousness through all changes that happen to him, one and the same person—i.e., through rank and dignity and entirely different being from things, such as irrational animals, with which one can do as one likes.” For Kant, one of the reasons humans “are entirely different beings” from other animals is due to the fact that humanity takes part in the noumenal realm, and, as such, is free and not constrained by the strict determinism that governs experience, or nature. Moreover, while Kant argued that we cannot have knowledge of God, he still emphatically maintained that it is rational to have faith both in a benevolent God and in the immortality of the human soul as moral postulates. In this sense, Kant expelled anthropomorphic religion from the main entrance, while inviting it back from the back door. It is thus not a surprise that for many (post-)Christians, Kant’s philosophy provided an easy soft-landing in the face of secularization, a soft-landing that allowed them to stick to notions such as evil, free-will, and even, life after death.

Humanism had its own detractors and critics from ancient Xenophanes, through (the late) Maimonides and Hume, to Nietzsche, but none was as bold and methodical as Spinoza.

Spinoza’s attack on anthropomorphic religion is well-known. His sharp criticism of most other aspects of humanism is less recognized (at least in the Anglo-American philosophical arena). Both in the Ethics and in his Political Treatise, Spinoza scolds those who uphold the common perception of humanity as a “dominion within a dominion,” i.e., as constituting an autonomous realm of beings that disturb rather than strictly follow the laws of nature by virtue of their alleged, unique endowment with free will. Whatever exclusive qualities the humanists claim bestow humanity with a unique status—elevated above the rest of nature—Spinoza would either argue that the belief that humans have this quality is a pleasant fairy-tale (as in the case of free will, a miraculously causeless event that obtains out of thin air), or he would deny that human beings are unique in having these qualities. Spinoza would equally reject the dogma that human subjectivity and reason can be better known than the world (since our knowledge of the causes of human subjectivity is still far less developed than our knowledge of the mechanics of billiard balls, and their like).

Next to Nietzsche and Luis Althusser, Hegel was one of the few readers who recognized the scale of Spinoza’s attack on humanism, but in spite of his appreciation, perhaps even attraction to Spinoza’s anti-humanism, Hegel still argued, pace Spinoza, that the “absolute must be a subject, not only a substance” (to which Spinoza would have responded by saying that if Hegel were a triangle, rather than a human being—i.e., “a subject”—he would have surely insisted “that the absolute must be triangular”).

The temptations of anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism are obvious, and it is not a coincidence that so many philosophers (and theologians) conceived the ultimate being (God, the Absolute, etc.) in their own image. Equally clear is the motivation to conceive human beings as free agents: our notions of justice, reward, and the entire package of our bourgeois values, require it desperately. But if humanity ever sets its step beyond the safe boundaries of humanism, and begin doubting this cult of our last and most magnificent idol—Man—at that very day we should recognize our debt to Spinoza, “the all-crushing destroyer” of our ultimate idol (Spinoza himself, to be clear, is not at all a misanthrope: in fact, his entire Ethics is about charting the path toward a blessed human life, though one which is free from humanistic illusions).

Would that day ever shine? Having no access to crystal balls, I can only paraphrase the words of a sage (yes, the very same sage!): since human affairs are by nature contingent and changeable, I would believe that someday, given the right conditions, this may well happen.

The double-slit experiment doesn’t reveal the essence of quantum weirdness

The double-slit experiment doesn’t reveal the essence of quantum weirdness

Seeing | Quantum Theory

Lorenzo Catani, PhD | 2023-05-07

Double-Slit Experiment - 3D Rendering

The Nobel Prize in physics in 2022 went to scientists who, for over 40 years, have carried out a series of experiments indicating that, contrary to materialist expectations, physical entities do not have standalone existence but are, in fact, products of observation. This result is extraordinarily relevant to our understanding of the nature of reality, and so Essentia Foundation, in collaboration with the Institute for Quantum Optics and Quantum Information, Vienna, of the Austrian Academy of Sciences (home to Prof. Anton Zeilinger, one of 2022’s Nobel Laureates in physics), organized a conference discussing the implications of this result. The conference was hosted by IQOQI-Vienna’s Dr. Markus Müller and featured seven other speakers.

In this presentation, Dr. Lorenzo Catani argues that interference phenomena, such as observed in the famous double-slit experiment, in fact do not capture the essence of quantum theory.

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Why evolutionary theory contradicts materialism

Why evolutionary theory contradicts materialism

Reading | Evolutionary theory

Richard Oxenberg, PhD | 2023-04-30

Human evolution, natural selection, from monkeys to modern humans. Anthropology and genetic heritage, against the background of the starry sky,milky way

Evolutionary theory not only fails to account for the putative emergence of consciousness from a non-conscious, material substrate, but it also outright contradicts materialism by implying that subjective states have causal powers in and of themselves, argues Dr. Oxenberg. His argument is explicit, conceptually clear, original, compelling, and we could not find a way to refute it. It is an argument not against evolutionary theory, but precisely based on it. Dr. Oxenberg then goes on to conclude that “the truth of evolutionary theory is consistent with a fully informed and rational spiritual faith.”

My thesis in this paper is a fairly simple one, and one, I believe, that is fairly simple to support on rational grounds—although I imagine it will prove controversial among some dedicated to a philosophy of ‘scientific objectivism.’ But the thesis can be stated simply enough: A materialist interpretation of evolutionary theory cannot account for the subjective dimension of life and, in particular, cannot account for the desire for physical survival, which it presupposes. When we analyze evolutionary theory with care we discover, somewhat astonishingly, that it is actually inconsistent with a philosophy of metaphysical materialism. A full recognition of this undermines the claims of evolutionary materialists (such as Richard Dawkins and others) who have advanced and popularized the notion that the truth of evolutionary theory implies the falsity of religious belief.

But before considering my thesis let me first of all clarify it. I want to be quick to say that when I speak of the limits of evolutionary explanation I do not mean this in the sense in which Intelligent Design (ID) theorists say that natural selection cannot account for irreducible complexity. The ID theorists argue that irreducibly complex organic systems cannot result from natural selection, as each element of the system would need to be selected for independently. This is a more or less straightforward rational argument based upon a key premise of natural selection theory: that only what bestows a survival advantage is selected for. If, say the ID theorists, the elements of an irreducibly complex system do not each bestow a survival advantage, then the logic of natural selection itself implies that they cannot have resulted from it. On this basis, it is argued that such systems must be accounted for by something else; in particular, some deliberately acting intelligence. This is the basic argument of ID theory.

Evolutionists answer by denying that there are, in fact, ‘irreducibly’ complex systems. They maintain that the examples of irreducible complexity provided by ID theorists can indeed be shown to be reducible to elements that would have bestowed survival advantage when they first appeared. In some cases, this can be demonstrated more or less directly. In others, say the evolutionists, it is reasonable to assume it on the basis of the general success of natural selection theory. In other words, the evolutionists claim that the explanatory gaps ID theorists profess to find in natural selection theory simply do not exist.

My argument differs from this. It does not seek to demonstrate gaps in the explanatory power of evolutionary theory, but to show that evolution’s explanations do not reach as far as the evolutionary materialists (e.g., Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, E. O. Wilson, Richard Lewontin, etc.) suggest. Indeed, I maintain that a careful consideration of natural selection theory itself calls into question the assumptions of metaphysical materialism. To see this, however, we will need to attend closely to the logic of natural selection theory.

That logic is straightforward and can be expressed simply: In order for a trait to be ‘selected for’ it must meet two criteria: (1) It must exist. It must be present in some entity. Nothing can be selected for that does not already exist. (2) It must be such as to bestow a survival advantage on the entity that possesses it.

Criterion (1) alone is sufficient to indicate the explanatory limits of natural selection theory. This theory is often said to be a theory of origins (of course, Darwin’s revolutionary work was entitled The Origin of the Species), but in fact natural selection as such does not explain the ‘origin’ of anything. Given that only traits that already exist can be selected for, the origin of those traits must be attributed to something other than selection. This is obvious enough and would be uncontroversial if it were not for the way that evolutionary theorists often slip into a casual, teleological mode of speaking, as if this or that trait were intentionally produced by natural selection for the purpose of fulfilling this or that survival aim. Among the most flagrant examples of this sloppy mode of speaking is the title of Richard Dawkins’ popular bestseller, The Selfish Gene. The word ‘selfish’ suggests an intentionality that is contrary to the actual logic of evolutionary theory. Of course, the evolutionists themselves understand this to be a shorthand—and scientifically sloppy—way of speaking. It is, however, more than sloppy; it is misleading. It involves the logical blunder of mistaking an effect for a cause.

According to natural selection theory, survival advantage is the effect of traits that are then selected for because they have that effect. The giraffe’s long neck, for instance, is not produced in order for the giraffe to reach the high leaves; rather, the giraffe is able to reach the high leaves because it has a long neck. What then is the origin of the long neck? Natural selection theory cannot answer this question. Evolutionary theory in general answers ‘random mutation.’ But what kind of an ‘origin’ is this? What is ‘random mutation’?

Mutation simply means change. Of course, in order for something to change, randomly or otherwise, it must first of all exist, and in two distinct ways. The medium that undergoes the mutation must exist as the substratum of mutation, and that into which that medium changes must exist in potentia as a real possibility of that substratum.

For example, in order for the gene that determines the length of the giraffe’s neck to mutate into a gene that produces a longer neck, that gene must, first of all, already exist, and, second of all, must have the potential to mutate in just the way it does. Of course, it is entirely possible, logically, that genes in general would not have that particular potential. Even more to the point, neither the existence of genes nor their potentialities have their ‘origin’ in random mutation. The term ‘random mutation’ describes a process; it tells us nothing of the origin of that which undergoes the process. It does not answer the question of how the universe comes to be a place that makes possible such genes. Carefully considered, then, neither the theory of natural selection nor the theory of random mutation provide insight into the origin of living traits and processes.

These two ideas—natural selection and random mutation—constitute the core of Darwinian evolutionary theory. Neither provide an explanation of the origin of living entities. Thus, evolutionary theory is not actually a theory of ‘origins’ at all. It describes processes, but yields no insight into the origin of that which undergoes these processes. It describes how, it does not explain wherefrom. But it is this latter that we would need to understand if we wanted to understand the nature of life in its essence.

At this point, however, we can hear the evolutionary theorist object. The question evolutionary theory answers is why organic systems have the functional organization they do. Before Darwin, this organization was thought to be the work of a supreme intelligence who crafted these systems in just these ways for a divinely ordained purpose. After Darwin, we were better able to explain this organization as a function of strictly natural, i.e., material, processes. So, the evolutionist says, Darwin’s theory does indeed explain what was unexplained or poorly explained before, and does so through appeal to strictly natural, i.e., material, processes.

True enough. But a great deal hangs on just what we are to understand by the word ‘explain.’ What is explained by Darwinian theory is the manner in which living systems become organized. What remains unexplained is the ultimate nature of these living systems. It is this nature we must understand if we are to assess the ultimate potentialities of life. And it is these potentialities we must understand in order to assess the rationality of the religious impulse. Evolutionary theory does not address this. For sure, the evolutionary materialists contend that evolutionary theory implies that the nature of life will be (or can be) understood in entirely material terms.

Were this true it would indeed undermine most religious interpretations of the meaning of life. My contention, however, is that evolutionary theory implies no such thing; indeed, it implies the opposite. We can see this most clearly by applying our analysis of the limitations of evolutionary explanation to the non-material, subjective features of life we are familiar with through introspection.

It is a commonplace of evolutionary discourse to speak of the ‘competition for,’ or ‘struggle for,’ survival. Given the intensive struggle for survival we see among living systems, we are told, only those that are well adapted to the conditions of survival can persist from generation to generation. Those less well adapted fall by the wayside. This is the logic that drives natural selection. What is seldom noted with respect to this discourse, however, is that the very use of the term ‘struggle for survival’ takes us beyond the conceptual bounds of metaphysical materialism. Material systems as such may affect one another, but they do not struggle with one another. The word ‘struggle’ implies intentionality and purpose. A ‘struggle for survival’ implies a desire to survive. We have immediate knowledge of the existence of such desire, for we experience it within ourselves. What is its origin? How has it arisen? What is its essential nature and ultimate thrust? As we’ve already noted, evolutionary theory cannot answer these questions.

But, given the sloppy way evolutionary theory is often expressed, even by those who know better, it behooves us to put a finer point on this. Surely the desire to survive is selected for, some might say. Those who have a desire to survive are much more likely to behave in ways that will further their survival than those who do not, hence the desire to survive confers a clear survival advantage.

This is true enough (although its implications are not at all what the materialists might suppose, as we shall see in a moment). But, again, to suppose that this explains the desire to survive is to mistake an effect for a cause. The survival advantage conferred by the desire to survive is an effect of that desire, not its cause. The selection that then takes place is the effect of the survival advantage. The cause of the desire is not at all given by natural selection theory. It is not even addressed by it. Nor, for reasons stated above, does the idea of ‘random mutation’ provide a causal explanation. The origin of this desire is a pure mystery.

More broadly, the origin of the subjective in general is a pure mystery. No insight into this is provided by evolutionary theory. No one has, or can, explain the mechanism through which a material gene, however randomly mutated, results in thinking, feeling, caring, hoping, loving, etc. Neither the origin nor ultimate nature of these subjective states are given by evolutionary theory. True enough, evolutionary theory tells us that if subjective states are traceable to our genetic structure, then those states will be subject to selective pressures. But this tells us nothing at all of their origin or ultimate nature. Nor does it shed any light on how the subjective can emerge from the material.

As some will note, this is simply the mind-body problem considered in the context of evolutionary theory. My point in bringing it up in this context is simply to indicate that evolutionary theory in no way resolves it. This again highlights the limits of evolutionary explanation, and in a particularly striking way. After all, what we are subjectively is what we are most intimately and immediately. Our subjectivity is our immediate presence to ourselves. Without it, we would not be what we are. If we wish to understand our origin and ultimate nature, then, it is the origin of this subjectivity we must understand. Evolutionary theory provides no insight into this.

But we can take this point a step further. Indeed, we can turn the materialist argument altogether on its head. How, we might ask, can the desire to survive—a subjective state—confer a physical survival advantage? It can do so only by affecting physical behavior. The natural selection argument in this instance goes something like this: animals who desire survival are, for that reason, more likely to act in ways that further survival than those who do not. Hence, they are more likely to be winners in the struggle for survival and the desire for survival is ‘selected for.’ But this will only be true to the extent that desire—again, a subjective state—can have physical efficacy. Somehow this mind-state must be able to reach into matter, the matter of an animal’s body, and affect its behavior. To the extent that we were to understand evolutionary theory as grounded in, or as implying, metaphysical materialism, this would make no sense. How can a mere subjective state physically move a material body? On materialist grounds it cannot. This leads us to a startling conclusion: In order for the desire to survive to have any bearing on natural selection at all, metaphysical materialism must be wrong.

We can flesh this out by examining what we are calling the ‘desire for survival’ in closer detail. It might be pointed out that the phrase ‘desire for survival’ is an abstraction. In fact, we don’t desire ‘survival’ per se, but the furtherance of pleasurable states and the avoidance of painful states. It just happens that natural selection associates pleasure with survival and pain with threats to survival. If the opposite were the case we would desire our demise. Fair enough. But how are we to understand how such an association occurs? In order for the subjective states of pleasure and pain to become associated by natural selection with survival and threats to survival, those states must have the power to induce survival-relevant behavior. After all, it is behavior that is either selected for or selected out by tending to promote or undermine survival. In order for an association of pleasure with survival-promoting behavior to be selected for, the subjective state of pleasure itself must have the power to modify behavior. If subjective states couldn’t affect behavior, they would have no bearing on selection. But how, on materialist grounds, can subjective states modify physical behavior?

What we would expect, on materialist assumptions, is that there would be no subjective states at all. Of course, we know this not to be the case. In the face of the undeniable fact of subjective states, then, materialism maintains that these states are mere ‘epiphenomena,’ i.e., irrelevant to the causal nexus of the material world. But this is just what natural selection shows is not the case. If subjective states were irrelevant to material causality, they would have no correlation with survival-relevant behavior. We would expect a random distribution of these states, and expect them to have no affect on, or association with, behavior.

But we do not find a random distribution of subjective states; rather, we find that positive (i.e., desirable) states are, by and large, associated with survival-promoting behavior and negative states with survival-threatening behavior. Again, this could only result from natural selection if these states can reach into the physical world and change it. But if they can, then this means the subjective—i.e., the non-material—must have physical efficacy. This altogether contravenes the assumptions of materialism.

The materialist would likely counter that these states are not merely subjective, but have material counterparts in the brain or nervous system. Neurological study leaves little doubt that this is so. On this basis, the materialist would argue that it is not the subjective quality of the state that affects physical behavior but its material, neurological counterpart. This would allow all causality to remain on the material plane. Fair enough. But then how to account for the fact that these subjective states have just these subjective qualities? Why, for instance, does the material counterpart of pleasure feels good subjectively? Why does pain, or the physical counterpart of pain, hurt? The materialist can give no plausible explanation for this. If everything results from strictly material interactions to which the quality of subjective states is irrelevant, then the subjective qualities of pleasure and pain would have no efficacy. Not only would there be no need for these subjective qualities to be as they are, but, even more to the point, we could find no plausible explanation for how these qualities come to be associated with physical states and physical behavior relevant to survival. Can it be a mere coincidence that sticking a hand in a fire hurts, or that sexual activity feels good? Such a suggestion strains credulity.

The natural selection argument must be that the subjective quality of hurt is selected for because this subjective quality itself induces beneficial avoidance behavior. But, again, this means that the hurt itself—that is, the subjective quality of hurt—must be able to somehow reach into the physical and modify it. It must somehow be able to cause (or induce) our bodies to behave in certain ways. Only to the extent that this is the case does it make sense to believe that natural selection favors an association of hurt with avoidance behavior.

But if this is so then the materialist thesis that reality—or, at least, all that is efficacious in reality—has a material basis, must be wrong. We arrive at the astonishing conclusion that evolutionary theory, far from favoring a materialist metaphysic, actually undermines it, by indicating that the subjective has causal efficacy in the material world. This suggests that the subjective—consciousness—cannot be a mere byproduct or ‘epiphnomenon’ of matter.

What, then, is it? Where does it come from? What is its essential nature? Evolutionary theory does not—indeed cannot—answer these questions.

Of particular relevance to religion is the question of what potentialities the subjective has. Can it exist only in association with the material world as we know it, or might there be subjective domains of reality that do not have or require a material basis or association? Nothing in evolutionary theory yields an answer to this question. Are the values that arise from subjective desire—of which the value we place on physical survival is one—restricted to values that promote physical survival, or might the valuation of physical survival be but one aspect of a broader teleological trajectory, inherent to the subjective as such, that would find its ultimate consummation in what the religious person might call ‘communion with God’?

Again, given that evolutionary theory tells us nothing about the origin of the subjective, and hence nothing of its ultimate nature or thrust, it provides no answer to this question. In order for living systems to survive over generations they must engage in behavior that will effectively pass their genes along, and—to the extent that our subjective valuations have physical efficacy—this implies that behaviors that do will tend to be valued. But this in no way suggests that these are the only values inherent to the subjective.

The materialist might point out that we have evidence for Darwinian evolution and the ‘struggle for survival’ it suggests, but no evidence (other than the subjective testimonies of the faithful) for a religious teleology. But such a point would only be relevant to the extent that belief in the former contradicted belief in the latter, such that we had to choose between them. The point of my argument is to indicate that it does not. Does evolution raise difficulties for theology insofar as it highlights the dog-eat-dog (or animal-eat-animal) structure of the natural world, a structure, some might think, inconsistent with belief in a loving God? Perhaps, but then we did not need Darwin to point out this aspect of nature to us. Isaiah was aware long ago that, in the world we occupy, the wolf does not lie down with the lamb (except to eat it!). What in theology is called the ‘problem of evil,’ both natural and moral, has long been a difficulty for religion. Faith demands the ability to believe that this problem is not finally fatal to the rationality of theism. This is certainly a subject worthy of consideration, but it is a subject we will have to leave for another time.

In closing, I wish to make clear, again, that what I have presented here is no ‘God-of-the-gaps’ argument. What is at issue is whether evolutionary theory makes it unreasonable to believe that human life, at its core, is characterized by a teleology that finds its true consummation in some version of ‘communion with God.’ This is suggested by evolutionary materialists such as Dawkins and Dennett. My argument is not that they are mistaken because evolutionary theory is wrong or incomplete (as the ID theorists maintain), but that they are mistaken because evolutionary theory does not have the implications they suppose. In particular, it does not preclude the possibility of a ‘spiritual’ teleology. Indeed, when we consider evolution’s own recognition that life ‘struggles’ for survival—a struggle manifest in the subjective desire for survival—we see that it actually presupposes a teleological dimension to life.

My claim is that there is nothing in evolutionary theory that would require us to believe that life’s teleology is fully expressed in the pursuit of terrestrial survival. What evolution highlights is that terrestrial life includes this pursuit (something, of course, we already knew), but it neither proves nor implies that it is wholly defined by it.

Let us suppose, then, as a thought experiment, that some form of theism is right. What would we expect to see? We would expect to see the emergence of some creature whose desires are indeed favorable to terrestrial survival (otherwise the creature would not survive) but not wholly satisfied with such survival—a creature straining for something beyond mere material, terrestrial goods, in ways that yield no obvious selective advantage. I maintain that this is just what we do see in the human struggle for beauty, truth, justice and the spiritual in general. In this way religion serves as some evidence for its own validity. The human spirit aspires to more than mere material continuance. The suggestion on the part of evolutionary materialists that it does not—that, indeed, it cannot—lies at the heart of the hostility many religious people feel toward evolutionary theory. But when we separate evolutionary theory from the philosophy of metaphysical materialism it is often used, or misused, to advance, we see that there is no need for such hostility. The truth of evolutionary theory is consistent with a fully informed and rational spiritual faith.

How Idealism saved Leo Tolstoy’s life

How Idealism saved Leo Tolstoy’s life

Listening | Literature | 2023-04-23

RUSSIA - CIRCA 1910: Postcard printed in Russia shows Count Leo Tolstoy in Yasnaya Poliana with paintings by Ilya Repin, circa 1910

Today’s article sheds light on the personal journey of one of the world’s most renowned authors, and the impact of idealism on his development and growth. It shows us what joins humanity together in its suffering, but also what joins it in the potential for collective healing. The power is within all of us, quietly showing us the way. This is the latest episode of the Essentia Readings podcast.

There are no physical laws in the world

There are no physical laws in the world

Seeing | Foundations of Physics

Daniele Oriti, PhD | 2023-04-16

Science and research of the universe, spiral galaxy and physical formulas, concept of knowledge and education. Elements of this image furnished by NASA.

The Nobel Prize in physics in 2022 went to scientists who, for over 40 years, have carried out a series of experiments indicating that, contrary to materialist expectations, physical entities do not have standalone existence but are, in fact, products of observation. This result is extraordinarily relevant to our understanding of the nature of reality, and so Essentia Foundation, in collaboration with the Institute for Quantum Optics and Quantum Information, Vienna, of the Austrian Academy of Sciences (home to Prof. Anton Zeilinger, one of 2022’s Nobel Laureates in physics), organized a conference discussing the implications of this result. The conference was hosted by IQOQI-Vienna’s Dr. Markus Müller and featured seven other speakers.

In this, one of the most intriguing presentations of the conference, Dr. Daniele Oriti, from the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, defends the view that physical laws are epistemic in nature, having no independent ontological status.

This presentation was part of the ‘Physics of First-Person Perspective’ conference, organized at the end of 2022 by Essentia Foundation and the Institute for Quantum Optics and Quantum Information, Vienna, of the Austrian Academy of Sciences.

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Does science need intersubjective confirmation?

Does science need intersubjective confirmation?

Seeing | Quantum Mechanics

Emily Adlam, PhD | 2023-04-09

Medical Development Laboratory: Team of Female and Male Scientist Using Microscope, Analyzes Petri Dish Sample. Specialists Working on Medicine, Biotechnology Research in Advanced Pharma Lab

The Nobel Prize in physics in 2022 went to scientists who, for over 40 years, have carried out a series of experiments indicating that, contrary to materialist expectations, physical entities do not have standalone existence but are, in fact, products of observation. This result is extraordinarily relevant to our understanding of the nature of reality, and so Essentia Foundation, in collaboration with the Institute for Quantum Optics and Quantum Information, Vienna, of the Austrian Academy of Sciences (home to Prof. Anton Zeilinger, one of 2022’s Nobel Laureates in physics), organized a conference discussing the implications of this result. The conference was hosted by IQOQI-Vienna’s Dr. Markus Müller and featured seven other speakers.

In this presentation, Dr. Emily Adlam discusses the problem of confirmation in orthodox interpretations of quantum mechanics.

This presentation was part of the ‘Physics of First-Person Perspective’ conference, organized at the end of 2022 by Essentia Foundation and the Institute for Quantum Optics and Quantum Information, Vienna, of the Austrian Academy of Sciences.

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Imagination as the ground of reality, with Patrick Harpur

Imagination as the ground of reality, with Patrick Harpur

Seeing | Philosophy | 2023-04-02

boy pulled the big bulb half buried in the ground against night sky with stars and space dust, digital art style, illustration painting

In this wide-ranging interview, one of our favorite scholars, Patrick Harpur, discusses the fundamental role of the imagination in human history, the human mind, and reality at large. He also discusses the daimons, those elusive, contradictory figures who inhabit minds and the world, but who appear only to those with the eyes to see. Harpur’s extensive, extraordinary, life-transforming body of work is one of the most criminally underrated in modern scholarship.

This video has human-created English subtitles, so don’t forget to click on the ‘CC’ button below the video to enable them.

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